

CHIEF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHIES.

ARISTOTELIANISM.

THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE.

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THE LOGICAL TREATISES,


THE METAPHYSICS,

THE PSYCHOLOGY, THE POLITICS.

BY

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"Il Maestro di color che sanno."

DANTE, "Inferno," iv. 131.

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PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION.

I HAVE made some additions and corrections. The kind reception accorded to previous additions encourages a hope, that this little volume may do something towards a solution of two of the greatest questions which can occupy the mind,—Is the Will free? What is virtue essentially?

I. G. S.

PREFACE

(*TO THE FIRST EDITION*).

This little book is an attempt to tabulate from the "Ethics" the opinions of Aristotle on several questions of paramount importance, which are widely discussed at the present time, and to set his opinions side by side with those of some eminent modern philosophers. Perhaps in doing this something may be done towards indicating that "Scientific basis of morality,"[1] which is desired in many quarters. I have tried to be on my watch against the danger, to which commentators are specially exposed, of importing into the mind of their author opinions which are really their own, not his.

It would be a grave injury to moral philosophy if Aristotle were left out of consideration by moralists or displaced in the studies of our Universities.

In a work which, though of small compass, has occupied so many years (so far as other duties permitted), it would not be easy to enumerate all those to whom I am under obligation. But I would men-

[1] "The establishment of rules of right conduct on a scientific basis is a pressing need."—H. SPENCER, "Data of Ethics," p. iii.

tion particularly the very sensible "Commentary on the 'Ethics'"[1] by the late accomplished Principal of the University of Edinburgh, as more really helpful to the student than some more ambitious treatises. After all, the old saying is true, "Aristotelem non nisi ex ipso Aristotele intelliges."

The Appendices A, C, G (in part), H, I, J, K are from an essay which I contributed some years ago to a Quarterly Review.

The references to the "Ethics" are to the divisions of chapters in Grant's 3rd edition, 1874.

I have endeavoured to compress what I would say.


MALVERN, *Feb.*, 1885. I. G. S.

P.S.—I have made some additions and corrections. The kind reception accorded to the previous editions encourages a hope that this little volume may do something towards a solution of two of the greatest questions which can occupy the mind,—Is the Will Free? What is Virtue essentially?

With this attempt to explain and illustrate the "Ethics" of Aristotle is incorporated a treatise on his principal other works by the Head Master of Malvern College.

MALVERN, *May* 10, 1889. I. G. S.

[1] "The Ethics of Aristotle," by Sir Alexander Grant, Bart. &c., &c.



INTRODUCTION.

It might seem superfluous, when ethical questions are discussed, to call attention to the Ethics of Aristotle, were it not, that he is in some danger of being overlooked now in England. However far behind he may be left by the progress of knowledge in many departments, he may still be worth hearing on questions of morality and conduct. In regard to these the advance made by philosophy is rather in the art than in the science, in the application of principles rather than in the principles themselves; ethical philosophy, as has been well said, being assimilative rather than progressive. There are indeed some characteristics of the Aristotelian philosophy, which bring it very near to modern thought on these subjects; while the terseness of his style is a relief to those who are accustomed to modern diffuseness.

Aristotle's method of reasoning is mainly inductive. He has been called the inventor of the syllogism;[1] he may as fairly be said to have anticipated the inductive process of Bacon. With him analysis precedes synthesis; observation furnishes the materials for generalising; his major premiss is based on the collation of particular instances. Partly, perhaps,

[1] Appendix A.

[2] Aristotle's dissection of the inconsistencies of those who are deficient in self-control (οἱ ἀκρατεῖς. "Ethics," VII.), is a good instance of the keenness of his analysis.

by recoil from the transcendental theorisings of his great rival, partly from natural temperament, Aristotle prefers the comparative certainty, solid, precise, definite, which experience alone can give. He starts from what he knows and rises from the bare fact to the potentiality of the principle, which it embodies and exemplifies. In ethics he is content to take what he finds ready to hand, a practical consent, so far as he knows, as to what is praiseworthy and what is not. He will not even say, that there is any necessity to know the reason.[1]

His data may be insufficient and, therefore, his summary imperfect and his inference faulty, but, at any rate, the method, which he proposes to himself, is the method, which modern science commends. His method has been discredited by the rigid technicalities and minutely elaborated deductions of the schoolmen; but in itself it is, essentially, to ascend from what we know to what we know not.[2]

If the horizon, which Aristotle surveyed, is contracted in comparison with that, which science surveys now, at least he is eminently cautious in his assertions. So far as he knows, he affirms or denies, and no farther. If the major premiss in any of his arguments is invalidated by the inadequacy of the induction, on which it rests, he would be the first to admit, that the conclusion is good, only so far as the premisses go. His reticence makes what he says all the more valuable. The reservation and the limitation, which continually qualify his assertion, are a safe-

[1] "Ethics," I. vii. 20. [2] "Ethics," I. iv. 6.

guard against an overweening gnosticism. A favourite phrase with him, so far as a thing "is what it is," contains an important limitation of universal applicability for judging rightly. His philosophy abounds in distinctions, not purely dialectical, not mere refinements of language, but thoroughly practical. He insists on the difference for practical purposes between the absolute and the relative, the abstract and the concrete, the objective, as it is termed now, and the subjective.[1] The very staple of his teaching is, that our knowledge is limited; that things as they are to us, not as they may be in themselves, are what we are concerned with. His is a healthy agnosticism. He writes as one feeling his way from facts to theory.

Thus his use of induction and his tentative manner of using it bring Aristotle into sympathy with European philosophy at the present day. Another point of contact, less easily apprehended but not less important, is, that his teaching implies, if it does not express, the essential unity of the material and the spiritual world. More and more science discovers the ubiquity of law; more and more religion recognises the living presence, the continuous operation of God in nature. The trenchant line of demarcation, drawn by the exaggerated subjectivity of Kant and Coleridge on the one hand, and by an exaggerated materialism on the other, disappears; and the problem

[1] Ἁπλῶς, πρός τι· ἁπλῶς, ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων· καθόλου, τὰ καθέκαστα· ἁπλῶς, πρὸς ἡμᾶς· κατ' ἀλήθειαν, ἑκάστῳ. "Form" and "matter" in Aristotle do not coincide with "subject" and "object" in modern philosophy.

is now, how to reconcile the apparently heterogeneous manifestations of one and the same power. Aristotle may not contribute much to the solution, but at least he reminds,—that the problem must be faced and solved.

It has been objected, that Aristotle's opinions on the relation of intellectual to moral progress, on the comparative excellence of thought and action, on the true functions of the State are superseded by the doctrine of averages, by the theories of social science, or because the British empire is a larger and more complicated organisation than Athens or Sparta. But to reason thus is surely to forget, that the averages of what is called "sociology" are made up of individuals,[1] and that the political life of a tiny community is the life of a larger community in miniature, Florence or Athens being a microcosm in itself. Aristotle[2] can never be superseded. His calm, clear accents make themselves heard across centuries of controversy.[3]

[1] "The properties of its members determine the properties of the mass."—H. SPENCER, "Study of Sociology," p. 52.

[2] Appendix B.

[3] For an historic sketch of the influence of the Aristotelian philosophy, see GRANT, "Ethics of Aristotle," I. "Aristotle was, and still is, the sovereign lord of the understanding, the faculty judging by the senses. He was a conceptualist, and never could raise himself into that higher state, which is natural to Plato, and has been so to others, in which the understanding is distinctly contemplated, and, as it were, looked down upon from the throne of actual ideas or living, inborn, essential truths. Yet what a mind was Aristotle's—only not the greatest, that ever animated the human form—the parent of science properly so called, the master of criticism, the founder and editor of logic. But he confounded science with philosophy, which is an error."—S. T. COLERIDGE, "Table Talk," p. 96.

THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE.

CHAPTER I.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ETHICS.

The Intellect. — In analysing the attributes of humanity, Aristotle distinguishes the intellect from the emotions as separable in conception even if not separable actually. This is, indeed, in one aspect, the very foundation of his ethical philosophy. He sees clearly, by observing what takes place in himself and others, that, whenever brought into contact with things or persons other than himself, man experiences a two-fold sensation; intellectually he is aware of their existence, and emotionally he is attracted to them or repelled. In other words, he has the faculty of discriminating between himself and all that is extraneous to him and the faculty of liking or disliking whatever is presented to him.

Aristotle recognises, of course, that there are other processes and operations in man, which are more mechanical, for instance the assimilation and digestion of food. But these vegetative faculties, though intimately connected with the higher faculties, and subsidiary to their being in good order, he

regards as outside the question, what is the proper excellence of man?[1] They are busiest, he says, in sleep,[2] at the very time, when the higher functions are in abeyance.

If this vegetative element in the nature of man is taken into account, the division, which Aristotle makes, is threefold. There is the reason; there are the affections unreasoning indeed, but receptive of the influence, which reason exercises; there are these altogether unreasoning and merely mechanical faculties (p. 38). But practically the reason and the affections are all, that we are concerned with now.

With Aristotle the intellect is what especially constitutes man; because with him the intellect is normally the dominant faculty. He assumes, without proof, this superiority of the intellect.[3] By the intellect the conduct is to be checked, guided, controlled. It is the arbiter of truth and falsity; it stands (p. 28) for will and conscience.[4] It is the recipient of the impressions produced by phenomena through the senses (for Aristotle does not favour the doctrine of innate intuitions), and thence it evolves the varying

[1] "Ethics," I. xiii. 6., 12.

[2] Dreams, like drunkenness, seem to reveal the natural propensities rather than the acquired.

[3] Cf. FERRIER, "Lectures on Greek Philosophy," I. p. 382.

[4] The kind of education encouraged by the Edgeworths in these islands and by Madame de Genlis in France is a practical illustration of the results to be expected from making the intellect the mainspring of action, vanity in the one case, self-respect in the other, being the motive, rather than simple obedience.

combinations, into which these impressions are sorted and grouped, the almost endless complications of thought, acting and reacting one on another. In those later books of the Ethics, where his master-hand may be traced in the outlines,[1] even if a pupil has filled in the details, he classifies the functions of the intellect according to the materials, which it handles, science strictly so called dealing with things certain, art, in his sense of the word, dealing with whatever is problematic.[2]

It has been well said,[3] "objects of abstract thought," according to Aristotle, "come from within, not from without," only so far, as "they are presented by the imagination to the reason."[4] With him, "sensation and ideation [*sic*] are analogous"; "perception is homogeneous with highest thought": "elementary sensations pass into complex reasonings by imperceptible gradations." If it grows more and more evident, as physical science penetrates more and more deeply into the secrets of the life physical, that causality reigns in mental phenomena, and if

[1] GRANT, "Ethics," I. 63; II. 95.

[2] Ἐπιστήμη, τέχνη. Cf. τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν, τὸ λογιστικὸν, in "Ethics," VI. i.

[3] WESTMINSTER REVIEW, New Series, LX. 351–505.

[4] Even mathematical science bears witness to this theory. No study is more purely abstract, and yet it would not be easy to prove, that the primary principles of notation are really from any other source than the senses. The idea of numbers is but the perception through the senses of two or more objects, which are felt to be distinct. Aristotle would not accept the theory of Schopenhauer and others, that phenomena are subjective.

experimental psychology can refute loose assertions of mind being purely immaterial, by detecting molecular action in mental operations, still the vital question of man's free agency and responsibility remains untouched by these discoveries, so long as they do not disprove his power to choose, what to accept, what to reject of the thoughts and wishes presented to him by a mechanical and material process. If a man is a machine, at any rate he is himself the driver of it.

The Emotions.—But the intellect, Aristotle allows, cannot by itself impel to action; it is, by itself, only a passive, though a critical, looker on.[1] The affections supply the impulse, the motive force, the fire, which sets the machinery going. Rightly or wrongly, wisely or foolishly, for good or for evil, they prompt, incite, urge, importune. They are the tendrils, by which the creeping plant feels its way among the objects, which it encounters; they are the tentacles, which the living creature thrusts out to grasp or to reject, whatever comes in its way. Just as all the senses may be resolved into touch and as all knowledge resolves itself ultimately into the apprehension of identity or non-identity, so all the multitudinous emotions, which contend for mastery in man, love, hate, hope, fear, joy, sorrow, and the rest, are only modifications of one and the same principle at work, an instinctive movement towards, or an instinctive shrinking from something. How to know, when to approach, when to draw back, they need, according to Aristotle, the guidance of the intellect. It is, he

[1] "Ethics," VI. ii. 5. Διάνοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ.

says, from the co-operation of these emotional forces with the intellect, or rather from their being duly directed by it, that all moral excellence issues.[1] Whatever may be the diversities of temperament, in the Peripatetic philosophy the intellect rules, the passions obey.

Dualism. — The stress, which Aristotle lays on the distinction between intelligence and emotion exposes him to the charge of "dualism"; as if he were losing sight of the individuality of each person. The same fault has been found with Bishop Butler. In both philosophers it is only a way of speaking. For Aristotle teaches, that thought and affection move on parallel lines; that affirmation and negation correspond to desire and aversion; that truth and error are analogous to right conduct and wrong.[2] The distinction is one, which carefully analysed, leads back to a truth, which lies at the very foundation of psychology. It has been well said,

[1] "Ethics," VI. xiii. There may be naturally a preponderance of either element. Women, for example, are, as a rule, less swayed by abstract considerations. With men, as a rule, a dry statement of facts is more convincing than appeals to the imagination. Imagination and fancy are the syntheses of intellect and emotion. When the intellectual element prevails, we call it fancy; when there is more of feeling and less of ingenuity, we call it imagination. The distinction is similar between humour and wit.

[2] "Ethics," VI. i. and ii. To express the concurrence of the reason and the affections he speaks of "emotions of a reasonable kind" and "reasoning of an emotional kind" indifferently. Sympathy is the substructure of knowledge "Our naked feelings make haste to clothe themselves in propositions, which lie at hand among our store of opinions."— G. ELIOT, "Romola," ch. lxiii.

that "disjunction is the primordial form of all reasoning."[1] The starting-point of consciousness is that perception of the difference between self and non-self, from which are evolved all the manifold and complex harmonies of thought and desire.

The first dawn of a distinct consciousness is to be aware, that surrounding objects are a something external to self;[2] then experience, observing likeness or unlikeness everywhere,[3] teaches, how to marshal them aright by the law of association or identity in their several ranks and companies, and how to conjecture, tentatively and hypothetically, by the same law, that so far as things are identical, so far their concomitants will be found to be the same. The essential unity of the person underlies at every stage the operations of the intellect and the parallel process of attraction or repulsion, which is for ever going on in the emotions. The reason and the emotions are co-operants, not independent factors, in producing conduct. Reason propounds the practical problem; emotion propels to or from the thing proposed. All reasoning is the outgrowth of the rudimentary sensation, "This is myself; this is not." All emotion is the outgrowth of the rudimentary sensation, "This I like; this I dislike." No one who observes, how plainly Aristotle enforces personal responsibility for conduct will say, that he inculcates "the old, dreary dualism."[4]

[1] WESTMINSTER REVIEW, LX. 357.

[2] Cf. TENNYSON, "In Memoriam," xl.

[3] Likeness is partial identity in appearance.

[4] "Our passions do not live apart in locked chambers, but, dressed in their small wardrobe of notions, bring their provisions to a common table and mess together, feeding out of the

The conception of the intellectual and emotional functions apart from one another no more involves forgetfulness of the unity of the individual, than to speak or think of the senses or of the limbs separately. To say, that a man is a microcosm, or even that he contains many microcosms, does not mean, that he is not one person. If physical science speaks of "colourless corpuscles in the blood, little masses of protoplasm—each enveloping a central nucleus, like an amœba,"[1] similarly psychology may regard the individual as having senses, intellect, affections, all subject to one conscious will, absorbing them into itself, and identifying itself with them.

Terminology.—In delineating the combined operations of intellect and passion Aristotle may seem at times to contradict himself, and the nomenclature, which he employs, may not be always strictly consistent. But the general drift is clear for practical purposes.

Metaphysically he speaks of a capability, formless and motionless, till it becomes an actual force producing an actual result, and of a vague potentiality, whence are to be educed order and symmetry.[2] Ethically he leads us, step by step, from wishing to deliberating, and thence to the final, irrevocable choice;[3] or starting afresh from this act of choosing,

common store according to their appetite."—GEORGE ELIOT, "Middlemarch," Bk. ii. pp. 298-9.

[1] HARVEY GOODWIN, "Science and Faith," p. 19.

[2] *Δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, ἔργον.*

[3] *Βούλησις, βούλευσις, προαίρεσις.* Usually with Aristotle, *προαίρεσις* is about the end immediately in view, *βούλευσις*

(for, though final on each occasion, it renews itself continually, as fresh occasions arise), he tells us, that the practical effort of choosing forms by degrees a habit, the outgrowth of which is at last an acquired disposition;[1] or, by a slight variation of his phraseology, he speaks of a capacity, as yet dormant for good or for evil, developing itself, if the desires are rightly disciplined by the intellect, into a permanent condition of well-doing and well-being.[2] But the discrepancies are more apparent than real. For this permanent and persistent excellence, the aim and goal of all, which precedes it, is itself by its very nature reproductive of the same energies, from which it has its being. The virtuous conduct is at once the antecedent and the consequent of the virtuous character. Nor is this to argue in a circle. For the intention,[3] which alone stamps actions good or evil, is latent and implicit, or, at most, only operative in part, until the opportunity expresses and consummates it in action, even as in the laboratory of the chemist

about the way to it. In one place ("Ethics," III. iii.) *βούλευσις* is described as occupied about what is done through our own agency and is not invariable, while *προαίρεσις* occupies itself about the things, which lead to the end. Here the end appears to be, what Aristotle regards as the ultimate object of all human endeavour, happiness: consequently here the consultation and decision are, whether or not a particular course of action conduces to this end.

[1] *Ἕθος, ἦθος.*

[2] *Δύναμις, ἕξις, ἀρετή.* The second of these terms, sometimes rendered "habit," *e.g.*, by Professor FERRIER ("Lectures on Greek Philosophy," I. 392), is, rather, the result of habit.

[3] *Προαίρεσις.*

the hypothesis remains not unverified only, but, as it were, a mere embryo of the form, which it shall assume, till it is plunged into the crucible of experiment. The vague, almost unconscious craving is shaped and matured, for better or for worse, by conflict with actual realities.[1]

Virtue a Science?—Can moral excellence be learned by the cultivation of the intellect? Is to know what is right the same thing as to practise it? Is knowledge synonymous with goodness? To questions such as these Aristotle gives only a qualified assent. He places, indeed, the purely intellectual life,[2] undisturbed in the serenity of its contemplation by the strife and tumult of passions, far above the grandest triumphs of moral excellence; and even in the winning of those moral triumphs, which must be won, before that higher life can be enjoyed, it is to the intellect, as we have seen already, that he assigns the palm. But he recognises truly, that there is something in human nature, which chafes and rebels against the reason,[3] and that there is an infirmity, whether from temperament or from habit, which can paralyse the will, even when a man sees clearly enough, what he ought to do. Thus he is careful to distinguish those, in whom reason, whether victorious in the end or not, contends for mastery with the passions, from those, on the one hand, who are un-

[1] Cf. "When lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin."—St. James i. 15.

[2] Θεωρία.

[3] "Ethics," I. xiii. 15. Cf. Romans vii. 19–24.

swerving in their allegiance to virtue, the passions having been reduced to obedience, and from those, on the other hand, who have fallen so low as to struggle no more. These who cannot govern themselves, in whom reason is too feeble to assert her authority, are wise, he says, only so far as knowing goes, not wise practically; or rather, their wisdom is a mere cleverness, which may be as powerful for evil as for good[1] (pp. 14, 37, 38).

What is sometimes translated "moral thought"[2] occupies a different place in the philosophies of Aristotle and Plato, the former making intellectual rectitude, though an indispensable condition of moral excellence, not identical with it. This practical insight, he tells us, can only dictate, what steps are to be taken in order to arrive at the end; but to decide the previous question, what is the end to be arrived at, something else is requisite, the moral excellence, which comes, when the affections are trained habitually to be obedient to reason.[3]

[1] "Ethics," VII. x. 2. Cf. St. Luke xii. 48.

[2] "Thought" is inadequate for *φρόνησις*; especially as "thought" resides in the other categories (*νοῦς*, *σοφία*, *τέχνη*, *ἐπιστήμη*) mentioned in juxtaposition with *φρόνησις* ("Ethics," VI. iii.–vii.). The "wisdom" which occurs frequently in the English version of the Bible is nearer to *φρόνησις*.

[3] "Ethics," VI. xiii.

CHAPTER II.

FREEWILL.

Aristotle assumes it.—On the question, which lies at the root of all ethical philosophy and of all practical distinctions between right and wrong in morals, Aristotle implies more, than he asserts explicitly. The question whether or not man is a free agent, or how far and under what limitations man is free, was not really before him. Some seven centuries later the civilised world in Europe discussed eagerly man's freewill in relation to God's omnipotence. In more modern times man's freewill is discussed in relation to a materialistic necessity. It is the same problem stated differently. In both cases it is by a full and free recognition of each phase of the fact, not by attempting to pare them down to the exigencies of a finite understanding, that the practical truth is attained.[1] It was enough for Aristotle to take the freedom of the will for granted;[2] and had he entered the arena at all in this quarrel it would have been for

[1] Thus St. Paul never shrinks from expressing, on the one hand, the absolute foreknowledge of God and, on the other, the absolute responsibility of man in their strongest terms, without trying to reconcile fate and freewill in their apparently internecine conflict.

[2] "Ethics," III. i. Cf. GRANT, "Ethics," I. 285.

him a question of metaphysics rather than of ethics Writing on ethics he was content to take things as he found them; and probably his reply to a sceptic about freewill would have been, like Dr. Johnson's retort to an idealist questioning the existence of a stone, that the sceptic should try for himself. Free-will is a postulate, a practical assumption, which he starts with. It is implied in the appeal, which he makes constantly to praise and blame to determine the goodness or badness of an action, for, though praise or blame of a certain kind may be awarded to a piece of machinery, it is the intention of the agent, which, with him, determines the quality of the action, and consequently, with him, it is to the intention that praise or blame is due.[1] It is implied in the distinction which (pp. 7, 14) he insists upon emphatically between right-wishing and right-willing, and between right-knowing and right-doing, and in his graphic portraiture of those, who can admire what is best and yet practise what is worst, because their baser propensities are not firmly repressed by their reason. It is implied in what he says of the impossibility in ethics of doing more, than trace

[1] Thus Aristotle distinguishes doing just things from being just, the action considered by itself and estimated only by external circumstances from the intelligent and deliberate intention, the habitual moral condition of the agent,—*e.g.*; "Ethics," II. iv. 5; V. vii. viii. ix.; VI. xii. 7. Cf. 1 Cor. xiii. 3. Similarly the Epistle to the Romans contrasts a formal observance of law with a willing surrender of self to God. Cf. pp. 12, 45, 59, 60, 64. *See* Addenda.

[2] "Ethics," II. ii. 3, 4.

an outline without attempting to fill in the particulars. It pervades the ethics from beginning to end. If he speaks, in passages, of nature, necessity,[1] chance as the causes at work, elsewhere he adds reason and all, that comes from man.

Man's capability for Good or Evil.—Aristotle regards human nature as an undetermined capability for virtue or vice, until it receives a bias in the one direction or the other, by training from without and by the higher element asserting its supremacy within.[2] This capability he sees everywhere in nature, in things inanimate as in man, but he marks the difference. The capability of heat, for example, he tells us, speaking not as a physicist but as a metaphysician, must result, if developed into actuality, in heat by an inherent and invariable law. But human nature is to him, as the raw material, which may be worked up into what is beautiful or what is hideous, as the quarry, from which is to be chiselled an Apollo or a Satyr.[3] So far as what seems praiseworthy in a man is merely a gift of nature, an inherited aptitude, or so far as it is merely the capricious play of the emotions or the ineffective and inoperative theorising of the intellect, it is not, for him, virtue, but only, when matured into a normal and habitual principle of conduct, intelligently adopted, and after due deliberation.[4] The passions are to him as neutral in

[1] Aristotle generally regards necessity from a subjective standpoint, and uses the word as equivalent to "certainty."

[2] Cf. AUGUSTINE, "De Civitate Dei," XII. v., "Pro usu motuque rerum in melius deteriusve mutantur."

[3] Appendix C.

[4] "Ethics," II. v.

tint as the appetites, until they are coloured for good or evil by the discipline of life. Even in the intellect, which he exalts so highly, all that nature gives is a cleverness, which, he says, may degenerate into cunning, if it is not duly cultured into wisdom, and may thus enhance the mischief done, as a huge mass falls with a heavier crash.[1] At every step of the process, as desire ripens into deed, from the fantasy to the wish, from the wish to the volition, he sees a growing capacity for virtue or vice, accomplishing itself in the actual. His successors in the Peripatetic school taught less equivocally than their teacher, that this energising actuality, which he had been so careful to separate in conception from mere capability, involves self-determination in the agent.[2] But the distinction itself, in his way of enforcing it, implies, that there is something in man as well as in his environment, which shapes the formation of his character;[3] that, come what may, he is master of himself; that the inalienable freedom of his will shows itself in grappling with temptations; that evil, after all, is for eventual good, as eliciting and developing the latent strength in man to "overcome evil with good."

Habit.—Aristotle lays great stress on habituation as the most important factor in the formation of character. He regards moral excellence as far more

[1] "Ethics," VI. xiii. Cf. "Vis consilî expers Mole ruit suâ." HORACE.

[2] Cf. GRANT, "Ethics," I. 37.

[3] "A man's action is the joint result of circumstances and character."—GREEN, "Prolegomena to Ethics," p. 109.

dependent on habit than on nature or even on the instruction imparted by others.[1] He takes the law of habit for granted, as a law of human nature so plainly self-evident as to require no proof, no argument.[2] As all natural endowments must be brought to perfection by constant practice, as the eye of the sculptor, the ear of the musician must be trained by constant exercise, so must they, who would be virtuous, practise virtue continually. Whether the action shall be done well or badly, and whether the general conduct shall be regulated rightly or amiss (and it is the adverb, not the verb, which always characterises), turns most of all on daily, hourly habituation. On the surface habit wears the appearance of being merely mechanical. It looks like the routine of clockwork, which once set going persists methodically in its monotonous beats and pauses. It may even seem to a hasty glance to preclude free-will. But a closer inspection shows, that, so far as concerns human conduct, this invariability is more apparent than real, and that there is a disturbing force, which can derange the nicely-calculated movements. With nearly the same conditions existing very frequently within and without, there would be less variability than there is, but for the will. There are inconsistencies and irregularities,[3] not only in persons closely similar in disposition and in circum-

[1] Cf. "Fortes creantur fortibus et bonis; doctrina sed vim promovet insitam, Rectique cultus pectora roborat." HORACE.

[2] Cf. GRANT, "Ethics," I. 240.

[3] Cf. H. SPENCER, "Study of Sociology," p. 367.

stances, but in one and the same person, which defy the anticipations founded on law and precedent, and which can only be accounted for by something in man stronger even than the almost irresistible force of habit. There would, doubtless, be even less of apparent uniformity of conduct than there is, were it not, that too many follow one another, like sheep, instead of realising their personal freedom and personal responsibility. Will, with all its arbitrary changefulness, may indeed be subject to laws as unvarying as those, which govern a chess-board. But, so long as these laws lie beyond his cognisance, man is practically free.

Aristotle saw all this clearly. In the studio of the artist, he tells us, the work is distinct from the workman; in the formation of character the workman is himself the work.[1] Even in the domain of art the artist is helped or hindered in his future endeavours by what he has done already.[2] But in that, which is the work of life, the thing done is a more integral part of the man, more inseparable from him. He is making or marring himself. He is imperceptibly weaving a closely-fitting garment for his limbs, which must embarrass or expedite their efforts. The chains, which he forges for himself, are, it is well said, too slight to be felt, till they are almost too strong to be broken. Each vicious action is a link, which

[1] "Ethics," II. iv.

[2] Contrast AUGUSTINE, "De Civitate Dei," XI. xxi., on the divine skill not being improvable by its operations, because already perfect.

makes the lengthening chain more cumbrous, more inextricable. Every moral disposition, good or evil, gains strength by continuance,[1] and by every consent to evil the quickness of conscience is deadened, the elasticity of the will is weakened. All this restricting influence of habit, leaving a man at every step more predisposed either to good or to evil, Aristotle admits freely. He sees, that a man's actions are, indeed, his offspring, and are, in turn, progenitors of a long line of children's children,[2] reacting on the man himself. He grants, that each step in the wrong direction makes it increasingly difficult to retrace the steps; just as he grants, that some are by nature better equipped than others[3] for going right. But the force of habit is with Aristotle no excuse for vice. The man is responsible for his habits, for he is free to choose, before he commits himself to action; he must decide for himself, whether this or that course, presented to him by the imagination,[4] is really to be preferred. Habit, with Aristotle, far from being an excuse for vice, intensifies the responsibility of every action, of every intention. The incapacity for discerning and for doing what is right,[5] the vitiated taste, the perverted judgment, the enfeebled will, Aristotle traces back to the culpable remissness, which allowed the vicious habit to become so strong.[6]

[1] Cf. "Crescit indulgens sibi dirus hydrops."—HORACE. The power of habit is analagous to the law of association, which governs the intellect. [2] Cf. St. Matt. xi. 19. [3] Cf. St. Matt. xxv. 15. [4] "Ethics," III. v. 17–21. [5] Cf. St. Matt. vi. 23.

[6] In saying, that the will makes the habit and the habit makes

The deliberate Choice.—The keystone of the arch in the ethical system of Aristotle is the determination made at the moment, when deliberation is over and action must begin.[1] Till then the affections are importuning, the reason is advising; then the final plunge is taken, the man resolves, decides, acts. If the action is to be pronounced virtuous, in the fullest sense, the agent must act knowingly, from a deliberate preference for what is right for its own sake, from an habitual conviction.[2] All this implies freewill.[3] The apparent discrepancy between the Eudemian explanation of the word expressive of this decisive choice and the explanation of it in the earlier books is scarcely more than verbal.[4] When Eudemus says, that it concerns itself about the end in view as well as about the means, he speaks of the immediate end, as wealth, enjoyment, renown. When Aristotle limits the word to the choice of means only, he merely excludes that, which he considers, by universal consent, the object of all human endeavours, the good thing,

the will, Aristotle is not really arguing in a circle. The will initiates, the habit intensifies. There is, as always, action with reaction. "Etiam quod vitium consuetudine nimiove progressu roboratum velut naturaliter inolevit, a voluntate sumsit exordium."—AUGUSTINE, "De Civitate Dei," XII. iii.

[1] "Ethics," III. ii. 19. [2] "Ethics," II. iv. 3.

[3] "Ethics," III. ii. 5. Elsewhere (X. v. 4) Aristotle speaks of one pleasure thrusting out another. The former passage shows that one inducement does not prevail over another mechanically and by sheer weight, without the will intervening.

[4] In "Ethics," VII. x. 3, the word προαίρεσις is used inexactly. Here it must, by the context, mean, as Grant has remarked, a "general intention"; just as one acting wrongly may be said "to mean well."

which every one must desire, the happiness, which all seek, however widely they may disagree as to the way of seeking, and which therefore lies for him outside the pale of deliberation and decision.[1] Throughout the treatise man is regarded as responsible (if not always altogether, yet, at the least, so far as nature and circumstances have not prejudiced his choice)[2] for choosing the true happiness, as well as for choosing, on each several occasion, the true way to attain it.

What has been called "the practical syllogism" illustrates the independency of the will, however much the will may be swayed by the logic of the intellect and by the promptings of the affections. No one would contend, that the syllogism is worked out consciously in all its minuteness, whenever a man has to decide; for this goes on continuously. The process may be, and usually is, so rapid as to be instantaneous. Happiness, in whatever sense understood, is with Aristotle, the subject of the major premiss; the conclusion would follow inevitably, if men were always obedient to the dictates of reason.[3] But the liberty of choice intervenes at every step. The man decides for himself, what shall be the object, which he will propose to himself for attainment, and,

[1] Cf. note 3 on pp. 7, 8.

[2] Cf. "How oft the sight of means to do ill deeds
Makes ill deeds done."
SHAKSPEARE, "King John," IV. 2.

[3] Happiness is to be preferred to other considerations; this conduct is happiness; therefore this conduct is to be preferred.

whether the particular action is conducive to that end or not; and, even when he has assented to the propositions before him, he may still demur to carry out his reasonings to their legitimate conclusion.[1] For example, he may place duty or pleasure as the end in view; he may select this or that course of action as leading to this end; and, when all this is done, he may refuse to ratify his own verdict, choosing to be inconsistent with himself. Esau[2] might have put aside the conception of pleasure presented to his imagination by the pottage, which he longed for, if he had willed to set before himself duty as the thing to be aimed at; or, while proposing pleasure as his end, he might have accepted the birthright, not the pottage, as the way to it; or, at the last moment he might have shaken himself free of the propositions, which he had assented to intellectually. A man drawn to a ginshop or a gaming-table by his craving for drink or for gambling, drawn to his home by the thought of wife and children, is free, till he has passed the doorstep, to choose, into which of the scales he will throw his own weight, the preference of his will. If the action of his will, it has been said, were governed by purely physical causes, the upshot of the conflict of these contradictory syllogisms within him would be, that he would make his way neither to the ginshop nor to his home but to a spot between the two. A

[1] *E.g.*, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor. —HORACE.

[2] Cf. GREEN, "Prolegomena to Ethics," p. 99.

physical combination of opposing forces would not result in the utter destruction of the weaker of the two.[1]

Aristotle's teaching about courage corroborates what has been said, that this deliberate intention is everything with him for praise or for blame. He will not allow, that insensibility to danger, whether from natural temperament or from experience (or, it might be added, from the rashness of ignorance) is courage in the true sense of the word.[2] A soldier, he says, may seem brave, when he is only callous to the sense of danger. The truly brave are those, who see and appreciate the peril, and yet overcome their fear.[3] The natural emotion of fear, like other emotions, is in itself neither right nor wrong. Courage and cowardice consist in the choice made between an inglorious self-preservation and an honourable exposure of self to danger. Perhaps Aristotle errs in saying,[4] that to abstain from things pleasant is easier than to endure pain. Probably much depends on the idiosyncrasy of the person. But in principle he is right. In enduring pain as in refraining from pleasure it is the will (Aristotle would say, the higher reason) which ratifies or cancels the logic of the understanding and the persuasive solicitations of the emotional elements in our being.

Actions involuntary wholly or in part.—Aristotle

[1] Appendix D.

[2] "Ethics," III. vi 8.

[3] Cf. "The brave man is not he, who feels no fear,
For that were stupid and irrational."

[4] "Ethics," III. ix. 2, ἐγκρατὴς, καρτερικός. Cf. p. 42.

enters with characteristic exactitude on the subtle inquiry,[1] more properly belonging to casuistry, but intimately connected with the great question of free-will, how far any one can truly be said to act voluntarily, if he is acting under protest, reluctantly and with an assent, which is only half-hearted at most. He brings, as usual, a judicial acuteness to bear on these apparently dubious cases. Where physical constraint is exercised, there, he says, is no free agency; if the fingers are compelled by physical pressure to sign a document, neither the act nor the agent is free. Where intimidation is used, or a bribe, or cajolery, there, whatever deduction may be made for the influence at work, the act and the agent are free. This distinction he extends to those cases, where the pressure of the inducement is from within, in the shape of pleasure, or of profit, or of reputation, or of what is right for its own sake. These inducements, he says, however potent and attractive, cannot compel. If they could, no action would be free.[2] Besides, he argues, the doer has pleasure in what he is doing, while, on the contrary, in actions really compulsory, there is a preponderance of pain. He rends asunder the sophistry, which would excuse crimes committed under the influence of lust or anger or any other evil passion, on the plea, that the criminal could not help it, replying, that, be the inducement ever so great, the

[1] "Ethics," III. i.

[2] "Ethics," III. i. He instances the captain of a ship throwing overboard the cargo in a storm.

real origination of the act is in the man's consent to it.[1] It is a man's own fault, due allowance being made, as always, for the bias of natural dispositions and of circumstances, that he is so easily caught by the bait[2] dangled before him. If he knows, what he is about, or if he wilfully refuses to know, or if his inability to know is due to the demoralising influence of vicious habits, the offender is responsible. The drunkard may be as unconscious as a man walking in his sleep, but he has brought himself by his own doing into this unconsciousness; and therefore a crime committed in this state of unconsciousness, being the consequence of a responsible act, is itself indirectly the act of a responsible being.[3] The tests, with Aristotle, of voluntariness and responsibility are very practical. Is the actor aware, what he is doing? Is he unconstrained by physical force? In

[1] "Ethics," III. i. 6, 12; III. v. 6, 21, 22.

[2] "Ethics," III. i. 11. *Εὐθήρατος.*

[3] He, who errs because of ignorance involuntarily, and for which he is not responsible (*δι' ἄγνοιαν*), knows right from wrong (*τὸ καθόλου*), but mistakes the circumstances (*τὰ καθέκαστα*); he acts against his intention (*ἄκων*) or, at least, without intention (*οὐκ ἑκών*). He who errs in inexcusable ignorance (*ἀγνοῶν*) knows not, at least for the time, right from wrong, the blindness being in his intention ("Ethics," III. i.). In the New Testament *κατ' ἀγνόιαν* is used of culpable ignorance in Acts iii. 17. The thoroughly depraved, according to Aristotle, lose the faculty of discerning good from evil ("Ethics," III. i. 14. Cf. St. Matt. vi. 23). The graduated scale of responsibility in the "Ethics" (V. viii. 3) resembles roughly the distinctions in English law relating to murder.

other words, does the act trace back its real origin to something within the man or without?[1]

It had been argued,[2] that none are willingly wicked, none happy against their will. Aristotle admits, that all wish to be happy, and that, consequently, in a normal state none can wish to be wicked. But he insists on the fact, that, while wishing for happiness, it is possible to choose the path, which leads away from it; and that, without deliberately wishing to be wicked, any one may become so by consenting to what is wrong. This inconsistency, this irresolution, by which, in the collision of opposing principles within a man the worse prevails, Aristotle anatomises in his description of those, who cannot restrain their propensities. The man, who yields to his lower propensities,[3] yields with a sigh, but he yields. The man, who overcomes them,[4] overcomes not without a pang. In both the regret is mastered by a something, which converts it into a sense of satisfaction in the choice, and which indicates, that the action is not the mere outcome of material forces within the man, but springs from himself.

Freewill and Law.—Freewill, as regarded by

[1] "Ethics," III. i. *v.s.*

[2] "Οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἀκὼν μάκαρ" is true in a sense. It is scarcely conceivable of any human being, that he wishes to be wicked for the sake of being wicked, but only for some ulterior good to himself, apparently resulting from the wickedness. It is inconceivable, that any human being can be happy against his will, for that would be misery. Yet happiness to self may come unsought and without being aimed at.

[3] Ἀκρατής. [4] Ἐγκρατής.

Aristotle, is not incompatible with law; for whether exercised rightly or wrongly, it obeys the laws, which pervade immaterial existence. As a miracle cannot be truly said to violate the laws of the universe, merely because man can neither explain nor control the laws, by which it works; so the human will cannot be said to violate law, merely because, when it overrules the forces of intellect and of affection, man cannot define, cannot pon derate the conditions, which determine it. In both cases a living force displays itself in its effects, not in the secret of its being. In both cases that force may be in accord with law, though the law transcends man's power to decipher it.

It may be true, ideally and theoretically, that a science might be constructed from the study of social developments, which would enable the student to calculate beforehand, how the will would act in certain contingencies. But the diversities of character and of external circumstances are too intricate to encourage the hope, that such aspirations can ever be realised in this life. The requisite data are unattainable.[1] The fullest assertion of freewill does not really clash with the unvarying sequence of cause and effect,[2] though that sequence may baffle all attempts to trace it. Mutable and capricious as may seem the operations of the will, they are closely intertwined with

[1] Cf. H. SPENCER, "The Study of Sociology," p. 55.
[2] Cf. GREEN, "Prolegomena," &c., p. 113.

those material elements of our nature, which subject themselves to the analysis of the physicist.[1] For all practical purposes, Aristotle gives his voice, in no faltering tones, for man's freedom of action, for man's responsibility. A philosophy which has learned, since his day, that sorrow for sin is no longer barren remorse[2] but the first step to amendment, that man is not left alone to struggle with his lower self, that new strength is given him for the future, and that even the guilty past can be effaced, as though it had never been, may look back thankfully on what Aristotle did in his day and according to his opportunities in asserting, that man is free.

[1] Cf. "Self is not something apart from feelings, desires, and thoughts. The Ego identifies itself with some desire."—GREEN, "Prolegomena," &c., pp. 104, 106.

[2] *Μεταμέλεια*. *Μετανοία* is not in the "Ethics."

CHAPTER III.

CONSCIENCE.

Conscience and Consciousness.—What has been said of Freewill in the "Ethics" is true of Conscience. Freewill, we have seen, is assumed as a postulate, if not as an axiom, the starting-point of the investigation, a truth underlying the argument from first to last; and, if there cannot be found a precise equivalent for the term, expressions occur, which come very near to it.[1] Similarly conscience is implied, if not expressed in formula. There is a twofold meaning in the word. It includes not only the knowledge of right and wrong, but the application of this knowledge to self, as a rule by which self is to be measured; it includes introspection or consciousness, as well as what is vaguely termed the "moral sense." In both senses conscience is implied by Aristotle. For the whole drift of his treatise takes for granted, that there is a solid distinction, whatever may be his principle of distinguishing, between right conduct and wrong; and the reflex or introspective consciousness[2] is implied, for instance,

[1] *E.g.*, ἑκὼν, ἀκουσίος.

[2] Consciousness is implied in Aristotle's idea of perfect energy.—GRANT, "Ethics," I. pp. 244, 245. Cf. AUGUSTINE, "De Civitate Dei," XI. xxvii.

in the distinction on which he insists, between right knowledge and right practice, as well as in the self-reproaches and self-justification of those, who fail or who succeed in their efforts to control themselves.[1] There is not indeed the unhesitating and unequivocal enunciation of self-knowledge, self-acquittal, self-condemnation, which is the inheritance of Christian ethics.[2] The word, which the New Testament has made familiar for this moral introspection, is not in Aristotle.[3] As we have seen, he makes the reason the judge, presiding over this court ever in session within the man, rather than the advocate, laying his case before the will, whose verdict is final.[4] Above all, apart from any deficiencies in the character of the morality, which it inculcates, the great defect in the Aristotelian conception of conscience is the want of authority. Conscience, with Aristotle, is not the voice of God. So long as conscience is supported by no sanction higher, than man himself can give, so long as conscience can appeal only to the general consent of mankind, to the intelligent approval of those, who are esteemed above their fellows, to the legislative

[1] *E.g.*, "Ethics," IX. iv. 5, 10.

[2] Cf. "Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control."
TENNYSON.
Cf. Bishop Butler's Sermons.
Cf. "In unpretending holiness of soul
Can still suspect and still revere himself."
WORDSWORTH.

[3] Συνείδησις.

[4] *E.g.*, "Ethics," IX. iv. 4. Cf. FERRIER, "Lectures on Greek Philosophy," I. p. 382. (See Appendix E.)

enactments of the State, to considerations, however obvious, of expediency, conscience cannot dictate, can only expostulate and remonstrate, often, like Cassandra, in vain. Without a sanction more permanent, more comprehensive, more unquestionably obligatory than human enforcements, singly or collectively, can supply, conscience cannot claim obedience as a due, which must be rendered, come what may.[1]

The Use of Δεῖ.—Some have argued from the word,[2] which is the Greek equivalent for obligation, and which occurs frequently in the "Ethics," as if it implied a tacit recognition of conscience. But a careful collation of the passages in question disproves this, and shows, that the word is used invariably in a secondary or subsidiary sense, merely as implying, that something is indispensable for the end in view, whatever the end may be. For example, any one, who would be a good recipient of ethical instruction, must previously be trained in good habits.[3] The politician must be a psychologist.[4] We must not even wish for what is wrong, if we would be virtuous.[5] Even in passages, where at first sight the word seems, as if it meant a rule or principle acknowledged by conscience, a closer inspection shows, as before, that the word

[1] *E.g.*, "Ethics," IV. vii. viii. ix., where, about boasting, jesting, &c., the standard of propriety is merely conventional.

[2] Δεῖ, with Aristotle, means a want to be supplied rather than a debt to be discharged.

[3] "Ethics," I. iv. 6; II. iii. 2.

[4] "Ethics," I. xiii. 7.

[5] "Ethics," V. i. 9.

refers to some particular purpose. The really brave man must be, for the purpose of the definition, one, who is brave not by the force of necessity;[1] the glutton is one, who eats more than he ought, if he would be well in health.[2] Those, who attain the summit of moral perfection according to Aristotle, desire as they ought; that is, as they must, if they wish to attain perfect self-control.[3] In the same sense those, who become hopelessly vicious, according to Aristotle, desire, as they ought not;[4] and those, who mean well but are feeble in self-control, do not what they think that they ought to do.[5] The magnanimous man must be a good man, that is, if he is to be worthy to be called magnanimous; he must be only so far ambitious, as he ought to be, or, as Aristotle himself explains his phrase, only so far as is generally commended.[6] Clearly, it would be unfair to argue from so contracted a use of the word, that it represents conscience, as the acknowledgment of a debt to be paid to a person other than self.

Origin of Conscience.—What is termed the genesis of conscience, in other words, the origin, growth, formation of conscience, is a question, which has exercised philosophy ever since the great revival of thought in Europe during the sixteenth century. On the one side are those, who maintain, that conscience is a primary and integral fact in human nature, coeval with the origin of man. On the other side are

[1] "Ethics," III. viii. 5; ix. 1.
[2] "Ethics," III. xi. 8.
[3] "Ethics," III. x. 3, 4.
[4] "Ethics," III. xi. 4.
[5] "Ethics," V. ix. 6.
[6] "Ethics," IV. iii. 8, 10.

those, who would resolve conscience into elements more or less inconsistent with the conception of conscience as the restraining sense of duty, into mere cravings of appetite, or into calculations of what will bring profit or pleasure to the individual himself or to society at large. To avoid ambiguity the distinction must be kept in mind between the two ideas contained in the term, self-consciousness and the perception of a difference between right and wrong.[1] Self-consciousness, it has been said,[2] by a singularly thoughtful and unbiassed student of moral philosophy, cannot be the outcome of a merely material organism. The spirit in man,[3] which is his very self, is, in itself, independent of the development of its environment, though not unaffected by modifications arising from progress of a material kind. So far as the perception of the difference between right and wrong is cultivated by experience, the reflex action of consciousness in this direction is developed proportionately. The germ-conscience, the dim sense of duty in the child, the savage, the dog, or the horse, is to the enlightened conscience of the saint or the philosopher as the faint streak, which heralds the sunrise is to the matured brightness of noonday. This growth of conscience is exemplified alike in the life of the individual and in the collective history of mankind,

[1] Cf. p. 27.

[2] "Self-consciousness is not a merely natural event."—GREEN, "Prolegomena," &c., p. 99. Cf. p. 117.

[3] Cf. 1 Cor. ii. 11.

unless it is thwarted and checked by adverse circumstances.

The sense of duty, though having its origin in the constituent elements of man's being, needs to be fostered and strengthened by appliances from without; and as it attains maturity, it learns to dispense with these supports and reverts more and more to unconstrained and instantaneous operations.[1] Revelation has enforced and expanded the rudimentary dictates of conscience, slowly and painfully training mankind for the full revelation of perfect goodness in the Incarnate God. Human thought ascends from the elementary principles of unselfishness, to God above, and thence descends to earth in the person of Christ Jesus.

Indeed, the question, whether conscience can or cannot be traced back to an origin apparently alien to the high position, which it claims for itself in the civilised world, is, like all questions about evolution, of very slight importance practically. Conscience is, what it is. If conscience has its parentage in sympathetic or "altruistic" instincts, there is nothing here incompatible with the belief, that these impulses of sympathy

[1] Cf. "There are, who ask not if thine eye
Be on them, who, in love and truth
Where no misgiving is, rely
Upon the genial sense of youth."

WORDSWORTH.

"The sense of duty will diminish, as fast as moralisation increases."—H. SPENCER, "Data of Ethics," p. 127. In other words, "Perfect love casteth out fear" (1 St. John iv. 18).

have been strengthened and purified by a providential discipline.[1] Even if the descent of conscience could be demonstrated from ancestry so unlike itself as the greediness of a mere animal selfishness, the fact would still remain, that under the shapings of a guiding hand, conscience has become, what it is. Nor is this a question, to the solution of which Aristotle contributes largely, except as favoring the opinion, that conscience is developed by civilisation.[2] He is content, as usual, to appeal to the fact, that those, who are accounted most trustworthy,[3] praise or blame this or that principle of conduct. Their verdict is enough for him. Their consent is all that he requires, to explain, not how conscience comes to be, what he finds it, but how it takes its part in regulating the affairs of men.

Variations in the Moral Code.—But an objection presents itself, based on the discrepancies as to what things are culpable or praiseworthy in different parts of the world, and on the still more startling anomaly, that certain individuals and certain tribes appear to have no sense at all of there being any difference between vice and virtue.[4] Against all

[1] "The real morality of the Bible is its final morality, the morality in the intention of the lawgiver from the beginning. In its very *evolution* we have a sign of the supernatural life in the religion of Israel. There is the continuity of a divine purpose here."—"New Analogy" (Macmillan & Co.).

[2] Cf. GRANT, "Ethics," &c., I. 381.

[3] Οἱ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένοι.

[4] TYLOR, "Primitive Culture," II. p. 289. Cf. St. Matt xiii. 28, 39; Rom. i. 20-32.

objections of this kind Aristotle would reply, and it is a reply well worthy of consideration, that the final court of appeal, on questions of morality, is to the cultivated intelligence of the nations and of the individuals, which stand foremost in civilisation. Whatever jars with this, he puts aside as exceptional and unhealthy. Even if there were a numerical preponderance of votes against it, he would abide by this. The fact, that some savage tribes have no love for their offspring, or that others prefer a nephew to a son, no more disproves the axiomatic rule, that parents love their children, than the fact, that a savage does not accept the axioms of mathematics, till he has been taught, disproves the practical universality of these axioms. It may be retorted, that even in highly-civilised communities there is occasionally a glaring divergence[1] from the received code. But this is only tantamount to saying, that the refinements of culture in Athens, Rome, Paris, London, are no safeguard, by themselves, against immorality. There is, after all, a valid consent on the part of those, who prove their title to speak by their superiority otherwise, on what may be termed the axioms of morality, truth, justice, temperance, purity, courage, kindness; and history shows, as a fact, whether, when they are brought face to face, the higher or lower morality wins the day.

The "Tribal Self."—Aristotle has something to say on another point, which commends itself to

[1] *E.g.*, "Voltaire was a terrible liar, but not a bad fellow after all."—*Nineteenth Century*, Oct. 1882.

the philosophy of the present day. Some would explain conscience by a theory, which merges the existence of the individual in a "tribal self," or in what is called "social tissue," as if the life social could be studied apart from the life of the atoms, which constitute society, and as if what is more simple and more obvious could be understood better in the complex whole, of which it is a part, than in itself.[1] Aristotle is not without a certain sympathy for ideas like these. He regards man as essentially a political creature.[2] It is, with him, as part of a social organism, that man exercises most adequately his noblest energies. The community, with him, overshadows, and dwarfs the individual. But to demonstrate, that virtue conduces to the well-being of the State is not to demonstrate that virtue has no being of her own irrespective of results. To prove, that honesty is the best policy, is not the same thing as to prove, that honesty is mere expediency. In maintaining, that virtue can find full scope only in the mutual relations of society, Aristotle is not maintaining, that virtue is only a name to express the net result of the balance-sheet of profit and loss to the community.

"*Judicet Orbis.*"—In appealing to the verdict of those who are entitled to the greatest deference, Aristotle appeals to the most enlightened communities as well as to the individuals, who are foremost there. For

[2] "Ethics," I. vii. 6. Cf. "De Civitate Dei," xii. 27. "Homo discordiosum vitio, sociale naturâ."

from first to last he regards man as reaching his full stature, practically, in his social relations; and his ideal man, from this point of view, represents the community. This consummate judge of moral rectitude, from whose sentence Aristotle admits of no appeal, he describes in various ways. He is the man in earnest,[1] as distinct from the triflers, who drift listlessly and helplessly down the stream. He is the thoughtful[2] man, who sees things as they are, grasping their true meaning, regulating himself by reason. He is the man trained thoroughly,[3] and equipped on all sides for the conflict.[4] In the two phrases, which stand first, we have, severally, the emotions and the intellect at their best for practical purposes. For this earnestness means, that the affections are not dissipated and wasted, but concentrated on the right objects; this thoughtfulness means, that the judgment sees clearly, what these objects are. In the last phrase we have the external discipline, without which the faculties are stunted and misshapen. Aristotle speaks of a perceptiveness, which wears the appearance of intuition in its instantaneous grasp of moral fitness,[5] or, as he would express it, of the mean between the two extremes,[6] in every crisis. But the tenor of his psychology teaches, that every faculty lies dormant, as though it were not, till wakened by

[1] "Ethics," III. iv. 4, σπουδαῖος.
[2] "Ethics," II. vi. 15, φρόνιμος.
[3] "Ethics," I. iii. 4, πεπαιδευμένος. Cf. Appendix F.
[4] "Ethics," I. x. 15, κεχορηγημένος.
GRANT, "Ethics," &c., I. 256, 377.
Ethics," II. vi. 15.

the touch of its surroundings, and grows only by experience. With intellect and emotions thus made perfect the thoughtful student of life discerns the true purport of life,[1] regarded as a whole, as well as what he must do and be[2] on each particular occasion,[3] if he would attain to this felicity, being himself the rule and measure of these things.[4]

Φρόνησις.—The word,[5] sometimes translated "prudence," more properly "moral thoughtfulness," used by Aristotle to denote the mature faculty of judging rightly in questions of morality, has, with him, the reflex and introspective action of consciousness, and is, perhaps, the nearest approach, in his terminology, to conscience. It pronounces, what is good, not in the abstract merely but for oneself,[6] and it enjoins, what must be done with a view to this end.[7] Thus he distinguishes it from that apprehension of what is right generally,[8] which can co-exist with moral depravity,[9] and which may degenerate into mere cleverness,[10] more mischievous[11] than unintelligent vice. In art, he says, those, who err from not knowing better, are most to be blamed; in conduct the knowledge

[1] "Ethics," III. iv. 4.
[2] Εὐπραξία.
[3] "Ethics," VI. vii. 6, 7.
[4] "Ethics," III. iv. 5.
[5] Φρόνησις.
[6] "Ethics," VI. v. 5.
[7] "Ethics," VI. x. 2.
[8] Σύνεσις.
[9] A vicious man, Aristotle says, can repeat fine phrases about virtue ("Ethics," VII. iii. 8).
[10] Δεινότης.
[11] Πανουργία. Cf. St. Luke xii. 47; St. James i. 22. Cf. "Cunning is not *dishonest wisdom*, which would be a contradiction in terms; it is *dishonest prudence*." CARLYLE, "Life of Sterling," p. 171.

of what is right aggravates the offence.[1] He is never weary of reiterating, that a vicious life dims the intellectual insight into the beautiful and the expedient; the insolence of rebellious passions disturbs the serene equilibrium, which the life contemplative enjoys, and renders, what should be certain, unstable and precarious.[2]

Ἐγκράτεια.—Nowhere, perhaps, in his philosophy does Aristotle assert more implicitly the existence of what in his system is analogous to conscience than in his graphic delineation of the struggle between right and wrong in those, who have neither fallen so low, nor soared so high as to be exempt from it.[3] According to the Hindu proverb, only the supremely wise and the utterly foolish are happy in this world, because they only stand outside this arena of deadly and incessant strife. Aristotle would include few in these categories. There is, he says, something in our nature different from reason, contrary to it, contending with it;[4] the desires. This refractory element in our being is not, like the vegetative,[5] insensible to the voice of reason, for, unless it gains the upper hand, it is amenable to reproof and exhortation. But those, who allow themselves to be its slaves, are paralysed and spell-bound; they cannot hear, cannot understand, what

[1] "Ethics," VI. v.

[2] "Ethics," VI. v. Cf. "Faults in the life breed errors in the brain."—COWPER.

[3] Ἀκόλαστοι, σώφρονες.

[4] "Ethics," I. xiii. 15; III. xii. 7; VII. iii. 11. Cf. Rom vi. 15-25.

[5] "Ethics," I. xiii. 11. Cf. pp. 1, 2.

[6] "Ethics," I. xiii. 15.

reason is saying.[1] The passions therefore must be regulated by reason; they must not put themselves in opposition to it; they must be in perfect harmony with it, speaking in the same tones, breathing the same spirit. While making allowance for their vehemence, as an extenuation of the wrong-doing, Aristotle does not allow that the wrong-doer is justified thereby. He argues, that those, who err deliberately without the provocation of strong passions, would, simply, be all the worse with that incentive added.[2] Neither in the one case, nor in the other does he admit, that those, who act against the sober dictates of reason, are free from blame.

Self-control in regard to Pleasure.—If it is asked, how can any reasoning being act against reason? Aristotle replies, with consistency, that right conduct does not depend merely on knowing what is right. Morality with him is not, as with Plato, a science.[3] Gusts of passion, sweeping over the soul, derange the equilibrium of the machine, and hinder the intellect[4] from working out the practical problem with the exactitude of a problem in mathematics. When passion intrudes, the intellect is like a steamship making her way against wind and tide; it plies its task with mechanical regularity, but is baffled by

[1] "Ethics," X. ix. 7. Cf. Ps. lviii. 5; St. Mk. viii. 18. Cf. "Ethics," III. xii. 7 (ἀνόητος). So in the Psalms, folly and madness are predicated of the unholy. Cf. The "forward step and lingering will."—KEBLE'S "Christian Year."

[2] "Ethics," VII. iv. 4.

[3] "Ethics," VII. ii. 4.

[4] Νοῦς πρακτικός.

disturbing forces. Where, then, is the intellectual flaw, which results in the practical error? The major premiss of the practical syllogism, with Aristotle, the fundamental principle, which underlies all action, indisputable and irrefragable as an axiom in mathematics, is self-preservation, self-development, the happiness of self (pp. 45, 46). But before this principle can be applied to any particular action, an intermediate syllogism must be worked out, consciously or not, to define more exactly the vague and comprehensive term. Is this happiness the enjoyment of the moment, or the complete realisation of man's being? Here an error creeps into the reasoning, and vitiates it. The man deficient in self-control starts with the major premiss, that happiness is to be pursued, but he mistakes the minor premiss.[2] Pleasure is happiness, he affirms; and he concludes, therefore, that, whatever produces immediate gratification, is to be chosen. Roughly speaking, two very different trains of thought offer themselves on every occasion. This course of conduct is pleasant, and therefore to be followed; or this course of conduct is wrong, and therefore to be shunned. It is in allowing themselves to be biassed by their passions into choosing amiss, whether they will listen to this or that line of argument, that the fault lies of those, who are weak in restraining themselves. They have,

[1] *E.g.*, Esau selling his birthright.

[2] But the drunkard or maniac mistakes the minor premiss in the syllogism, which is subsequent on this; he mistakes the actual circumstances.

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all the time, the right principle of action but they use it not; it is, with them, in abeyance;[1] they see it not,[2] blinded by passion. Too late they regret their error. Those, who do not act on principle are always full of regrets and remorse.[3] For the logical illusion, which, by a sleight of hand prompted by passion, substitutes the false for the true, lasts only till the transient wave of passion breaks.[4] Two temperaments Aristotle singles out as specially liable to these inconsistencies, the precipitate and the feeble (faults often found together); the rash, he adds, are better than those, who err through irresolution, as more likely to recover themselves after a fall.[5]

As the English word "incontinency" comes to be used in a restricted sense for the absence of control over a certain class of desires, so Aristotle regards self-indulgence as predicable in regard to other desires than the desire of pleasure only by resemblance or analogy.[6] Yet the weakness, the irresolution, through which a man plays the coward in face of danger, is closely akin to the weakness through, which he must

[1] "Ethics," VII. x. 3.

[2] Cf. Isaiah lvii. 20. (*See* Note 3 on p. 23).

[3] "Ethics," IX. iv. 10; VII. vii. 2, viii. 1.

[4] Cf. "Conscience, anticipating time,
Already rues the enacted crime."—SCOTT, *Rokeby*.
"That juggling fiend, who never spoke before,
But cries 'I warned thee,' when the deed is o'er."
BYRON, *Corsair*.

[5] "Ethics," VII. iii. 7. The fault of the ἀκρατὴς is like an epileptic fit rather than a chronic disease.

[6] "Ethics," VII. iv. 2. Cf. 1. Cor. ix. 25. Cf. "Sir Galahad."—TENNYSON.

and will have what is pleasurable, at any price (p. 21). For pain is the contradiction of pleasure; to shun the one is to seek the other; and to endure pain is, in fact, to resist the seductions of pleasure.[1] In balancing the vices of cowardice and of incontinence Aristotle pronounces cowardice the more involuntary of the two, as depending less on causes, for which man is not responsible; but he admits, that on each separate occasion the latter is less voluntary, the tyranny of habit in this case being more irresistible.[2] Excessive anger he regards as less inexcusable than excessive indulgence in the appetites of the body, as less insidious, less directly selfish, less enervating, less tainted with that insolent contempt for others, which makes victims of them for the gratification of lust; and on the more questionable ground, that the pain, which provokes anger is more natural, and therefore a more valid excuse than the craving for enjoyment. Anger, with him, is "a kind of wild justice";[3] and he makes allowance for an outburst of anger caused by a misunderstanding, comparing the choleric and impetuous to a dog, which barks fiercely at an inoffensive stranger.[4] With characteristic acuteness he detects the latent weakness in obstinacy, which, while wearing the semblance of self-control, is indeed the very opposite of it.[5] There may be a firmer

[1] Καρτερικός, ἐγκρατής. The profligate are pained in being debarred from their pleasures.—"Ethics," III. xi. 6. Cf. p. 21.

[2] The hereditary difference of temperament seems not to be taken into account sufficiently. [3] GRANT's "Ethics," &c.

[4] "Ethics," VII. vi. Cf. GRANT, *ad loc.*

[5] "Ethics," VII. ix. 3.

exercise of self-control, he says, in relinquishing an opinion or an intention than in clinging to it whether right or wrong.

Four Classes.—Artistotle classifies mankind, from this point of view, in four divisions.[1] The majority, being fairly disposed on the whole, though, not unfrequently, unstable, he divides into those, who keep down their bad desires, and those, who give way to them. The comparatively few, at each end of the scale, are those, who have on principle so subjugated their evil inclinations to reason, systematically and habitually, as to have little or no further trouble with them, and those, who have flung down the reins and abandoned themselves to their base propensities. These he compares to wild beasts, those to gods in their passionless serenity.[2] In all alike he sees a something, which should direct by warning and encouragement. This is vigorously at work in those who restrain themselves; it has done its work in those who are thoroughly virtuous; but in the self-indulgent it is silenced for the moment,[3] in the utterly unprincipled for ever. In other words, some, though they have evil desire, are not led by them; they resist and with an effort are victorious; some are so free from evil desires, that to them what is right is intrinsically delightful;[4] some pursue, what seems pleasurable, even while they think, that they

[1] 'Εγκρατής, ἀκρατής (strong or weak in resisting evil desires); σώφρων, ἀκόλαστος (sound in mind or incorrigible). Tito, in "Romola," sinks from ἀκρατής to ἀκόλαστος.

[2] "Ethics," VII. i. 1

[3] "Ethics," V. ix. 6.

[4] Cf. Ps. cxix. 47.

ought not, like a state, where the laws are good, but are not obeyed; some, like a state, where the very laws are bad, make no attempt to restrain themselves, and have no scruple, no compunction, in their depravity.[1]

Three stages are noted in this downward process of deterioration; to know that a particular action is wrong, and yet, swayed by passion, to do it; to fail to see, that it is wrong, being blinded by passion for the moment; to know not, that there is any right or wrong in the world, except in accordance with the craving of one's own evil desires. Thus according to Aristotle, men sink to the level of the brute[2] beast with no perception of right or wrong; or rather they fall immeasurably below it, having quenched by their own doing the light, which was to guide them on to perfection.

[1] Aristotle speaks, not very positively, as if those, who err through a conscious and deliberate preference, were better than those, who are guilty of the same fault through want of self-control, as more likely to be cured of their fault, on being convinced of their mistake. But this seems inconsistent with the hardening effect, which Aristotle attributes elsewhere to a conscious, deliberate, habitual preference for what is evil, and these he pronounces incurable.—"Ethics," VII. vii. 2; III. v. 14. Cf. pp. 9, 10, 24, 37, 38, 39.

[2] "Ethics," VII. iii. 11. But brute beasts have a glimmering, at least, of this ὑπόληψις.

CHAPTER IV.

THE MOTIVE OF VIRTUOUS CONDUCT.

Happiness the End in View.—Thus far the testimony of Aristotle must be allowed on all hands to be in favour of the morality inculcated by Christianity. He teaches, that man is a free agent; that he is responsible, to himself at least, if to no higher power; that he has a guiding voice within him, which has a right to be obeyed; and that the intention, especially if conscious and deliberate, is what really qualifies the action as good or bad. What then is the bidding of this voice, and what the proper end of man's endeavours? If the answer, which Aristotle makes, is disappointing to those, who seek for a motive higher than self-love, it must be remembered, that the study of ethics, as a separate department of philosophy, was, with him, still in its infancy, and, what is more important, that the circumstances, in which he lived, though predisposing men to welcome a philosophy, tending by the repression of unruly passions to elevate and tranquillise, were inimical to a theory of ethics, based on any other foundation than self-love. The end proposed is happiness;[1] to this the whole current of being must set; and, because without virtue happiness is

[1] "Ethics," I. vii. 4. Vice has been called "a miscalculation of chances." Cf. p. 78.

impossible, virtuous habits must be acquired and cultivated diligently. Virtue is duly appraised as an indispensable condition of true happiness, but only for this end. Virtue is instrumental in regulating the passions, which would otherwise frustrate the pursuit of happiness by their infatuation. Be good, that you may be happy is the key-note of his philosophy.[1] Self is the centre of his system*; regard for self shapes and colours it from first to last. The "Ethics" are Aristotle's answer to the question, "How is man to be happy?"

Self-love.—It is a lofty selfishness. There is nothing sordid, nothing gross about it. It marks as by a high-water line, how high ideal selfishness can be raised. But it is genuine, unalloyed selfishness, and this lies at the very core of the philosophy. Happiness is defined as the proper business of man,[2] the exercise of his best faculties,[3] the free and healthy exercise, not of his vegetative faculties, not of those which he shares with other

[1] "Good conduct," Mr. Herbert Spencer has said ("Data of Ethics," p. 26), "simultaneously achieves the greatest totality of life in self, in offspring, and in fellow-men." So far as results go, a selfish theory of virtue, though diametrically opposed in motive to the doctrine of self-sacrifice, corresponds with it. So far as relates to results, and not to intention, "conduct is good or bad according as its total effects are pleasurable or painful" (p. 28). But this totality of consequences can be appreciated truly by Omniscience alone.

[2] "Ethics," I. vii. 14. See Appendix G.

[3] "Ethics," I. vii. 14; ix. 7. Ἐνεργεία ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. But ἀρετή here is not necessarily "virtue," but an excellence (of the soul), whatever that excellence may be.

* *See* Addenda.

animals, but of his reason dominating his emotions in art, soaring above them in science into the cloudless æther of abstract intelligence. This happiness is self-sufficing, self-contained, self-evolved;[1] not variable with accidents of time and place; not changing colour, as a chameleon,[2] in different aspects; habitual, constant, permanent.[3] It lasts, while life asts, undiminished, unimpaired: defection at any time shows, that it never was really.[4] It excludes not fellowship with others; but they are a secondary consideration; regard for them is only an emanation of self-love, a radiation from the central glow, diffusing and multiplying itself in them by refraction[5] (p. 63). Though essentially independent of adventitious aids, it needs a suitable equipment for its perfection,[6] as a casket for the jewel. It is, in a word, the unruffled serenity, inseparable from virtue.[7] Where could

[1] "Ethics," I. vii. 6, 7, 8. Cf. Isaiah xlvii. 8, 10.

[2] "Ethics," I. ix. 8. Cf. Ps. cxii. 7, 8.

[3] Ἕξις. Cf. "Ethics," II. iv. 3.

[4] Cf. AUGUSTINE, "De Civitate Dei," xi.

[5] "Ethics," IX. ix. 5. It makes all the difference, whether a man habitually regards his fellow-creatures as *persons* like himself with claims similar to his own but even stronger, or as *things* instrumental for the gratification of his own wishes. A St. Francis of Assisi personifies even things without life; a Napoleon degrades persons into things. It is hardly an adequate excuse for the habit, as is alleged, of using his fellow-beings as materials for his art, that to Goethe art was a religion, unless tortures inflicted in the name of religion are justifiable. Cf. "The unsympathising, factitious calm of art, in Goethe." CARLYLE, "Life of Sterling," p. 102: but, see also p. 110. Cf. "Characteristics of Christian Morality," p. 22 (2nd edit.).

[6] "Ethics," I. vii. 16, x. 15; X. vii. 4.

[7] "Ethics," I. x 13. Cf. "The Imitation of Christ" (*passim*).

there be a more beautiful ideal of life, if the culture of self, the beatification of self were all in all?

Even when, leaving sublunary things, Aristotle soars upward into the life contemplative, self clings to him. He places contemplation above action as more continuous, more independent, more reposeful, more final.[1] It is, he says, the highest occupation of man's highest faculties. It can only be reached through a strict discipline of the emotions, but it is as superior to the highest moral excellence as the summit of the mountain to the arduous path, which leads to the summit. Emotion disturbs it. Therefore emotions, rightly directed or not, must be hushed into absolute stillness. This is a glorious ideal, so far as it represents the supremacy of reason over passion. But it is a selfish glory after all; even as the devout raptures of the monk in his cell are selfish, so far as they are purchased by the soldier's abandonment of his post in the turmoil and peril of life. The contemplative life is a refined selfishness, the selfish enjoyment of a transcendental bliss incommunicable to mankind generally. The happiness, which Aristotle proposes as the end of being is not something, which all have a title to share in; it is the privilege of a few. He rejects the hedonism or utilitarianism of the vulgar, only to substitute the same thing in disguise.

Self-sacrifice.—It has been no easy thing for moral philosophy to escape from this groove and to emancipate itself from the traditionary influence of this

[1] "Ethics," X. vii.

teaching.[1] Even the plain precepts of self-sacrifice in the Gospel, however prolific of results practically, have failed to eradicate the idea, that virtue is only a prudential self-love, a wise self-love, and not a wise unselfishness.[1] Of course an act of self-sacrifice is, unless done under compulsion and involuntarily, as truly as an act of self-indulgence, the act, which the doer chooses and prefers.[2] But this obvious fact, that a sense of gratification invariably accompanies every determination, although the determination may be fraught with pain of one kind or another, cannot efface the difference in motive between an action done for the sake of others and an action for the sake of self.[3] It might as fairly be argued, that advantage or enjoyment must be the determining motive in

[1] So far as conventionality implies sympathy with others, so far (but this is not much) Aristotle's moral philosophy does imply something above self-love. (See p. 77, Note 1.)

[2] In speaking of *τἀγαθον* as *τὸ βουλητὸν*, *τὸ προαιρετόν* (*e.g.*, "Ethics," III. iv. 4), Aristotle cannot conceive the good being another's good. Cf. "Ethics," V. vi. 8, *αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν*. Similarly it is urged, that the motive, which actuates any one, must be "conceived as his own good, though he may conceive it [*sic*] as his own good only on account of his interest in others"; "the motive is always some idea of the man's personal good."—(GREEN, "Prolegomena," pp. 96, 98.) But Christianity, while duly recognising, what may be called the centripetal force, lays the chief emphasis on the centrifugal. "No man hateth his own flesh" (Ephesians v. 29) is more than balanced by "He, that loveth his life, shall lose it," and many other precepts of self-abnegation; *e.g.*, 1 St. John iii. 16, St. John xii. 25. Cf. "De Imitatione Christi," III. xxxvii. Cf. "Life and Letters of James Hinton," pp. v. 27, &c.

[3] Cf. "Pleasure somewhere, sometime, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element in the ultimate moral aim." —H. SPENCER, "Data of Ethics," p. 123. Cf. p. 55, Note 2.

every virtuous act, because these results accrue to it sooner or later. If the saint or the hero wishes himself "accursed"[1] for the sake of others, it is not, because such a doom gratifies self-love, but because, by sheer force of will, he chooses to care for others more than for himself. That, which he likes and prefers is, in itself, diametrically contrary to that, which self-love would choose. But his love for others is stronger than his love for self.

The sense of duty is the sense of obligation or indebtedness to a person, other than self, substituted for self by sympathy and imagined as having an even more urgent claim than self to be considered. If goodness is unselfish love, and if goodness is better in proportion as the object, to which it devotes itself, is worthier, then unselfish, willing obedience to God is the highest goodness conceivable. Even to refrain from what is wrong is not real goodness, if the motive is mercenary.[2]

The State.—The selfish tendency of the "Ethics" is modified by the importance, which Aristotle, like ancient Greeks generally, attached to the political relations.[3] Regard for fellow-citizens is a counterpoise to the excessive regard for self. Allegiance to the community stands in the place of duty to a higher power. The statesman is to provide for the moral culture of the citizens, as well as for their material convenience, because he is to provide for

[1] Romans ix. 3.

[2] Cf. Spinoza, par E. RENAN, 1877.

[3] "Ethics," I. ii. 9. Socialism, apart from religion, is an apotheosis of humanity.

their happiness in every respect, and especially in respect of those things, on which happiness most depends. Every citizen is to contribute, according to his ability, to the happiness of all. Here is a practical correction of the theoretical tendency to absorb everything into self and to make use of others for merely selfish purposes. But even here self-love is latent, though not self-love of the baser kind, for the happiness of the individual is bound up with the happiness of his community.

Public Opinion.—Thus, in defining happiness and the way to attain it, Aristotle gives the foremost place among virtuous incentives to reputation, placing it above pleasure and wealth.[1] Not endowed by nature nor by training with the stern sense of justice, which characterised the Roman and the Teuton, nor with the devout awe, which his religion breathed into the Jew, the Greek worshipped the beautiful.[2] With him vice was an offence against good taste, an impropriety, a deformity; and public opinion was the arbiter. The admiring applause, not indeed of the multitude, but of the select few, is, according to Aristotle, what constitutes the assurance of felicity, and their praise is the spur to exertion. It is glory, he says, which incites the brave to deeds of daring.[3] True magnificence, while disdaining a tasteless display of wealth,[4] consists

[1] "Ethics," I. iv. 3, v. 4; II. iii. 7; IV. iii. 10.
[2] *E.g.*, "Ethics," IV. ii. 5, 6, 16.
[3] "Ethics," III. ix. 3. [4] "Ethics," IV. ii. 20.

in the possession of things, which are deservedly coveted.[1] Even the life contemplative, divine as it seems in comparison with mundane vicissitudes, has to prove its title to precedence by the wonder and awe, which it provokes in others.[2] Even excess in the thirst for honour is marked off from all other kinds of excess; it is not classed under the want of self-control; if, indeed, a thing to be shunned, still it is not to be censured severely.

Pleasure.—Aristotle draws a distinction, which, though very important, is sometimes overlooked, between pleasure and happiness. With him happiness means, as we have seen, something intrinsic, permanent, immutable, the crown and consummation of life-long endeavours. Pleasure is transitional and precarious, an adjunct and concomitant of happiness, not itself the end to be pursued.[3] Those, who are in all respects masters of themselves, find enjoyment in the abstinence from pleasures, which are harmful; while to the depraved this abstinence is torture.[4] Aristotle cannot bring himself to allow, that enjoyment is the chief good, the highest aim, in life; but he is too practical not to see, that it is an ingredient in happiness.[5] He admits, that it sweetens toil,[6] assuages trouble, lubricates the wheels of life, and that, without it, the healthful energies cannot have free play;[7] but he insists, that it

1 "Ethics," IV. ii. 11. 2 "Ethics," IV. ii. 10.
3 "Ethics," X. iv. 8; X. iii. 5. Cf. St. Matthew vi. 33.
4 "Ethics," II. iii. 1. 5 "Ethics," VII. xii.
6 Cf. "The labour we delight in physics pain." SHAKSPEARE.
7 "Ethics," VII. xiv. Cf. VII. xiii. 2.

implies and presupposes a want, an incompleteness.[1] It does not follow, he says, that pleasure is of no account at all,[2] because it is not the best of all things. He has no praise for the apathy, which looks on what is agreeable with stolid indifference;[3] but he distrusts the fascination, which pleasure exercises over her votaries, warping and distorting their judgment by the illusions of sense;[4] and he quotes approvingly the legendary saying, "Send away Helen, if you would decide rightly."[5]

Perhaps Aristotle would not have assigned so high a place even as this to pleasure, but for the fear of seeming to propose an impracticable ideal. He saw the inconsistencies of many, who were loud in decrying pleasure and in vaunting their contempt for it.[6] He dreaded overstatements, especially of a sentimental kind. After all, in making pleasure secondary, the consequence and not the thing aimed at, his teaching coincides with the precepts of the Gospel; but the primary motive with him is self-improvement, not duty to God and man.[7]

Pleasure, with Aristotle, is far above that ignoble

[1] *E.g.*, "Ethics," X. iii. 6. [2] "Ethics," X. i. 2.

[3] "Ethics," II. iii. 5. Cf. "Solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant."—TACITUS. "Ethics," iii. xi. 7.

"Nil admirari prope res est una, Numici,
Solaque, quæ possit facere et servare beatum."—HORACE.

[4] "Ethics," III. iv. 5. [5] "Ethics," II. ix. 6.

[6] "Ethics," X. i. The practical inconsistencies of Christians have tended in the same way to lower the tone of the moral philosophy of Christianity. Monachism and Calvinism have done much to make Christian morality selfish.

[7] *E.g.*, St. Matthew vi. 33.

gratification of the senses, which is too commonly all, that is meant by the word. As happiness, with him, is the highest development, of which man's nature is capable,[1] so the pleasure, which accompanies it, must be such as commends itself to the reason[2] of the virtuous;[3] conducive to health; consistent with propriety; not incommensurate with a man's means. In the vulgar notion of pleasure he detects an unrest and a vacuity, essentially incompatible with true happiness. Sensual pleasure, he says, is preceded by an uneasy craving; while the pleasure, which the wise and good enjoy in the free exercise of their highest faculties, is uninterrupted by pain.[4] His theory of pleasure is that of a race exquisitely alive to every thrill of pleasure or of pain,[5] and of an age, which had not yet learnt, from the Cross on Calvary, that unselfish endurance for others' sake, as it is the highest purpose in life, so brings with it, although unsought, the abiding happiness, independent of external things, which Aristotle imagined in vain. Not that pain, any more than pleasure, is to be sought for its own sake. Nor is there any danger, as some apprehend, lest the spirit of self-sacrifice, could it ever possess mankind, should result in a general frustration of happiness on all sides. The fear is chimerical. Even were it conceivable, that self-interest could ever be so thrust aside, the antidote to a suicidal fanaticism would be found

[1] *E.g.*, "Ethics," X. vi. [2] "Ethics," X. iv. 8.
[3] "Ethics," X. v. 10.
[4] "Ethics," VII. xiv. Cf. III. xi. 6. [5] "Ethics," II. vii. 3.

in the fact, that self-preservation, as a rule, is an indispensable preliminary to benefiting others, and, therefore, as a rule, a duty not to be neglected. Clearly, too, even with purely unselfish motives at work, the result would be the happiness not only of those receiving, but of those who confer benefits.[1] The truth on pleasure as a motive is well summed up. "Pleasure (somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings) is an inexpugnable element in the conception of the ultimate moral aim."[2] The pleasure may be to self, to fellow-creatures or to a power above all. That pleasure, in the largest sense of the word, is invariably an ingredient in the determining motive,[3] may be admitted by those, who are not hedonists, with the proviso, that the moral character of the act depends on the further question, whether the advantage is sought for self or for another. It goes without saying, that the will finds a pleasure in consenting, however reluctantly; for, otherwise, the will would not consent. But this pleasure may be either for self or, by sympathy, for another. Christianity teaches that this pleasure is to be found, first, in God; next, in one's neighbour;

[1] Cf. "Mercy . . is twice blessed;
It blesseth him, that gives, and him, that takes."
SHAKSPEARE.

[2] H. SPENCER, "Data of Ethics," p. 123. Cf. p. 49. Note 3.

[3] "Ethics," VII. ix. 4. Neoptolemus speaks the truth, because it pleases him. If this means only, that he does what he prefers, it is a truism and a tautology. If it means, that he is actuated by the desire for what is pleasurable to himself, the motive is inferior to the desire simply to do right.

lastly, in oneself. The practical inconsistencies of Christians cannot abrogate this royal law of love. If the religion "of amity" becomes too often a religion "of enmity,"[1] this only shows, that they, who profess a creed, do not always practise it. The life and death of one such man as Charles Gordon show, that the ideal, however difficult, is not beyond attainment.[2]

Moderation.—It is strictly in keeping with the utilitarian basis of his philosophy, that Aristotle, in default of an authoritative rule of right and wrong, has recourse to the idea, especially congenial to a Greek,[3] of proportion. Questions of morality, he

[1] H. Spencer. Cf. "Study of Sociology," p. 175.

[2] "The impracticability of 'the ideal' produces a despairing abandonment of all attempts at a higher life" (H. SPENCER, "Data of Ethics," p. v.). The hopelessness of these words is in strange contrast to the description in the New Testament of the "great multitude, which no man could number," of saints (Revelations vii. 9; Cf. Hebrews xi. 17–40). Besides, an ideal may have uses of its own, even if it cannot be realised completely. "Up to a certain point altruistic action blesses giver and receiver; beyond that point it curses both" (Study of Sociology," p. 181). Mr. Spencer argues that in desiring to make others happy every one will neglect himself and so be incapacitated for helping others. But self-preservation *for the sake of others* is a corollary of self-sacrifice; it is an integral part of it, or rather an indispensable preliminary. As for the objection, that altruism encourages selfishness in the recipients, these also, on the hypothesis, are givers, and, by consequence, habitually unselfish. "As society develops [*sic*], the duties of men towards each other become more numerous and more complex; and consequently the opportunities for having regard to each other must increase" (Dr. WACE, Paper read at the Victoria Institute, p. 18). This alone is the answer to the pessimistic question, "Is life worth living?"

[3] Cf. the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers. See Appendix H.

says, must be answered according to the circumstances of each particular case;[1] no absolute rule can be laid down;[2] the only practicable test is, to avoid extremes, and to remember, that virtue is to be found between excess and defect.[3] The rule is admirable in the abstract. But practically, as Aristotle himself is constrained to own, the marksman has to aim at a target, continually shifting its position before his eyes.[4] Where the fault to be shunned is a graver fault on the one side than on the other, or when there is a personal bias in the one direction or in the other,[5] there the virtue to be aimed at stands not midway between the vices to be avoided. It is impracticable to define the position of that, which is excessive, on the one hand and defective on the other, till excess and defect have been themselves defined.[6]

Virtues enumerated. — The Aristotelian catalogue of virtues is far from being exhaustive. Throughout it presents self-love, duly regulated by prudence, as the mainspring of action; ambition, instead of being rebuked as a greedy craving for self-aggrandisement, is commended, with the vague proviso, that it must

[1] "Ethics," II. ii. 2. [2] "Ethics," II. ii. 3.

[3] *E.g.*, "Ethics," II. vi. 4, 9, 13. Cf. μηδὲν ἄγαν. Cf. "Auream quisquis mediocritatem," etc. (HORACE). Cf. 1 Corinthians ix. 25; Philippians iv. 5.

[4] "Ethics," II. vi. 8, 9.

[5] Cf. "Compound for sins that they're inclined to," &c. ("Hudibras").

[6] Cf. Ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί ("Ethics," II. vi. 14). Cf. St. Matthew vii. 14.

not be misdirected nor pushed to excess;[1] meekness, on the other hand, is valued, only as promoting evenness of temper;[2] the man, who is slow to revenge himself, it is added, is guilty of a blunder,[3] and behaves like a slave.[4]

The conception, otherwise lofty, of the magnanimous man,[5] the ideal hero, the embodiment of what is great and good, is disfigured by the pride of self-assertion.[6] He appraises himself highly;[7] he despises others;[8] he has a short memory for benefits received.[9] In social intercourse his first consideration is, what will redound to his own credit;[10] he interposes to prevent serious mischief, provided that his intervention will not involve much annoyance to himself.[11] He is a thorough egotist. Similarly the manly bearing of the soldier or of the athlete is made to depend on the pursuit of glory and on the dread of disgrace.[12] Aristotle would approve the sayings (ascribed severally to Emerson and to Seneca), "Self-trust

[1] "Ethics," IV. iv. Cf. p. 52.

[2] "Ethics," IV. v. 3. [3] "Ethics," IV. v. 15.

[4] "Ethics," IV. v. [5] So Spinoza taught, that humility and repentance are not virtues, because they are consequences of weakness and inferiority.—Spinoza, par E. RENAN, 1877.

[5] He is imperturbable; not fussy; στάσιμος. Cf. AUGUSTINE, "De Civitate Dei," xii. 17.

[6] Contrast 1 Corinthians xiii.; Romans xii. 10, &c.

[7] "Ethics," IV. iii. 3.

[8] "Ethics," IV. iii. 22. Contrast

"The man who feels contempt
For any living thing, hath faculties,
Which he has never used," &c.—WORDSWORTH.

[10] "Ethics," IV. iii. 25. [9] "Ethics," I. x. 13.

[11] "Ethics," IV. vi. 6, 7.

[12] "Ethics," III. viii. 3. Cf. III. ix. 3.

is the essence of heroism," "Take away ambition and vanity, and where will be your heroes and patriots?"[1]

Justice.—Aristotle, or his pupil, rightly assigns a twofold meaning to justice. In the larger sense, it includes every obligation to others, the whole domain of duty; in the narrower sense, it is the fulfilment of contracts and engagements.[2] In either sense justice may seem, at first sight, an exception to the Aristotelian rule, that a wise regard to self is the motive of virtue. He remarks, that justice alone of virtues has reference to another person, and acts for the advantage of others;[3] and this, he adds in words, which are significant of the inherent principle of his morality, constitutes the especial difficulty of being just.[4] Again, the latent selfishness of his morality betrays itself in the suggestion, that ingratitude is impolitic, as likely to check the flow of favours in the future.[5] Though he consistently applies to justice the test, which he applies to every virtue, insisting, that justice is not merely doing what is just, but doing it with a just intention and from the wish to be just,[6] yet, if

[1] Στάσιμος ("Ethics," IV. iii. 34) may be compared with Goethe's "Ohne rast, ohne hast." Cf. Isaiah xxx. 15.

[2] "Ethics," V. i. 15, τελεία ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἕτερον. So πλεονεξία includes lust in 1 Thessalonians iv. (see p. 95, Note 1). Cf. Romans xiii. 7, 10. Cf. St. Matthew i. 19.

"All being brought into a sum,
What place or person call for, he doth pay."

G. HERBERT.

[3] "Ethics," V. i. 17.

[4] "Ethics," V. i. 18.

[5] "Ethics," V. iv.

[6] "Ethics," V. i. 3.

pressed to give a fundamental motive for justice, he would answer, that injustice means the disintegration of society, and the consequent ruin of each and all. His comparison of justice to a sum in proportion, while implying, that justice is with him a matter of calculation, shows, that he takes into account, what there may be differential in each case.[1] Equitableness, or a willingness to concede to others,[2] is his corrective of the mechanical and stereotyped justice, which doles out, what the law demands, and nothing more.[3] Questions are raised, whether a man can be injured with his own consent,[4] and whether self-murder is wrong.[5] The former is answered by Aristotle's own teaching, that the intention of the agent is, what qualifies the act. To answer the latter rightly, a higher standpoint is required, than pagan ethics can supply.

Friendship.—Nowhere does Aristotle approach so near to an unselfish theory of virtue as in his books on friendship; and yet even here he fails to reach it. A glimpse is given of something brighter and better than self-interest, but the clouds quickly close over it again. The moralist soars upward; but he soon sinks down with flagging wing, drawn by an irresistible attraction to self as the centre of gravitation. It seems as if, at last, virtue were to be re-

[1] "Ethics," V. iv. 2, 3, 9, *τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ' ἀναλογίαν.*

[2] "Ethics," V. x., *ἐπιεικεία.*

[3] Cf. "The quality of mercy is not strained."
SHAKSPEARE.

[4] "Ethics," V. ix.

[5] "Ethics," V. xi. 2, 3. Cf. III. ii.

vealed in all her loveliness; but the expectation is disappointed. After all, the friend is only self disguised very cleverly.

Friendship, like the kindred virtue, patriotism, throve luxuriantly in the sun-lit atmosphere of Greece; so as, indeed, to need the careful hand of the pruner and to degenerate at times into a rank and poisonous weed. The allegation is groundless, that Christianity takes no notice of friendship;[1] the Gospel reinforces all, that was tender and noble in the friendships of the older dispensation.[2] It sanctions all, that was not merely provisional in the earlier discipline of life, by the precept and example of Him who came "not to destroy, but to fulfil."[3] It is a great saying of Aristotle, that, where friendship is, there is no need of justice with her strict demands.[4] So Christianity teaches, that "Love is the fulfilling of the law."

A kind intention towards any one, Aristotle insists, is not friendship, unless reciprocated.[5] There must be the mutual pleasure, which springs from having the same likings and dislikings and from enjoying frequent opportunities of being together.[6] Thus defined, friendship may seem only a partnership in trade

[1] GRANT, "Ethics," I. 250.

[2] *E.g.*, David and Jonathan. Earthly friendships are typical of the friendship between God and man. Cf. St. John xv. 13-15.

[3] *E.g.*, St. Matt. v. 17.

[4] "Ethics," VIII. i. 4.

[5] "Ethics," VIII. ii. 3. Cf. 1 St. John iv 19.

[6] "Ethics," IX. iv 1. Cf. "Idem velle atque nolle, ea demum firma est amicitia."—SALLUST, "Catilina," xx.

for mutual convenience. But Aristotle is careful, as always, to eliminate selfishness of a sordid or vulgar type. It is not the short-lived gratification of having a pleasant companion, nor the profit, which may be extracted from his good services, which is to be looked for in a friend.[1] Nor is he to be valued primarily for the sake even of a more true enjoyment or a more solid advantage, but for the sake of himself; not because he can do much for the happiness of his comrade, but because he is, what he is.[2] His existence is to be desired for his own sake.[3] Accordingly friendship must not be precipitate: time and intimacy are required to ripen it.[4] True friendship is the concentration, not the dissipation of the affections; it is not like the butterfly roving from flower to flower, but steadfast and abiding.[5] Thus the only perfect friendship is the friendship of the good.[6] For the unprincipled are fickle and inconstant;[7] and friends are often severed by the weakness or wickedness of either.[8] The true friend deliberately practises everything, that is excellent, for the sake of his friend.[9]

Thus portrayed friendship seems at first sight not far removed from the unselfish love of a mother for her child; and self-love seems relegated to its proper place, as a secondary motive. But self is still in the

[1] "Ethics," VIII. iii. 1.
[2] "Ethics," VIII. ii. 3.
[3] "Ethics," IX. iv. 1.
[4] "Ethics," VIII. iii. 8.
[5] "Ethics," IX. x. 6. Cf. Proverbs xxiii. 26; Deut. vi. 5.
[6] "Ethics," VIII. iii. 6.
[7] "Ethics," IX. xii. 3.
[8] "Ethics," IX. iii.
[9] "Ethics," IX iv. 1.

ascendant. Each of the friends is studying his own happiness in the happiness of the other. It is not, that the friend displaces self, supersedes self, is enthroned in the heart instead of self, but that self is gazing at itself in the friend as in a mirror. Self is not merged in the friend; he is a second self; not a substitute for self, but a self projected as an object of admiration and esteem.[1] Even the happiest, Aristotle says, need a friend, in whom to contemplate their own felicity, and in whom they may find a conscious exercise for the beneficent energies, which would otherwise be inert and sterile. A solitary life, however blissful in itself, is a life truncated; it hungers for friendship to develope all that is useful and agreeable in itself.[2] Self-love, Aristotle tells us explicitly, is proper and commendable in those, who live according to reason; it is out of place only in those, who are slaves to their passions.[3] To die for another, he says rightly,[4] is the culmination of self-sacrifice. But, if the motive is to gain the applause of others or of oneself, the seeming self-sacrifice is really selfish.[5]

Throughout his treatment of friendship Aristotle seems endeavouring ineffectually to rise above selfish considerations. It is honourable, he says, to do good to others without seeking a recompense, though the recompense is not to be despised.[6] He sees the

[1] "Ethics," IX. iv. 1. Cf. IX. ix. 1, φίλος ἕτερος αὐτός. IX. ix. 4, 10.

[2] "Ethics," IX. ix. 5.

[3] "Ethics," IX. viii. 6.

[4] Cf. St. John xv. 13.

[5] "Ethics," IX. viii. 9.

[6] "Ethics," VIII. xiii. 8. Cf. IX. xii. 1.

same unconscious struggle in the world around him. Most men, he says, wish to be loved for the sake of the honour which redounds to them through their friends:[1] and yet a mother is happy in the happiness of her child, even though she knows, that the child has no thought of her.[2] There can be no friendship, he says, with things inanimate; and yet too many use their friends merely as instruments for profit or amusement.[3] In one aspect, he admits, friendship is an affair, in which men barter their several commodities; but those, who are disappointed in this way, have only themselves to thank, for putting the wrong consideration in the first place, and for loving, not their friend, but what belonged to him.[4] The exchange must be equitable; that is, with due regard to possibility, and on the principle, which Aristotle is never weary of reiterating, that the intention is the main thing.[5] As always, circumstances must be taken into account; for instance, more is due to a benefactor than to one, who is only a pleasant companion. Why is it, he asks, that those, who have conferred a favour, love the recipient more, than they are loved by him?[6] He repudiates the sordid supposition, that they calculate on being repaid with usury; but he argues, that in benefiting others men are more able to realise their own superiority, and that

[1] "Ethics," VIII. viii. 1. [2] "Ethics," VIII. viii. 3.
[3] "Ethics," VIII. viii. 6. Cf. note 5, p. 47.
[4] "Ethics," IX. i. 3. See note 5, p. 47.
[5] "Ethics," IX. ii. Cf. V. ix. 11.
[6] Cf. "Odisse quem læseris."—TACITUS.

the retrospective delight arising from this sense of superiority outlasts the enjoyment of pecuniary gain.[1] They who excel their friends in goodness must be loved more than they love; otherwise there will be a disparity or rather a disproportion.[2] The man of great soul, Aristotle says, must not rally his friends round him in his misfortune, for it would humiliate him to be helped by them. A friend cannot wish his friends to enjoy perfect felicity, for then they would want his aid no more.[3] Even the love of kinsmen is resolved into the consideration of the profit or pleasure accruing thereby.[4] The idea of barter recurs continually; and the attempt to reconcile the conflicting principles of self-interest and benevolence blurs and distorts the loveliness of true friendship.[5]

Pagan friendship is restricted within a small circle;[6] slaves are excluded; they are machines, not men in the full sense.[7] Women and children are admissible only on a lower footing.[8] The friend, who proves unworthy, must be cast adrift. It is wrong, indeed, to forget in a moment all the intimacy of the past,[9] or not to come to the rescue, if there is likelihood of

[1] "Ethics," IX. vii. 6.

[2] "Ethics," VIII. vii. But in purely unselfish friendship the higher raises the lower to his own level. So God raises man.

[3] "Ethics," VIII. vii. 6. Cf. IX. iv. 4.

[4] "Ethics," VIII. xii. [5] "Ethics," VIII. vii. 6.

[6] Contrast St. M., v. 44. Cf. "Ethics," VIII. xi. 7.

[7] "Ethics," VIII. xi. 6, *ἔμψυχον ὄργανον*. See Appendix I.

[8] "Ethics," VIII. x. 5. Cf. V. vi. 9, *τὰ τέκνα*.

[9] "Ethics," IX. iii. 5. Cf. "Tales amicitiæ dissuendæ non dirumpendæ sunt."—CICERO.

extricating a friend from the consequences of his fault;[1] but, if the predicament looks hopeless, a prudent man will keep at a safe distance.[2] With Aristotle friendship, like happiness, like virtue, is the privilege of a chosen few; Christian brotherhood is for all. So, the charitable associations of Pagan Rome were for special political purposes only;[3] those, which Christianity has created and fostered, are world-wide in their range.

[1] "Ethics," IX. iii. 3.

[2] "Ethics," IX. iii. 3; Contrast Galatians vi. 2; St. Luke xix. 10. Aristotle disparages forgiveness (see p. 58). Cf. DÖLLINGER, "Jew and Gentile," I. p. 341.

[3] "Collegia."

CHAPTER V.

IMMORTALITY.

Apparent Inconsistency.—It would be easy to cite from the writings of Aristotle passages not a few apparently contradicting one another on the question, whether or not there is a life beyond the present life for man. This discrepancy is in part merely a discrepancy of expression; for, occasionally he borrows a phrase in vogue, if it will serve to illustrate his meaning, even though it cannot pass muster critically, and uses for the purpose of the moment a conventional opinion, as a traveller uses the current coin of a foreign country, without stopping to test its intrinsic value. Thus he speaks of sacrifices for the dead, of swearing by the dead, of calling the dead enviable.[1] Partly, too, it arises from the difference between esoteric and exoteric teaching. For Aristotle was a man of the world as well as a philosopher; he adapts his terminology, as the treatise is abstruse or practical. Above all, the discrepancy is the inevitable embodiment of an actual incertitude, such as varies with varying moods, presenting, for instance, a future existence to the imagination clearly on the breezy

[1] DÖLLINGER, "Jew and Gentile, I. p. 338.

summit of the mountain, dimly amid the stifling fumes of the laboratory. He longs for a happiness more unalloyed than is attainable here, for something more restful than the onward march of science, for an unimpeded, uninterrupted flow of healthful energies, such as the vicissitudes of this life cannot permit. As a close observer of life, he cannot close his eyes to the fact, that a certain amount, at least, of outward prosperity is wanted for the inward serenity, absolute in itself, if it is only as a frame to the picture, as a setting for the jewel. Health and wealth, a good reputation, length of days, friends and clients, propitious seasons, and other external advantages, all conduce to happiness; they minister to it, though they cannot constitute it; they are not essential to it, but their absence weakens and impairs it; and all these are precarious and unstable.[1] Even the man, who, so far as he is himself concerned, stands firm as a four-square tower,[2] and presents an inexpugnable front to his assailants, needs to be surrounded by others like himself. The plaintive cry is forced even from the compressed lips of Aristotle, that there is no continuous enjoyment on earth, for there is no possibility of continuous energising.[3] But no certain answer comes to him from the darkness.

As a physiologist, Aristotle speaks of an immortality; but it is an immortality of a species,[4]

[1] "Ethics," I. viii. 6, 17, *εὐετηρία, εὐημερία, κ.τ.λ.*

[2] "Ethics," I. x. 11, *τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου.*

[3] "Ethics," X. iv. 9, *οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἥδεται, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ.*

[4] GRANT, "Ethics," I. p. 299.

not of an individual. Arguing against the Platonic notion of memory, he implies, that, as there can have been no previous existence of the soul, so there can be no future existence in store for it. Generally in the Ethics he avoids the question, as scarcely bearing on the subject before him. If he touches it at all, it is with the neutrality of an agnostic or of a positivist in the present day. He leaves it undetermined, whether the dead have any cognisance of what happens on earth to those, who were dearest to them,[1] contenting himself with saying, that, if they have any such cognisance at all, it can only be of the faintest kind and hardly appreciable.[2] It is very ungracious, he says, to oppose popular prejudices on such a subject, but he is reluctantly compelled for the truth's sake.[3] In discussing Solon's aphorism, that no one is to be pronounced happy before death, he calls it altogether absurd to understand Solon as meaning, that there can be any happiness after death, for after death there can be no more energising.[4] In depicting courage, he remarks incidentally, that after death there seems to be neither good nor evil;[5] and that the happiest are those who have most cause to

[1] "Ethics," I. xi. 5, 6. Cf. "The Two Voices."
TENNYSON.

[2] "Ethics," I. xi. Cf. *νεκύων ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα.*
HOMER.

[3] "Ethics," I. xi. 1, *λίαν ἄφιλον.*

[4] "Ethics," I. x. 2, *παντελῶς ἄτοπον.* Cf. "Dicique beatus Ante obitum nemo supremaque funera debet."

[5] "Ethics," III. vi. 6. The words on suicide in "The Ethics" are neutral as to a life beyond the grave.

dread dying.[1] Here on earth, and now in the life present, if anywhere and at any time, is to be found the happiness, which Aristotle proposes to his disciples as their aim in life.

Personal Immortality.—So far, then, as can be ascertained from dubious and conflicting statements, Aristotle excludes from his philosophy a personal immortality.[2] He rejects the Pythagorean doctrine of the soul passing from one body to another, together with the Platonic doctrine, that the experiences of this life bear witness to a life in the past. He distinguishes the creative from the receptive intelligence in man; or, to anticipate the terms of modern philosophy, the reason from the understanding.[3] The intelligence, which is receptive of sensations, a particle or emanation from the universal soul, depends for existence on the body, to which it imparts completeness and individuality,[4] as the seal to the wax, and to which it stands in the relation of artist to his instrument, of pilot to his boat, or of master to his slave.[5] This receptive intelligence is diverse and peculiar in each person; though not the body, it belongs to the body;[6] with

[1] "Ethics," III. ix. 4. Grant rightly observes, that the passage (III. ii. 7) on exemption from death being for men an impossibility, has no bearing on the question of a future life (GRANT; *ad loc.*)

[2] GRANT, "Ethics," I. 299.

[3] GRANT, "Ethics," I. 297.

[4] Ἐντελεχεία.

[5] "Ethics," VIII. xi. 6; GRANT, "Ethics," I. 295,296.

[6] WESTMINSTER REVIEW, LX. (New Series), p. 351.

all its functions of thought, memory, consciousness, and so forth, it ceases to be, when the vegetative life of the body ceases, for it is inseparable from it. But the creative soul, which shapes and informs the universe, is indestructible, unlike the body, in which it sojourns for a time. It is one and the same in every person. All that is personal and individual dies with the body.[1] The stars, Aristotle says, are far more divine than man;[2] for there is no sure and certain hope of immortality for him.[3]

[1] GRANT, "Ethics," I. 298.

[2] "Ethics," VI. vii. 4. Cf. Psalms viii. 4, 5; cxiii. 5. Cf. GRANT, "Ethics," I. 286, 287.

[3] The distinction which Aristotle draws, between the *νοῦς* and the *πρακτικὸς λόγος* supports, negatively, the belief, that personality does not reside in the intellect but in the will, and, positively, the belief, that life eternal is in union with God, *e.g.*, "Ethics," IX. iv. 4, *δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι, ἢ μάλιστα*; X. vii. 9, *δόξειε δ' ἂν εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον.* Cf. St. John xvii. 3. Cf. Appendix J.

CHAPTER VI.

DEITY.

Popular Phraseology.—What has been said of Aristotle on the question of an immortal soul, is true of him in great measure on the question of the existence and attributes of God. By bringing face to face his exoteric and esoteric teachings, and by contrasting his conventional phrases with those of a more precisely philosophical kind, he may easily be made to contradict himself. The wise man he says, is a favourite of God.[1] He speaks of praying for things absolutely best, that they may be best for ourselves.[2] He even uses the term "gods," as if a believer in the polytheism of the vulgar.[3] The friendship of parents with their children is compared with the friendship of gods with men.[4] Honour is due to gods as to parents, because from them comes succour.[5] The gods are above being praised by men.[6] But it is only a hypothetical assent, after all, which he gives to current beliefs on this point. As about the soul, so about the deity, he shuns making

[1] "Ethics," X. viii. 13. [2] "Ethics," V. i. 9.
[3] "Ethics," I. xii. 3, 4; IX. ii. 8. See Appendix K.
[4] "Ethics," VIII. xii. 5. [5] "Ethics," VIII. xiv. 4.
[6] "Ethics," I. xii. 4.

an explicit declaration.[1] In speaking of the wise as very dear to heaven, he adds significantly, if the gods have any care for man and exercise any superintendence over his affairs.[2] Happiness, he says, may well be called a gift from the gods, if, indeed, there is anything which comes to man from them.[3]

Atheism.—Apart from particular expressions, which may or may not have weight in helping us to formulate Aristotle's opinions on this point, there is much in the general tenor of his moral philosophy which separates him from those, who deny the existence of a God. Even while avowedly it makes man the judge of what is right, his philosophy bears tacit witness to the existence of God, so far as it bears witness to the existence of a moral order in the world. The supremacy, which he assigns to reason in man,[4] and the obedience, which he claims for it from the lower parts of his nature, indicate the presence in the universe of a divine, over-ruling intelligence. The teleologic form, in which his argument is cast, implies design. The gradual ascent from the life vegetative to life intellectual points upward to a yet higher Being. Consciousness in man suggests an existence external to the material world. The vital force, originating the incessant

[1] "Ethics," I. iii. 6; vi. 14; vii. 18. Cf. Dr. Johnson's Prayer, "In this world, where much is to be done and little to be known," &c.

[2] "Ethics," X. viii. 13.

[3] "Ethics," I. ix. 2.

[4] *E.g.*, "Ethics," V. xi. 9.

movement, which symbolises growth and decay alike, whence is the origin of it?[1]

Pantheism.—The drift, then, of the Aristotelian philosophy is far from irreconcileable with the supremacy of an infinite Being. But the language of Aristotle is equivocal, at one time vaguely deistic, at another pantheistic. On the one hand he speaks of what are called the laws of nature as necessary only "conditionally," and as "means to an end."[2] On the other hand he speaks of the universe, as if "self-designed," "a design without a designer."[3] He speaks of the supreme intelligence, at one time, as of a commander ordering his troops; at another time, as of the spirit of discipline, which animates them.[4] It is the great central object of all desire and of all thought, the aim and end of all being,[5] setting all things in motion,[6] itself immoveable nor liable to

[1] Aristotle speaks of chance, from the subjective point of view, as man's incertitude about the future, not as an intrinsic fortuitousness in the events themselves. "Ethics," I. ix. x. Cf. GRATRY, "La Connaissance de Dieu." Paris. 1864.

[2] Cf. GRANT, "Ethics," I. 280, 281. The immutability of natural laws, while negativing some popular misconceptions (Cf. H. Spencer, "Study of Sociology," p. 437), does not negative the conception of a divine government. Omniscience can frame laws immutable, which shall fit themselves to every possible emergency. Nor does "evolution" really "exclude creation," for evolution traces itself back ultimately to a creating power.

[3] GRANT, "Ethics," I. 282, 283.

[4] GRANT, "Ethics," I. 290, 291.

[5] GRANT, "Ethics," I. 221, 222.

[6] GRANT, "Ethics," I. 221.

change;[1] but it is not with him, as with Plato, the architect of the universe. It is self-existent, eternal; but so is the universe. It is an unceasing energy, not a mere potentiality; but it works without volition. It contemplates itself; but it is utterly incomprehensible by man. It is form, unalloyed by matter; but it pervades a material world. It is one; but it is inseparable from the universe. It is at once personal and impersonal; it is an individual and an idea. It is infinite power, but not infinite benevolence. In the bliss of self-contemplation it is serenely indifferent to right and wrong among men.[2] Pagan philosophy can go no further.[3]

[1] GRANT, "Ethics," I. 289.

[2] *V.s. e.g.*, "Sapientum templa serena."—LUCRETIUS.

[3] Cf. DÖLLINGER, "Jew and Gentile," II. 334, 335; GRANT, "Ethics," I. 289, 293; WESTMINSTER REVIEW (New Series), LX. 335.

CHAPTER VII.

CONCLUSION.

The Limitations of the Aristotelian Moral Philosophy.—In surveying the Ethics of Aristotle as a whole, three things stand out conspicuously admirable; the delight of friendship, the stately seemliness of self-control, the blissful serenity of contemplation. But these excellences are marred, as we have seen, by the defects inseparable from the time and place, in which he lived. What he sees, he sees clearly; what he knows, he knows thoroughly; what he can grasp firmly, he can appreciate fully; but in every direction his range of vision is circumscribed by barriers impassable for him. He cripples the free expansion of all, that is noblest in man's nature, by subordinating all other motives to regard for self. The true purpose of man's existence, he says rightly, is to do well the work, which belongs to him.[1] But this work, according to his teaching, is to develope himself for himself, not for others and for God.

Nor can this well be otherwise, so long as his philosophy can impart no higher teaching, than what was conventionally current in his day, and can claim

[1] "Ethics," II. vi. 2.

no higher sanction, than public opinion.[1] The imperfect aspirations of pagan morality are perfected in the revelation of divine love through Jesus Christ; for man's gratitude finds in that love a motive and a sanction for willing self-sacrifice, such as Altruism, even the purest, can never supply by itself. The Utilitarianism even of culture and æstheticism is less able, even than Altruism, to raise itself above the Aristotelian ideal. In their result self-interest and self-sacrifice may coincide, for self-sacrifice tends through self-control to true happiness. But so long as the rightful order is inverted, and self-interest is made the end in view, the endeavour frustrates itself and the end is unattainable. When man's true ideal is set before him, in the triumph of self-sacrifice on Calvary, then, notwithstanding the ineradicable hindrances, which are at work within man and without to the end of time, his nature is emancipated from the bondage of self for that service, which alone is "perfect freedom."

An able writer has said that "the radical error of Aristotle's philosophy is the false abstraction and isolation of the intellectual from the material sphere in nature and in human life."[2] This is an error, which the progress of experimental psychology tends more and more to correct, by showing material forces at

[1] Aristotle's recognition of a conventional morality so far as this recognition is based on sympathy, implies, tacitly and unconsciously, that self is subordinate to regard for others. See p. 49, Note 1.

[2] WESTMINSTER REVIEW (New Series), No. LX., p. 370.

work in man's intellect and emotions. But for those practical purposes, which are indeed the ultimate aim of moral philosophy, a radical defect in the ethics of Aristotle is the non-recognition of sin.[1] It makes all the difference, in the formation of character, whether wrong-doing is (as, apparently, in Goethe's autobiography) only a blunder, which thwarts man's chances of being happy, or a defilement of the soul, loathsome and hideous, for which he is himself responsible. Regret or remorse for having made a mistake entailing disagreeable consequences [2] is very different from sorrow for having offended a loving Father. The ambition to be as God, and, like God, to enjoy a painless and passionless existence recoils upon itself, and, instead of lifting man nearer to his ideal, leaves him in an abnormal isolation, a mere parody of what he dreamed to be.

It belongs to the physiologist, according to Aristotle,[3] to say, how the ignorance is to be dispelled, which knows not, what is right and what is wrong. Pagan morality, confronted by the perversity, which refuses to see any reason, why virtue is to be preferred to vice, is silent. Nor do the Ethics of Aristotle encourage the hopes that the moral principles, which they enunciate so clearly, admit of a progressive development, which shall enable the moralist to answer

[1] The difference in the meanings of ἅγιος and ὅσιος in Christian and Pagan writers illustrates the difference in their ways of regarding virtue and vice.

[2] Cf. p. 45, Note 1.

[3] "Ethics," VII. iii. 12.

the sceptic, who questions the existence of morality. But in another land and among a people, who to the favourite of Alexander might seem scarcely worth a thought, a purer and loftier morality ripened slowly to its maturity. In the fulness of time, fore-measured by Omniscience, when the Alexandrine empire had crumbled to dust before the indomitable legions of Rome, the heavenly precepts, imparted to the Chosen People in the Desert and in Canaan, were consummated in Him, in Whose Gospel all, that is imperishable in the moral philosophy of Greece, lives on for ever.

Like a king on his death-bed, the moral philosophy of Ancient Greece points with faltering hand to the successor who shall ascend the vacant throne; or rather, in the full glory of its meridian, it resigns its crown and sceptre to the rightful Lord of Humanity, whose "kingdom shall have no end." His teaching, His example, His self-sacrifice transform suffering into discipline, despair into resignation, and raise human nature, prostrate before an inexorable fate, to the self-conquest, which is the union of the soul with God.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A. (See p. vii.)

THE SYLLOGISM.

"Of course, even before Aristotle, philosophy had been attempting to make its inductions; in other words, to form a collection of facts, from which to elicit laws of general application. This is not a method peculiar to philosophers, but common to every mind. We are all so constituted as to perceive a resemblance, and to classify instinctively the objects, which we perceive, according to their resemblance. By the same law of association we go on to infer, by the deductive syllogism, that, wherever there is resemblance, there what we have already ascertained about one thing may safely be predicated or asserted of the other. The only difference is in the manner of collecting our particular instances, and drawing from them our general conclusions. These operations may be performed loosely or exactly, partially or completely. Our analysis may be misled by a false resemblance, our deduction by an erroneous manner of connecting the two propositions, from which we argue."

"The syllogism is the most elementary mode of thought next to the mere apprehension of a quality in anything, for it is simply the combination of two apprehensions, which are connected in the mind by something, which is common to both. On meeting any object, which resembles an object known already, the mind, obeying its law of coincidence, substitutes it in thought for the object known already, and imputes to it whatever qualities belong to that object. The hypothetical syllogism is, in reality, only the ordinary syllogism, altered in expression, and may easily be converted into it."

"The distinction between inductive and deductive reasoning is sometimes pressed too far, as if the syllogism belonged to the latter only. But even induction uses the syllogism, and cannot proceed without it. In every step of its researches induction uses the syllogism as its instrument *provisionally* for classification and generalisation. Each particular instance, which meets us is, so to speak, a supposed universal for the time being, and retains the force of an universal statement until dethroned by wider experiences. One rose must stand as the representative in the mind of all roses, till the mind lights on another. The process, which is always at work in the mind of a child, as soon as it begins to take notice, is the same process in embryo as that, by which the philosopher elaborates his theories. The form of the syllogisms is identical. The connecting link between the two objects, which the mind endeavours to adjust within itself in due relation to one another, is the

little word, which expresses in its strictest sense identity of extension and intention, and, used loosely, mere resemblance. 'This *is* that' may express any degree of coincidence from absolute identity to a mere likeness in appearance. For example a child perceives, that an object called a stone is heavy, and by a law, which it must obey, he argues, that a something else, which seems to resemble this stone, has the same properties; and, accordingly, that this also is heavy. The process, by which the inductive philosopher establishes his general statement is precisely similar. Certain eagles, for instance, he learns by observation, have a certain habit; all eagles, so far as he knows, are like these eagles; therefore, he infers, all eagles have this habit. To a child even the sameness of name brings with it the sense of actual identity. A child accustomed to any one, for instance, called John, cannot at first understand without difficulty, that there can be another person of that name, another and not the same. What is called 'à priori' reasoning is, it we analyse it, reasoning 'à posteriori,' done hastily and superficially, and therefore done wrong. The facts, from which it argues, are only guesses."

APPENDIX B. (See p. x.)

ARISTOTLE.

"ABOUT Aristotle as about Shakspeare, Homer, and others pre-eminently great, there hangs a haze of uncertainty, disappointing the inquirer. But enough, at least, is certain to enable one to form a notion of the philosopher as a man. The most striking point in the anecdotes, which are recorded of him is the very thing, which stamps his philosophy with its individuality, and which is the keynote of his system. It is a more than ordinary power of balancing things opposite, of adjusting, of reconciling them. This habit of mind shows itself in small things as in great; in the trivialities of daily life, as well as in its sterner experiences, The very phrase—one thoroughly characteristic of the Greek nation generally, and of their subtle discernment, but peculiarly the property of Aristotle—the phrase, which recurs so continually in his writings, and by which he emphasises his distinctions, is irresistibly recalled by his biography. He seems continually endeavouring, and successfully, to counteract natural infirmities—to overcome, by the adaptation of himself, the force of uncongenial circumstances. He was, we are told, like the great Apostle, of a mean and contemptible presence; but he was studiously careful in his dress. He was of a

weakly and sickly constitution; but he got the better of it by temperance and by attention to rules of diet. He was of a restless and inquisitive temperament. 'Tell me the cause,' he said to his physician, 'treat me not as a driver of oxen or a digger—but tell me the cause, and you shall find me obedient!' He drove his aged teacher, it is related, to take refuge in the garden by the importunity of his questionings. But he could restrain this propensity, when necessary. With his usual tact he cautioned Callisthenes, his democratic disciple, to converse seldom and very courteously with his royal patron, Alexander. He thought, studied, wrote about politics and yet had the good sense to keep himself clear of the political entanglements around him; and when at last the malice of his enemies expelled him from Athens, he accepted this reverse with the equanimity of a true philosopher. Probably like the king-maker of our own country, he reigned by deputy; and through his royal pupil, exercised an indirect but incalculable influence on the policy of Macedon and on the destinies of the world.

"But there is another characteristic of the man to be noticed—not less important than this, and closely allied to it. Any one, who has read even a few pages only of Aristotle's treatises, cannot but mark the brevity and terseness of his style. It is, in a word—inappropriate as the epithet may sound when applied to a dweller beside the Ilissus—thoroughly Laconic. But this is not all. A closer acquaintance detects beneath this epigrammatic terseness a vein of irony;

not of irony such as Socrates delighted in, humorous and genial, but severe, caustic, and incisive. Socrates is quite willing to make himself ridiculous, if only he can make the truth clearer in the end. He does not at all object to his own snub nose being used as an illustration, nay, he is the first to call attention to it, provided that it may serve his purpose, and help on his argument. He can bear to have the laugh against him for the moment, knowing that, in the sequel of the controversy, 'he will laugh who wins.' Aristotle is too self-contained, too proud, too reserved to stoop thus. His irony is that of a man who sees a something wanting everywhere; who is painfully alive to the defects and mistakes of others; who detests any overstatement, even when he feels confident of his position, and dreads the interference of that 'forward and delusive faculty,' as it has been termed[1], the imagination; who feels constrained to own with a sigh, after all researches, that 'what is, must be.'

"The anecdotes of Aristotle prepare us for all this. They are so consistent with one another, so accordant with these peculiarities, that they warn us to make allowance, when we come to his writings, for this 'enstatic' habit of mind, this scrupulosity in objecting. When asked, 'What grows old soon?' he is said to have answered, 'Gratitude;' and he defined hope as 'the dream of one awakened.'[2] Cautious to the last, he shunned even on his deathbed

[1] By Bishop Butler.

[2] Rather, "a waking dream," "a day-dream."

to commit himself in favour either of Theophrastus or Menedemus, who both claimed the honour of succeeding him. He merely indicated the one, whom he preferred by the words, 'The Lesbian is the sweeter.' These casual traits are in perfect keeping with his philosophy. While Plato strikes a full, resounding chord, Aristotle thinks and writes in a minor key. His very pride, as often happens lends to his self-restraint an air of humility. He will not soar too high, because he foresees the fall. He is too well aware of possible objections even to his own most cherished theories, to expose them more than is absolutely needful, or to trust himself to a general statement, which he does not feel able to substantiate. His was a thoroughly critical, judicial mind. He was a thorough man of the world, as well as a professor of philosophy. He would rather build slowly and surely than see his cloud-castles toppling over at the breath of adverse winds. Accordingly the school, which Aristotle founded, is small and insignificant; but the influence, which Aristotle has exercised on the world at large, is unequalled in history.

"Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are a great triumvirate; partitioning among themselves the empire of Ancient Philosophy. Their specialities are too diverse to come into serious collision. The former excel respectively in analysis and synthesis; Aristotle in the harmonious combination of these two things. Socrates leads the way by levelling to the ground the strongholds of an unreasonable scepticism; Plato, like

an Eastern conqueror, dreaming of a universal empire, overruns a vast extent of territory; Aristotle, like a Roman law-giver, consolidates the empire by marshalling its heterogeneous elements in a more firmly organised policy. Or, to take a homelier illustration, Socrates breaks up the fallow ground, and eradicates the noxious overgrowth of weeds; Plato scatters the seeds with a liberal hand; Aristotle comes last to gather in the harvest, carefully severing facts from figments. Socrates is essentially destructive and refutative, even while he is laying his foundations in the incontrovertible truths of morality. Plato, while developing the same elenctic method, uses the abundant materials at his command to construct a system of his own. The strength of Aristotle shows itself especially in unravelling the ingenious complications of his idealistic predecessor, in reducing impracticable theories to more manageable dimensions, in restricting their pretensions by recourse to facts. Accordingly, Plato was the favourite of the Christian Church, while on the aggressive against Paganism, while struggling to extend its influence over regions of thought as yet unsubdued; Aristotle supplanted Plato so soon as it became necessary rather to consolidate, what had been acquired, than to attempt new conquests."

APPENDIX C. (See p. 13).

THE SCULPTOR.

I.

"Chisel in hand stood a sculptor boy,
With his marble block before him;
And his eye was lit by a gleam of joy,
As an angel dream passed o'er him.
He carved that dream on the shapeless stone
With many a sharp incision;
With Heav'n's own light the sculptor shone,
He had caught that Angel Vision.

II.

Sculptors of Life are we, as we stand
With our souls uncarved before us,
Waiting the time when at God's command
Our Life dream shall pass o'er us.
If we carve that dream on the shapeless soul,
With many a sharp incision,
Its heavenly beauty shall be our own,
Our lives that Angel Vision."

ANON.

APPENDIX D. (See p. 21.)

FREEWILL.

"THE will acts 'in accordance with motive'; and to suppose that the will can 'break loose from continuity and act without cause' is as absurd, it is added, as to suppose 'a balance sometimes acting in the usual way, but also possessed of the faculty of turning by itself, without or against its weight.'[1] But we do not say that the will is 'acting without cause'; for the will itself is an item in the causation; nay, to omit the will is to omit the most important factor in the calculation. We do not say that the will is 'breaking loose from continuity,' for the will itself is a connecting link in the chain of continuity. With contending motives equal, as sometimes happens, a man would be as powerless to stir one way or the other, as the ass between the two bundles of hay, but for the intervention of the will. Even with one motive, to all appearance and by all laws of experience outweighing the other, the will, simply by its own adhesion, can reverse the balance. The tender maiden chooses rather to endure the rack or the dungeon than succumb to the torturer. The veteran confessor for his faith frustrates all the hopes of his disciples by preferring shame to suffering. The scales are

[1] E. B. TYLOR, "Primitive Culture," I. 3.

adjusted; the weightier motive, be it of a better or a worse sort, an appetite, an ambition, a self-devotion to some unselfish cause, is sinking down; the lighter kicks the beam; but the will, like the victorious Gaul, flings its sword into the scale, and all is changed in a moment. True, the weights in these scales have no fixed intrinsic value, but one which varies subjectively to each of us. Even causes external to us, hereditary predispositions, early influences, local associations, all must be counted in. True, habitual indulgence may give to a propensity a force not its own, may even make it, by long persistence, a tyrant of that, to which it should be a servant and an instrument. True, the will may become so enfeebled in its miserable thraldom, that only by an extraordinary effort can it be free. Still, after all, the final verdict in that little court, where each man presides, arbiter of his own actions, of his own happiness, is not in the power of any propensity or inclination, but rests with himself, and resides in the conscious energy of his will."—*Characteristics of Christian Morality*, 2nd edition, pp. 19–21.

"It is impossible to define motives accurately, even our own. We cannot say sometimes, why we do a thing. Every reason may be against it—common sense, habit, inclination, experience, duty, all may be pulling one way, and yet we tear ourselves loose and do the thing."—*Anon.*

APPENDIX E. (See p. 28.)

THE INTELLECT.

In one respect, the Aristotelian way of speaking on this point, though questionable as attributing to the intellect a function, which seems more properly to belong to something in man superior to the intellect (his will), is invaluable, as reminding, that it is one and the same faculty, which appreciates scientific truth, artistic beauty, moral goodness, though in one kind of appreciation it may be more liable to disturbance from emotional influences than in another. The common expression "the conscious will" may be defensible, as a compendious way of saying, that the personality, which decides, is able so to detach and project itself from itself, as to criticise itself, but it may mislead, if taken to mean, that consciousness is not a function of the intellect.

APPENDIX F. (See p. 36.)

A LIBERAL EDUCATION.

"THAT man, I think, has had a liberal education, who has been so trained in youth, that his body is the ready servant of his will, and does with ease and pleasure all the work, that as a mechanism it is capable of; whose intellect is a clear, cold, logic engine, with all its parts of equal strength, and in smooth working order; ready, like a steam-engine, to be turned to any kind of work, and spin the gossamers as well as forge the anchors of the mind: whose mind is stored with the great and fundamental truths of nature, and laws of her operations; one who, no stunted ascetic, is full of life and fire, but whose passions are trained to come to heel by a vigorous will, the servant of a tender conscience; who has learned to love all beauty whether of nature or art, to hate all vileness, and to respect others as himself."—PROFESSOR HUXLEY.

APPENDIX G. (See p. 46.)

SELF-LOVE.

"ARISTOTELIANISM and Christianity both promise happiness; the former proposes it as an end in itself; the latter proposes duty as the end of life, and happiness as a reward for those, who do their duty for duty's sake, and not from selfish motives. The Apostle enjoins the Christians to practise things, that are "lovely and of good report," but it is in order that their Master may not be spoken against, and that their Father in Heaven may be glorified. With Aristotle honour is an end in itself. Whatever brings with it praise and renown, whatever enhances a man's reputation among his fellow citizens is right; and the verdict admits of no reversal by a higher tribunal. Exile was ignominious beyond what we with our notions can understand, simply because to be expelled in disgrace by his neighbours branded a man as having forfeited the good opinion, which was the only criterion of virtue."

The Eastern apologue illustrates quaintly the self-renunciation of faith.

"One night Abû Yezid Bestàmì being alone in his cell and plunged in ecstasy, cried out in his vivid apprehension of the feebleness and impotence of human nature, 'O, my God, when shall I unite

myself and Thee? O God most high how long wilt Thou leave me to consume away in this cruel separation? When wilt Thou give me the wine of Thy enjoyment?' Then a voice from out of the impenetrable abode of the Divine Majesty sounded above his head, and he heard the words 'Abû Yezid, the Thou is still with thee. If thou wilt attain unto Me, quit thyself and come.'" And so Jelâlu D-Dîn, the great Muslim saint and teacher, in the Mesuevî:—"One knocked at the door of the Beloved and a voice from within said:—'Who is there?' Then he answered: '*It is I.*' The voice replied: 'This house will not hold *me* and *thee!*' So the door remained shut. The lover retired to a wilderness and spent some time in solitude, fasting, and prayer. One year elapsed, when he again returned and knocked at the door. 'Who is there?' said the voice. The lover answered, '*It is Thou.*' Then the door was opened."—W. S. LILLY, *Ancient Religion and Modern Thought.* 2nd Edition.

APPENDIX H. (See p. 56.)

"THE GOLDEN MEAN."

"ARISTOTLE evidently felt a strong repugnance to the idea of a "summum bonum." By a natural reaction of thought he suspected, that the enquiry after any such thing would prove the pursuit of a chimera. He would not waste his time and trouble on anything so unpractical. His strength lay, and he knew it, in discriminating among the various circumstances of time, place, occasion, &c., which give its proper character to any particular action. The same action, he was well aware, may be worthy of praise or blame, according to the manner, in which it is done, the causes and consequences, which belong to it. Killing an invading foe in battle, for instance, and killing the friend, who sits beside one at a feast, are the same action, and yet as contrary as light and darkness. Aristotle would not lend himself to what had proved a fruitless quest to Plato. Still he felt, as every one, who thinks at all, must feel, that there is at the bottom an unity of principle in all manifestations of goodness, happiness, beauty, and truth.[1] He could see, that there is a proportionateness, invariably, which determines the fitness of every action, and which, as it is observed or disregarded, characterises every action as good or evil."

[1] St. Paul recognises this moral unity in using the same word, πλεονεξία, for covetousness and lust. (See p. 59, Note 2.)

APPENDIX I. (See p. 65.)

SLAVERY.

"CHRISTIANITY may allow slavery, under certain modifications, as a temporary necessity, as a lesser evil than lawlessness and anarchy, as the only way to restrain brute force, until the slave can be educated for citizenship; but Christianity never forgets, that slave as well as freeman has inalienable rights, which belong to every being endowed with free will and an heir of immortality."

APPENDIX J. (See p. 71.)

For he, who reasons on both parts doth bring,
Doth some things mortal, some immortal call;
Now, if himself were but a mortal thing,
He could not judge immortal things at all.

For when we judge, our minds we mirrors make;
And as those glasses, which material be,
Forms of material things do only take,
For thoughts or minds in them we cannot see;

So when we God and angels do conceive,
And think of truth, which is eternal too,
Then do our minds immortal forms receive,
Which, if they mortal were, they could not do.

SIR JOHN DAVIES.


APPENDIX K. (See p. 72.)

PANTHEISM AND POLYTHEISM.

"A GOOD and thoughtful man in those days had simply to choose between such impersonations of vice and folly as were the deities of the vulgar mythology, and a mere abstraction, a being too superior to take any notice of men. The prayer of the philosopher, if ever the ineradicable instinct of prayer forced its way upward from his soul, would naturally be—

'Thou Great First Cause least understood.'

Or, if in thought the philosopher could raise himself to the conception of a Person, in whom the attributes of divinity might worthily reside, he would still be offering his homages to an 'unknown God,' to 'One by many names adored, Jehovah, Jove, or Lord.'"



ADDENDA.

I.

p. 12 * Add—The moral essentiality of the intention is the key to the understanding of Evangelic precepts, sometimes explained away as "Counsels of Perfection," *e.g.*, about not resisting (St. Matt. v. 39–41.) There must be nothing selfish in the intention.

II.

* * "There was a wide distance with him between wishing and willing. . . . between the choice of means, and the putting of them into execution."—From Retz's character of the Duc d' Orleans; quoted in *The Nineteenth Century*, No. III., p. 646.

III.

p. 46 * Add—Chacun de nous rassembl' à la terre du vieux système de Ptolémée et veut "que l'univers entier tourne autour de lui."—Souvestre.

IV.

p. 46, Note 1.—For "so far as results go,——— corresponds with it," read—So far as results go, provided that self-love is intelligent enough to discern them completely, the selfish theory of virtue, though diametrically opposed in motive to the doctrine of self-sacrifice, coincides with the unselfish theory.

PART II.

THE LOGICAL TREATISES, THE METAPHYSICS, THE PSYCHOLOGY, THE POLITICS.

INTRODUCTION.

ARISTOTELIANISM has had a singular history. For more than two centuries after Aristotle's death, from 322 B.C. to 100 B.C., considerable portions of his writings were lost.[1] Among his immediate followers, interest in logic and metaphysics declined, and the sole stimulus they inherited from their teacher shewed itself in popular adaptations or alterations in the region of Ethics, and a more or less successful study of nature. According to the well-known story related by Strabo, Aristotle's original manuscripts, after a variety of fortunes, were brought to Athens, about 100 B.C., by Apellicon of Teos. Plutarch states that from these Andronicus of Rhodes, about 70 B.C., began a new edition, and compiled a catalogue. Yet the revival of interest which thus arose was transitory. By another strange freak of fortune, Christendom lost all knowledge of Aristotle, with the exception of the logical treatises, until the end of the twelfth century; and by a freak still more

[1] The Metaphysics, at all events, and probably the Politics.

strange, the Moorish conquerors of Spain brought back to the Western world a philosophy which had been dormant for a thousand years.

The Romans were, as a whole, indifferent to, or incapable of, abstract thought. When the capture of Athens, in 86 B.C., gave them possession of the rescued manuscripts, there is no trace to be found of anything like a philosophical renaissance. Moreover, Hellenic culture, which for more than a hundred years had cast so potent a spell upon the Roman mind, was beginning to lose its power. It had done its work, and Roman literature, the exotic which it had introduced and fostered, grew strong enough to assert a native and original force.

But though Aristotle was almost forgotten in the West, he found disciples in the East among the Syrians and Persians. Through both these channels his teaching passed on to the Arabians. Avicenna in the East, Averroës in the West, stand conspicuous among Arabian students and commentators. The Jews of Spain and Provence translated many of these commentaries into Hebrew, and, largely through their influence, translations were made from the Arabic into Latin. The Theologians of the Middle Ages seized upon Aristotle as their authority, both in logic and metaphysics. From the end of the thirteenth to the end of the sixteenth century,

Aristotelianism was orthodox and supreme. The logical treatises were elaborated with the utmost care and skill. Every subtlety of deductive argument was explored and practised ; but authority, instead of induction, supplied the premisses, until, by a transition which is not hard to understand, a system built upon experience became but another name for word-splitting and casuistry.

The great movement to which Bacon, in the early part of the seventeenth century, gave body and voice, came as a natural re-action upon three centuries of mental slavery. The Aristotelian logic, which had been almost a revelation to the early scholastics, had accomplished its task, and what appeared to Bacon and the Baconians as an inherent flaw in the system, sprang chiefly from its application. We can now see and acknowledge the immense debt which we owe even to the scholastics. They fashioned for the new order which followed an exquisitely delicate instrument of thought, although the material which it had been employed upon was obsolete.

For two centuries this re-action from Scholasticism depreciated the Aristotelian philosophy, but during the last hundred years a more careful discrimination has done much to remove the prejudice. There are certain principles which lie beneath the thought of every age. The majority of mankind act upon them

unconsciously, but the practised eye can detect them working through society, just as the geologist perceives the hidden lines of force which run through the colour and contour of a landscape. Those thinkers who have most fully grasped these principles will be the first to recognise that Aristotle is neither an old-world philosopher, nor the expounder of any particular century or system, but one who has formulated and often answered those questions which must be asked as long as human nature remains the same.

In the curious history which has been touched upon, there are two remarkable associations, which will serve to illustrate the divergent tendencies, as well as the wide scope of Aristotle's thought.

Medicine on the one hand, and theology on the other, have both used Aristotle's name to conjure with. It is not without significance that the practice of medicine was hereditary in his family. Nicomachus, Aristotle's father, claimed descent from Æsculapius himself, and his fame extended from his home, Stagirus, as far as the Macedonian Court at Pella. It is not improbable that Aristotle himself, in early life, gave some attention to surgery. Doubtless, he inherited from his father, along with the secrets of his craft, a delicacy of touch intensified through many generations, and habits of observation which gave a strong experimental bias to his philosophy.

The same suggestive connexion is often repeated. Alkendi, Avicenna, Avempace, Abubacer, Averroës, were physicians as well as philosophers, and they all recognised Aristotle as their master.

The doctrine of the Trinity, set forth at the Council of Nicæa, in 325 A.D., derived its force, in many minds, and for several centuries, from authority rather than conviction. Imperfectly understood, it appeared as a sort of disguised polytheism, and the Mohammedan movement of the seventh century was one of the forms of protest which sprang from the misconception. The philosophy of Aristotle, more especially his metaphysics, seemed to ally itself with the Monotheists, as they held themselves to be, rather than the Trinitarians. Thus, among Christians, the study of Aristotle was at first confined to the heretics, while the Mohammedans, from the outset, adopted him as the philosophical expounder of their creed. But long before the Schoolmen, orthodox Christians had ceased to regard the little they knew of Aristotle with disfavour, and when Arabian learning, even while transmitting itself, disappeared, Aristotle was recognised by the Church as an authority beyond dispute, and employed by the Christian Schoolmen, as before by the Mohammedans, to formulate an elaborate system.

These two associations are more than accidental

They indicate the comprehensive character of a system which can embrace two extremes of thought. Part of the secret of Aristotle lies hidden in his subtle union of opposites. Those who see the concave, but not the convex, to borrow one of his own illustrations, term him one-sided. He is stigmatised as a confounder of opposites, as a dualist, by minds which do not grasp the essential unity of the two. Yet it is in this rare balance of intellect that his strength and profundity must be sought for. Of Aristotle, and Aristotle alone, it may be said, that he neither "divides in order to distinguish," nor "distinguishes in order to divide."[1]

[1] Cf. COLERIDGE, "Aids to Reflection, Introductory Aphorisms," xxvi.

ARISTOTLE

(LOGIC, METAPHYSICS, PSYCHOLOGY, POLITICS).

CHAPTER I.

THE ORGANON.

THE death of Plato, in the year 347 B.C., may be taken as a turning-point in the history of Greek thought. Early in the previous century, Greek, and more especially Athenian life, had received a stimulus from victory over Persia, which was even greater than the effect of the defeat of the Spanish Armada upon England; and one of the directions taken by this new activity was a criticism of all accepted belief, which, if sceptical, was at its commencement thoroughly honest. The graduated meanings attached to the word "sophist" would form an instructive chapter in the history of ancient speculation. The wise investigator and master of his craft, known to Æschylus and Herodotus, became by degrees the man of cleverness and subtlety, the quibbler and trickster of Demosthenes. Part of the reason of this change may be found in the particular form which

critical investigation took. Philosophical, and even historical treatises were not wanting, but they presented a reflection of another and more important method, viz., actual discussion between the leaders of Hellenic thought. Although at the outset such discussion arose from a real desire to arrive at truth, the exigencies of debate, together with the applause of an audience keenly alive to the subtleties of verbal controversy, fostered a longing for victory in argument rather than for the solution of a question of high philosophy; and the controversialist who succeeded in defeating his antagonist gained in reputation at the expense of the genuine philosopher. Thus, verbal subtleties took the place of sound reasoning, and were developed to such an extent that the boundaries between truth and falsehood were obscured, and seemed almost to be decided by a trick of words. Political considerations helped forward the movement. The philosopher who forgot to teach or discover in his eagerness to convince, gathered round him a school of youthful candidates for popular favour, at a time when speaking was the easiest road to pre-eminence. Alcibiades and Critias attached themselves to Socrates, not so much from love of wisdom as to acquire his unrivalled skill in argument and refutation.

One of the great achievements of Socrates and Plato was to assert the existence of truth against the subtleties and quibbles of the time, and to make tentative efforts after a system which would lead to its discovery. What they began, Aristotle accom-

plished. By an analysis of the processes of deductive thought, so complete that nothing essential has since been added, he swept away the sophistries of a hundred years, and answered a question which had been asked with growing importunity by three successive generations of the noblest spirits of the Hellenic race.

The separate treatises in which Aristotle accomplished this great work are six in number. The first, the "Categories,"[1] treats of terms—names, or verbal symbols, *i.e.*, when used as the subject or predicate of a statement or proposition. Following naturally upon this, the second, the "De Interpretatione,"[2] deals with propositions thus formed. The third, the "Analytica Priora," shows the laws by which propositions can be combined so as to produce inference. The fourth, the "Analytica Posteriora," is an application of the methods already stated to scientific truth; while the fifth, the "Topica," applies the same methods to debate. The sixth, "De Sophisticis Elenchis," really forms a portion of the fifth, stating the distinction between genuine and fallacious disproof. In effect, it is an attack upon the Sophists and their methods, and might be termed a treatise upon fallacies.

These works were collectively termed the Organon, or instrument of thought, by Aristotle's successors;

[1] Although doubt has been thrown upon the genuineness of the Categories, the balance of evidence is in favour of assigning it to Aristotle.

[2] Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας.

but it is to the Stoics that we owe the title by which they are generally known, viz., Logic. They have been described as an analysis of certain processes of thought, but it would be equally true to regard them as statements concerning real existence. The philosophy of Aristotle was not a world of shadows flung by reality across the life of man, but an exposition of reality itself. Thus, the Categories are not only verbal symbols, but an analysis of the forms of real existence. They together constitute the various ways of stating real existence, and the assertion, the "Interpretatio," the ἑρμηνεία, is true or false according to its agreement with real existence. The "Analytica," an analysis of the forms of inference, corresponds in science with the orderly processes of the external world, the middle term representing the cause.[1]

[1] Analyt., post, ii. 2.

CHAPTER II.

THE CATEGORIES.

THE Categories, or the forms which real existence assumes, are, according to Aristotle, ten in number. They may be enumerated as follows:—I., Substance; II., Quantity; III., Quality; IV., Relation; V., Place; VI., Time; VII., Position; VIII., Possession; IX., Action; X., Passion.[1] The Categories have given rise to more criticism, perhaps, than any portion of Aristotle's writings, and opinions will vary according to the almost infinite variation in mental attitude and conformation. The number of the categories certainly, may either be increased or diminished. Perhaps, even Aristotle may have been influenced by the mystical or superstitious meaning which the Pythagoreans, and following them Plato, assigned to the number ten; but whether this be so or not, it would not be difficult to add other forms as important as Position and Possession. Again, those who take for their philosophical stand-point the relativity of all human knowledge will be disposed to omit Substance altogether, and to bring each of the remaining nine under the head of the fourth. Quantity, it may be

[1] Categoriæ, ii.

said, is unmeaning apart from comparison with some other quantity. Quality can only be stated in terms equally comparative, by reference to some resembling quality. Any particular Place or Time carries no significance without reference to other places and times; and the relativity of the remaining four is more obvious still. Aristotle himself, although he held the Categories to be exhaustive, did not treat them as mutually exclusive.

The method by which the Categories were reached can only be guessed at. It was logical at all events —part of the analysis of a proposition into its elements. And it can scarcely be doubted that it was grammatical, in a vague and rudimentary way. Grammar, as we understand it, was unknown until the necessity arose for learning a foreign language. It had its beginning nearly a hundred years later, when Livius Andronicus, about 241 B.C., opened a school at Rome, and taught to Romans the language and literature of Greece. But Aristotle could hardly have been influenced by the conception of different parts of speech. His category of Substance and his treatment of it, foreshadow the substantive of the grammarians. Quantity, Quality, and Relation nearly correspond with adjectives and adverbs; Place and Time represent certain adverbs and adverbial expressions; Position stands for the intransitive verb; Possession[1] for the perfect passive; Action for the

[1] To have arms = to have been armed, and still to be, by virtue of the Greek idiom; Categoriæ, ii.

active, and Passion for the passive verb. Moreover, it is probable that Aristotle drew up his list of Categories from the current words and topics of the time, analysing ordinary sentences and propositions into their constituent parts, and if this be so he can hardly have escaped some anticipation of the more practical work of the teacher of languages. But it would be an anachronism to press too far a natural, and possibly inevitable resemblance. That the Categories were metaphysical or ontological is true, in the modern acceptance of the terms, but not so according to the conception of Aristotle. They denoted real existence, however closely they were connected with the thought and its expression, but real existence in its varieties of manifestation; while the Aristotelian metaphysics are occupied with existence as a whole, and with those principles which are common to all its parts. Yet the Metaphysics, perhaps the latest of Aristotle's works, presuppose the logical treatises, and expressly refer back to them,[1] while the position which the logical treatises take up is not less significant in its bearing upon modern thought than the wider treatment of the metaphysics. The interest which attaches to nine of the ten Categories is antiquarian. One and all, except the first, mark the outlines of a coast which has shifted so as to be no longer recognisable, but those waves of thought which have swept away the old landmarks still beat restlessly about the adamantine barrier which shuts in the mystery of existence.

[1] Metaphys., iii. 3.

CHAPTER III.

SUBSTANCE.

PLATO, searching for reality among objects which were for ever changing, impressions often contradictory and always imperfect, conceptions too vague to build with and too unsettled to build upon, found the essence of all things in ideas. An idea was to him the perfect pattern, the reality; the individual object was the imperfect copy of it. The world was to the initiated a world of shadows, flung from the substance of ideas. The idea, though it entered into individual objects, existed apart from them, and was in turn related to some higher idea in the same way as the individual to itself. Thus, in his ideal heaven, perfection reached upward to perfection even higher, till the whole was touched and transfigured by the glory of the highest. This beautiful dream, which has exercised so profound an influence upon the philosophical imagination of the world, will always appear too unsubstantial to the more practical, yet no less eager temperament, which seeks to build upon fact, and refuses to climb until it has made sure of each step of the ascent. To Aristotle, the chief objection to the doctrine of his master consisted in the separation made between the idea and the individual object.

In his mind the whole picture was reversed. The idea, until it manifested itself in some concrete reality, was the shadow, while the substance was the individual, not as the individual alone, but permeated through and through by the significance which it embodied. Thus, Substance, in its fullest reality, is the individual. It is First Substance,[1] as contrasting with species and genus, which are substantial still, though one degree more remote. In its logical aspect, First Substance, the individual Socrates, for example, cannot in strict language be the predicate of any other category, though it may stand as subject to all of them. Unless First Substances existed, none of the other categories could exist. In other words, it is the individual which contains and constitutes its attributes, giving reality rather than receiving it. At the same time, no chronological priority over its attributes is assigned to the individual, for it would be equally true that without them the individual would be non-existent. The two are simultaneous in their manifestation, although the type and fullest exposition of reality remain with the individual alone.

The doctrine thus stated in the Categories is maintained with equal clearness and precision in the Metaphysics, though there is much in the latter which is apparently contradictory. Essence, for example, is found in the genus, the universal, rather than in the individual. But the seeming inconsistency

[1] *Πρώτη οὐσία.*

disappears upon closer examination. The essence, of which the Metaphysics speaks as prior to the individual, is the real, as an object of scientific knowledge;[1] the Substance of the Categories, although the same word is used for both the terms, is the real, as manifested in the individual. When our *knowledge* of existence is in question, essential qualities are more important than individual manifestation. All that is really knowledge, apart from an isolated act of sense-perception, depends upon those qualities. It is the universal realised in the individual which gives to the individual a significance for us, although it is precisely because of this realisation that the universal exists and is able to be significant.

It is in the individual, therefore, that all qualities exist and must be sought. It is the death-blow to realism, this conception, and yet not in the slightest degree a concession to nominalism. The distinction in thought is not a division in reality. The concave and the convex are one and inseparable, though intelligence may regard them under either of the two aspects.

When we come to consider the psychology and theology of Aristotle, it will be seen how supremely important this position is in its connexion with modern thought. Thus far, it will appear to the visionary and the enthusiast to occupy a low level in the graduated series of philosophic speculation, though in its ultimate development it may indicate a

[1] Ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσία, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.

path which rises upon a solid foundation of fact to a height as dizzy as was ever reached by imagination in its wildest flights. This building upon fact is precisely what brings Aristotle into sympathy with modern science. Induction, which starts from facts, has made an enormous advance upon the Aristotelian method of dealing with them, but it has, perhaps, lost its hold upon a truth which was clearly present to the ancient Greek.[1]

[1] Cf. Part I., Introd., p. iii.

CHAPTER IV.

DEDUCTION.

THE Categories, according to the Aristotelian doctrine, form an exhaustive classification of terms. Terms may be woven together[1] into propositions which affirm or deny, and propositions may be combined so as to produce inference. The form which a perfect inference assumes is the syllogism, by which, if the premisses are granted, the conclusion must also be granted. The syllogism depends upon a truth which is undemonstrable, the axiom of contradiction, viz., that when two predicates are contradictory, if they are applied to the same subject, one of the two must be false.

The precise and ingenious forms into which Aristotle analysed each species of syllogistic argument are given in every handbook of formal logic. In Aristotle's day the work which was thus accomplished was simply invaluable. Once for all he elaborated a test which could be applied to current argument, and gave the world of thought what it pre-eminently needed—an exact criterion of deductive

[1] The combination is *συμπλοκή*, the proposition *ἀπόφανσις*, the affirmation *κατάφασις*, the negation *ἀπόφασις*.

inference. The sophist could no longer puzzle his opponent by a verbal subtlety, or obtain a victory by disguising a fallacy. A canon had been framed which appealed irresistibly to the reason of the time, and the moment that an argument was brought to the test, and discovered to be wanting, it had of necessity to be abandoned. Mistake, if mistake there were, was thrust back from the argument to the assumptions preceding it—that is, to the premisses, and more especially to the major.[1] Differences of opinion there had to be settled by another process, generally too lengthy for the exigencies of debate, but if there was common ground to stand upon, there could only be agreement as to the inevitable conclusion. Whether the doctrine of the syllogism is the only shape which thought, apart from the matter of thought, or the premisses, is able to assume, is a question of psychology or metaphysics, rather than logic; but that it is one of the shapes, and that it can be readily applied to argument, is certain. What was pre-eminently useful in the old-world life of Greece has a value in modern times which is greater than is usually assigned to it. It may readily be granted that interest has shifted from Deduction to Induction; in other words, that the premisses on which the conclusion rests are more

[1] The three terms of the syllogism were the major, he minor, and the middle. The three propositions were the result of the combinations of the three terms. The two first were called the premisses, the last the conclusion. The major premiss was the premiss which contained the major term.

prominent in modern thought than the conclusion itself. It may even be conceded that the major premiss virtually contains the conclusion. Yet the hasty inferences which are currently accepted as legitimate indicate the need of a standard such as Aristotle's. Political speeches, and even treatises of a more scientific kind, abound with fallacies against which the Aristotelian canon has provided. One of the simplest rules—viz., that each term of the syllogism must be used in the same sense—is violated with a frequency almost incredible. The fallacy of the "undistributed middle" is, perhaps, as abundant a source of error now as in Aristotle's day. Part of the reason why his work is sometimes under-estimated arises from one great result which it has achieved. Although inconsistencies in thought and expression may arise, which mislead because they are undetected, Aristotle has stamped upon the intelligence of the world an indelible conviction that there is a standard to which an appeal may always be made. It would be a stretch of imagination to bring the mind into touch with a time when men really doubted whether laws of inference existed. Yet the sophists had so confused the outlines of thought that a disciple of Protagoras might well despair of a rule which would apply to himself and to other men alike, and even of a rule which would be invariable for himself. It was Aristotle's great achievement to place at least one half of truth upon an objective basis, which was unaffected by process of time or fluctuation of feeling. He rescued one solid fact from the eternal flux of

Heraclitus, and left it as a legacy to all future thought.

Part, also, of the reason why the Aristotelian canon has been disparaged springs from the exclusive use which was made of it by the scholastic logicians of the Middle Ages, to the neglect of that other process upon which Aristotle, no less than the votary of modern science, bases the truth of a conclusion. By the laws of syllogism, given the truth of the premisses, the truth of the inference is beyond question; but not even Bacon himself insisted more strongly upon the dependence of the whole upon the premisses than did Aristotle.[1] The truth of the premisses must be ascertained by another process, induction. But the scholastic logicians were not in a position to consider premisses. The Church of the Middle Ages assumed the office of providing them ready made, and to question them or to apply any test to them, Aristotelian or otherwise, was repugnant to devout minds, and an ordeal too fierce for those who doubted. The formidable accusation of heresy was the fate of all inquirers who questioned ecclesiastical authority upon any subject whatever, and, above all, upon the interpretation which the Church of that day put upon the cosmology of the Old Testament Scriptures. Thus the scholastic logicians ignored one conspicuous position of Aristotle's philosophy, viz., induction, and occupied themselves entirely with those syllogistic processes which unfolded the doctrines

[1] Cf. Part I., Introd., pp. vii. viii.

enunciated by the Church. It would be untrue to assert that they were wholly conscious of the neglect, or that they turned with any degree of repugnance to the elucidation of the syllogism. Their task was in keeping with the spirit of the time, and gave them precisely the mental satisfaction that they needed. They found and revelled in a method which, though one-sided as a means of discovering truth, was yet a powerful instrument for the development and systematisation of existing knowledge, and perfect in the important work of dragging inconsistency and fallacy into light. Under the stimulus of Aristotle they wrought out for the philosophy of Western Europe the result which their master had achieved for the earlier civilisation of the East. They translated, as it were, the precision of Greek thought into the language of the Latin-speaking races, and in so doing provided an instrument for thought even more perfect than the original. It is the tendency of later times to set little store by the work which they effected, but there is also a tendency toward random utterance, and mistakes which are often involuntary as well as unchallenged. By recognising what they did we shall not be less fitted for the recognition of what they failed to do.

It was, nevertheless, unfortunate for the study of Aristotle that scholasticism and Aristotelianism should have been confused. Bacon and his successors effected a genuine revolution in thought by their attack upon Aristotle, but it should be remembered that their real attack was upon one portion of his

teaching which the scholastics had made into a prison for intelligence by stretching the part into the whole. Acquiescing in the data furnished by authority, the scholastics applied no tests to them, and the false conclusions, deduced by strict Aristotelian methods from premisses equally false, found shelter behind the authority of a great name, and imposed upon the world by an appeal to it which Aristotle himself would have been the first to disclaim. By this means, ecclesiastical dogmatism, which furnished the data, persuaded itself that it had the profoundest philosophical justification, and those who were bold enough to doubt hesitated when confronted with this master of old-world thought. But something was lost to thought by the victory of the new school, though much was gained; and now that the prejudice has been removed, it is possible to recognise the forgotten truth.

CHAPTER V.

INDUCTION.[1]

It cannot be too often asserted that, according to the system of Aristotle, Induction must supply the premisses from which Deduction draws the inference. Induction and Deduction are contrasted as the two distinct methods by which all our knowledge is acquired,[2] although the clearness of the distinction is obscured by the reduction of Induction to a species of syllogism. Aristotle contributed to logic the theory of syllogism, and modern thinkers, from Bacon to John Stuart Mill, have finished the work which he began, by formulating the inductive methods. Yet the formulation of the methods does not rob Aristotle of the enunciation of the general principle. He, no less than they, made individual facts the basis upon which the universal rested. Nor did Aristotle confine himself to the enunciation of the principle. The practical tendency of his mind, inherited from a race of physicians, or due to early associations, did not desert him when he abandoned the more active life of soldier or surgeon to enroll himself among the disciples of Plato. He did not

[1] Cf. Part I., Introduction, pp. vii. viii.

[2] Ἅπαντα γὰρ πιστεύομεν ἢ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ ἢ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς. Analyt. Priora, ii. 25.

apply his deductive methods, like the schoolmen of a later day, to preconceived opinion, nor yet to any philosophic dictum, but gave himself up with untiring energy to the collection and classification of facts. The Natural History of Animals is a striking proof of the extent and accuracy of his observation. The Politics is more than a dream of an ideal state. It is a collection and analysis of existing constitutions.

In one respect, Induction, as understood by Aristotle, was more rigorous in its demand for accuracy than the methods of modern science. The generalisation, to be true, must be based upon the examination, not of selected instances, but of every instance. It proceeded, in the language of the schools, *per enumerationem simplicem*, while Induction, in its modern guise, corresponded with the Aristotelian inference from example; from particular instances, that is, to other particular instances of like kind, resulting in the rudimentary Induction of experience.[1] The Enumeratio Simplex is a valuable indication of the importance which Aristotle assigned to observation, although it, at the same time, constitutes the weakness of his conception. The demand is in most cases for an impossibility. The very ordinary assumption that all men are mortal cannot be justified in this rigorous fashion. If it be taken to mean that all existing men are mortal, the proof in its entirety will depend upon the death of the last observer, and the truth will not be demonstrated until no human intelligence exists

[1] Ἐμπειρία.

for which it is true. But if it signifies that all men, of whatever time, are mortal, it is a genuine Induction in its modern sense, a general statement based on the observation of instances within reach. And it cannot be doubted that Aristotle, while he set up a claim for Induction which could not be granted, gave the weight of certainty to the inference from example, in such instances as this. In his treatise on Memory, he makes recollection—that active effort of the mind, by which we recall impressions, and thus build up experience—something of the nature of a syllogism. He states, with a precision not exceeded by modern thinkers of the empirical school, the three associative laws by which we can recover our impressions—the law of similarity, contrariety, and contiguity—and to recover a past impression by means of its resemblance to any other, involves that very universal upon which Aristotle's whole system of reasoning is based. It would be an exaggeration to say that Aristotle, in this cursory statement, anticipated the doctrine of association, but his brief, though accurate allusion, shows that he was, as it were, feeling after the methods of modern science, and using one of them, the method of observation. The name of Aristotle is commonly connected with logic and metaphysics, but perhaps the greater portion of his energy was expended upon matters less abstruse; and it is precisely in those departments where observation is the chief guide that he accomplished most. In the process pursued by Aristotle the chief want, as contrasted with modern methods, was experiment. But in modern times

experiment cannot be applied to sociology or politics, except in a very limited degree. We must wait, for example, to discover from the instances that present themselves what results issue from the marriage of blood relations, or the introduction of any particular custom or constitutional measure. In other words, it is observation, not experiment, upon which we must rely. Here, the modern scientific mind has little advantage, and here, too, where comparison is thus made possible, we may best estimate the value of observation as applied by Aristotle. The Politics possesses value still, though more than two thousand years separate it from modern life. It contains a very exact record of experiments in government, and modern thinkers may find instances preserved for which they would search in vain elsewhere, and conclusions drawn which lapse of time has not impaired. The same, too, may be said, to a large extent, of Aristotle's contributions to psychology and mental science. The discovery of new facts and forces has revolutionised old conceptions of the material world, but very little which is absolutely new has been added to the stock of data which Aristotle possessed when he tried to solve the highest problems of thought. Physiology has accomplished much, but from the point beyond which it fails to ascend, the experience of an earlier time may still, if rightly understood, embody truth.

CHAPTER VI.

THE METAPHYSICS.—FORM.

THE Aristotelian term, or category, is, in its logical aspect, one of the constituent elements of a proposition. But it is more than a mere symbol, or even the symbol of a mental conception. It denotes a reality which is no less objective than subjective. In the same way the proposition, in which one term is affirmed or denied of another, is more than an expression of opinion. It is either true or false, according to its correspondence with things as they really are.

The syllogism has a double aspect. It may be used for purposes of argument or debate, and in this case the truth of the conclusion will depend upon the truth of the premisses. But it may also be applied to Demonstrative Science, and in this case the process indicates the causation of an external world, and the inference its result.

Reality and causation are metaphysical in the modern acceptance of the term. The antithesis between the phenomenal and the real, invariable sequence and cause, is the centre round which the deepest problems of modern thought revolve. But the Metaphysics of Aristotle, although they dealt with the question, approached it in a different way.

The sharp line of demarcation which has thrown itself out into distinctness in the processes of thought was shadowy then, and the term has enlarged its meaning as the contrast has become more marked.

It is almost certain that the title Metaphysics was not applied by Aristotle to the work which it now denotes. He speaks of it as First Philosophy, and Theology, in which it culminates. He conceives it as the science which deals with the principles common to all reality. It is in this sense that it is first. According to the modern meaning, the Organon is equally metaphysical, but to Aristotle it was only a department of reality, involving, indeed, metaphysical principles, in common with every other department, but not competent to discuss them in all their issues. The term itself has been twisted out of its proper meaning in order to suit later conceptions. Properly it can only signify the treatise which follows the Physics, but it has been interpreted as that which transcends the natural world. In its proper signification it gives the opinion of some later commentator as to the position which it occupied with regard to the Physical Treatises in order of composition; and from the references which it contains to other works, there can be little doubt that it was the last to take definite shape.[1]

The principles which Aristotle discovers as common to all reality are four in number: Form, Matter, the Efficient Cause, and the Final Cause. The Ideas

[1] The Ethics, and the Physics, as well as the Logical Treatises, are referred to in the Metaphysics as preceding.

of his master, Plato, doubtless had much to do with Aristotle's doctrine of Form. With Plato, the idea gave to the individual thing its power of existing and entering into knowledge, just as with Aristotle the Form.

According to modern theories, an isolated impression, cut off from all other impressions, is a mere sensation, without any significance at all. The colour of a flower, for example, conveys no meaning if coloured objects have never been seen before. It is only by reference to other objects that it can be called crimson or blue. Apart from such reference it is something like an unknown scent, which is pleasing or disagreeable in itself, but nothing more. Thus a child smiles at a glittering object. It is a pleasurable, though meaningless, sensation. Adults shrink from shrill and grating noises, and find pleasure in musical sounds apart from any significance which they attach to them. By degrees, as the laws of association do their work, binding together sensations according to their similarity, difference, or contiguity, the significance of the impression preponderates, and almost pushes the feeling which attends it out of consciousness. The flower is not, then, an isolated object, but associated with numberless other flowers seen before and remembered. It has its colours and shape, its genus and species, according to the observer's knowledge. The experience of the past rises, investing the particular object with a new meaning, and assigning to it a place among the impressions which have preceded it.

But Aristotle is not content with such an analysis of the processes of thought. He finds, both in the mind and in the world outside it, something more than similarity, difference, and contiguity. If the flower were the only flower in existence, its characteristics would remain the same, though our knowledge of it would be very different. The means by which we attain to our knowledge may, and must be, relative; that is, they work by reference to something else, apart from the particular object. Yet the particular object does not derive its characteristics from any reference to other objects, but is a reality in itself. It possesses a form or inner nature of its own, which may, indeed, resemble other forms, yet is a reality without them. It will appear, later, how in the region of psychology the soul is the form of the body, and this conception will illustrate the meaning which Aristotle gave to Form in general.

At the same time it must be remembered that reality is no more isolated than our knowledge of it. The individual manifestation stands by itself, but the form, the cause and groundwork of its being, is closely related to other forms, though not entirely dependent upon them. These forms enclose the universe of things in a network of causation. In their subjective aspect, in reference to the human mind that is, they are ideas. But the knowledge which we possess is a cause outside us, instinct with life. Within, mind recognises; without, mind works; and the Form is the purpose of the Master Mind which links the whole world together into one.

Thus, thought is no dead image of a living process. It does not play upon the surface of things, telling us that this resembles that, or differs from that, or is contiguous to something else, but it penetrates to the central core of the mystery of existence, saying why it is so, as well as that it is. This conception constitutes the difference between the general and the universal. The general is a numerical aggregate collected by one or more of the laws of association. All men are each individual man recognised as such by these laws, and, after recognition, swept together into a mental heap. But, though the quantity may have its importance, it adds nothing to our knowledge, and in itself it is dependent upon the quality, the universal, the Form. Each individual man has his Form, and if it were altered essentially, he would be no longer man. But the disappearance of any particular man would make no difference to the universal. It is true, indeed, that quality and quantity co-exist and coincide, but it is the quality, the universal, which in the outer world is Cause, in the inner Knowledge.

This conception of Form, as the cause of being as well as of Knowledge, will throw light upon a distinction in logic which must be clearly recognised before Aristotle's method can be grasped. The axiom upon which he based the syllogism was that of contradiction. If two predicates are contradictory, when they are applied to the same subject one of the two must be false; that is to say, contradictory attributes in the same subject are excluded from the region of thought. To admit them together would be to

destroy thought. Translating the axiom into its ontological or metaphysical equivalent, it may be said that mutually exclusive qualities cannot co-exist in things. A fish must be either cold-blooded or hot-blooded. It cannot be both at once, in the same part, and with reference to the same standard. The syllogistic process corresponds with outer reality, and is thus true when it is applied to Demonstrative Science. An alteration in the essential attribute or the essential quality would invalidate the truth of the conclusion; that is to say, it would no longer correspond with reality. Aristotle therefore founds his syllogistic process on Quality, on Form, on Causation.

The axiom into which the schoolmen resolved the fundamental principle of the syllogism was what is generally termed the *dictum de omni et nullo*. It may be stated thus: "Whatever can be affirmed (or denied) of a class, may be affirmed (or denied) of everything included in the class."[1] The *dictum* lends itself to another conception of the syllogistic process, if it does not necessitate it—viz., that deductive reasoning is quantitative, or chiefly so. From the fact that quantity and quality, in the sense in which they are used above, co-exist and co-incide, it follows that every syllogism may be expressed in terms of quantity. But Aristotle's syllogism is essentially qualitative, and to let slip the fundamental principle, or to allow the distinction to be obscured, would be to lose the key to his position.

The syllogism, therefore, when applied to Demon-

[1] MILL'S "Logic," bk. ii. ch. ii.

strative Science, corresponds with, and is the expression of, the causation of an outer world. It depends for its validity, not on any numerical or quantitative calculation, but upon those essential qualities which lie at the base of all number and quantity, and are recognised by the mind as Form. They are recognised not as a mere mental picture—an impression taken from the surface of things—but by virtue of an inner communion between things and thought. The atomists had explained the universe on mechanical principles. Anaxagoras found a divine mind upon which to rest when mechanism failed. But Aristotle discovered mind everywhere. Without mind nothing could be said to be really existent. Matter, the substratum out of which things were formed, was only a potential existence—a fluctuating chaos which had not yet risen to the dignity of being, or of recognition as such. It could neither exist in full nor be known. But the Divine Mind stamped its impress, the Form, upon Matter, and Matter and Form together sprang into being. The mind which shaped the universe existed also in man. Thus, when man recognised the Form, it was a recognition full of meaning. It was mind recognising mind by virtue of a natural affinity.

But in order to descend from the universal, the Form, to the particular, Aristotle most emphatically maintained that the ascent must first be made from the particular to the universal.[1] Until the universal

[1] Cf. Part I., Introduction, viii.

was recognised, the concrete object was to the human mind particular only, and therefore meaningless. The problem, therefore, to be solved was this: How could the mind reach the universal contained in the particular? As previously indicated, it is in the attempt to solve this problem that the Aristotelian system fails as contrasted with modern methods. It would be a curious, though not very profitable question whether Aristotle would have modified his treatment of induction if he had possessed the materials to work upon which presented themselves to modern inductive logicians. The alchemists, and their successors, the chemists and the physicists, gave Bacon the key to the processes by which man has, to a large extent, obtained mastery over the natural world, and it is possible that Aristotle, with the same stock of data, would have issued another formula. But better than the inquiry whether Aristotle could have effected what was reserved for a later development of time, is a consideration of another kind. Aristotle was influenced, though to a less extent than most ancient thinkers, by the conception that the utility of a law was not to be considered in comparison with the law itself. His problem was not how to subdue nature, but how to understand it. The applied sciences, so far as they existed, held in his estimation much the same position as the occupation by which a man obtains his living. Both alike were vulgar,[1] far removed from the dignity of the highest nature, whose privilege it was to dwell in the lofty

[1] *βάναυσος*.

region of contemplation, recognising by the particle of the divine mind enshrined within it, the working of the same mind in the universe without. The conception of modern times is, speaking generally, the reverse of this. Inquiries about the inner nature and meaning of things, if they are pursued at all, occupy a subordinate position. Metaphysical speculations are regarded as cobwebs of the imagination, which are not merely idle, but absolutely mischievous. To enter into cause is deemed a hopeless, if not a useless, effort. Co-existence and sequence, it is argued, supply the only ascertainable law, and the issue of their operation is our most valuable acquisition. It doubtless contributed largely to the progress of human thought that a considerable section of thinkers should have occupied themselves with this exclusive view. But in reality the metaphysical problem has only been pushed back. Existence, co-existence, sequence, law, the mind that recognises them and the world in which they are recognised, are as metaphysical in their nature as any postulate of the Aristotelian philosophy. Though they may be ignored for a time, working unconsciously in the background of intelligence, they thrust themselves forward ever and again, and demand to be considered. Aristotle indulged in few dreams. It will be seen how, in the region of psychology, he based all human knowledge upon sensation. The superstructure which he built upon it rose from a foundation common to the thought of every age, and may contain some elements of truth which

more extreme schools have allowed to escape them.[1]

The mind, according to the Aristotelian conception, could only be certain of the universal when it had examined every particular case in which it was manifested. Modern induction very profitably limits itself to selected instances. Yet it is unquestioned that the certainty obtained by the latter is as great as that postulated by the former. The formal logician of the present day will hardly admit such a view. He will maintain that all inductive inference, as at present practised, can only reach a degree, if a high degree, of probability, and that absolute certainty still remains with the Aristotelian method. These contrasting opinions are valuable as data. On the one hand, no one who soberly and without prejudice considers the question can doubt that some, at all events, of the conclusions of science are absolutely true, and the result attained will to a certain extent justify the means employed. But it is not merely the result which appeals to us. There is something in the method apart from the result, unformulated, yet not without significance, which claims our attention. We acquiesce entirely in the view that Aristotle's method *would* reach certainty; we know that modern science has reached it. Is there not, therefore, something common to the two which will give us, on the one hand, the reason of the certainty; on the other, the certainty itself? Aristotle was well

[1] Cf. Part I., pp. 2, 3.

aware of the weakness of that portion of the universal mind which entered into the constitution of individual men. He demanded that the investigation should proceed *per enumerationem simplicem*, through every instance, not because he doubted of the existence of the universal in each case, but because he questioned the power of the mind to discern it accurately unless the examination were complete. It was human weakness, and nothing else, which brought about the necessity. Had Aristotle been presented with a view of modern achievements, he might have extended his conception of mental power. Those who can place the two systems side by side may discover in the complete enumeration which Aristotle demanded, a perversion of the true process of reasoning, akin to the reduction, since effected, of every process of the syllogism to a quantitative expression. It is not the quantity which determines any of the processes, but the quality, the universal; and if the universal can be reached by any examination short of the sum total of the instances, the inference will be as valid as if all had been gone through, although the quantitative expression will be wanting. It is this insistence upon quantity which has, more than anything else, obscured the true mental process, and led to the opposition between the inductive and deductive methods. Induction has made a vast stride in inference, though it cannot see why. The fact is incontestable, though the explanation of it remains in doubt, and the development from entire enumeration to the enumeration of selected instances

may indicate a still further evolution. In fact, intelligence, as it becomes more intensive, has less need to be extensive. The mind that grasps the universal contained in a class by examining nearly all, but not all, is of a more penetrative order than the mind which must examine all; and with each access of power the range may be diminished without loss of accuracy. Definitions of genius have been often given. Perhaps the favourite hypothesis is that it is a capacity for unlimited work, a statement very consoling to the dull though industrious nature, but at variance with experience. The greatest genius, in fact, is the man who can reach the universal through the smallest number of instances. Carrying out the process still further, it may be said, and with truth, that as the universal is contained in each particular, according to the emphatic statement of Aristotle, perfect intelligence would be able to discern it in a single instance. Human intelligence, in its present state of development, has to reach the universal by laborious methods, and it will always be true that dulness of apprehension may be supplemented by extensive examination. But the quick, intuitive flash of thought which penetrates to the centre of the enigma has less need of the slower method. If we had senses which could reveal to us the whole nature of the acorn, there would be no need to study the oak. It is there, in embryo, waiting for its development. Modified as each detail may subsequently be by outward circumstances, by every breeze which blows upon it and every shower

which falls, it is there already, perfectly foreshadowed in all its essential features, and to the master mind which gave it its nature, and consistently develops it, every phase of its history is revealed. It may readily be conceded that insight such as this exceeds all human intelligence, yet here and there in the history of intellectual giants instances occur which approximate to it. Shakespeare was a student of human nature, yet his writings bear the impress of rapid and intuitive perception, and scarcely a trace of laborious classification. The individual stands to him as the universal, revealing a chapter of the history of man rather than the character and fortunes of a particular person. The creations of writers who first make their classification of principles and passions, and then fit their characters into the framework, carry with them indications of the method pursued. They are frigid automata moved by mechanism instead of living men and women. But the true genius, who leaps to his principle when once it stands embodied before him, produces a creature of flesh and blood, instinct with life.

Even with that larger class who can only reach the universal from a number of particulars there is something analagous to be observed. The doctrine of Aristotle implies, if it does not state, that there is more in the transference of the Form from things to thought than a mere passage. The Form without is the reflection of a creative mind; and when human intelligence receives the Form, it is a recognition rather than an impression. Thus it passes beyond generalisation.

It may, indeed, be applied to the practical needs of life, or be used for the development or discovery of other truth, but it has the glow of a kindred nature about it, making it an end in itself as well as a means. Modern science, although it expresses itself in a different way, is not without some recognition of this principle. In its methods of observation it permits no hasty generalisation, and allows a large margin for error. But a single experiment is sufficient to demonstrate a law. The chemist discovers that the combination of two elements produces a third, possessing properties not to be found in either of the two uncombined; and he knows from this single instance that every repetition of the experiment under precisely the same conditions will bring about the same result. The rational foundation of this conviction is a belief in the uniformity of nature.[1] But this belief, which is really a kind of major premiss, is more than the sum total of all human experience can justify. All that such experience can legitimately assert is that up to the moment of its statement nature has been uniform. But when it goes beyond this, and catching the mantle of the prophet, maintains that what has been will be, it has unconsciously invested phenomena with the universal which it despises. Strictly speaking, the chemist is not even justified in making an announcement of probability, apart from bare experience, and by this is meant an experience which is not a recognition, but only a copy. There is no warrant

[1] MILL'S "Logic," bk. iii. ch. iii.

whatever for outrunning the data.[1] A thousand things may occur to overthrow the calculation. But when the uniformity which is found by experience is recognised as truth; when the mind within is stirred to consciousness of itself by the mind without, and turning back again reads the records of a nature like its own, it has power and rational authority to pass beyond the means which have suggested law, and to declare not only what will be, but what must be.

Yet this final goal of a ratiocination which begins with every instance, and ends with only one, can never be attained in full. Human nature is too limited in its capacity to be able to dispense with the defences which induction has raised about it, or even with those quantitative expressions which in the syllogism mark the extension of the notion. It is the final analysis of reason, but for human reason hardly a distant hope. At the point when it is attained, in fact, reasoning, as we understand it, vanishes, and intuition takes its place. Possibly no addition to the number of our senses would bring it more within our grasp. The philosophical imagination of Voltaire[2] has conceived of beings with nearly a thousand senses, who could yet come no nearer to the apprehension of what really is than those apparently less fortunate creatures who have only the commonly accepted number.[3] Milton, with a more profound insight, makes reason such as this, though not exclusively denied to

[1] Cf. LOTZE, "Metaphysic." Introduction, § 3.
[2] "Micromégas: Histoire Philosophique."
[3] There are probably seven, if not more.

man, one of the endowments of natures superior to man. Raphael, speaking of the soul, says:—

> "Reason is her being,
> Discursive or intuitive: discourse
> Is oftest yours, the latter most is ours."[1]

But the position is interesting as a philosophical speculation. It has a bearing upon the education of the mind which may serve as a corrective to false conceptions, and lead to no mischief if cautiously applied. Hasty generalisation is an evil of portentous magnitude, and it may vary inversely with the area of observation. But the endeavour to make the surface of the mind, to borrow a geometrical expression, a more sensitive mirror, and mind itself a rapid and intuitive interpreter of a wider mind, need not imply hopes too extravagant, nor yet the neglect of wise precautions. The truth contained and implied in Aristotle's doctrine of universals is the one thing needed to elevate science above narrow utilitarianism and empiricism. It may be cast into formulas which differ in expression according to the temper of different minds, and yet lose little of its essential meaning. It is subtle to grasp, and often used even when repudiated, but it offers an answer, and in the light of later history, a true answer, to those ultimate questions which human nature can never cease to ask.

The Form in Aristotle's system corresponds to the idea of Plato, but there is a distinction between the

[1] "Paradise Lost," bk. v. 486.

two which is of vital importance. The ideal theory, as it is called, was the doctrine against which Aristotle directed his most vigorous attacks. He has been accused of want of respect for his illustrious master, and even of introducing personal acrimony into the philosophic discussion of the problem. At least, one modern Platonist conceives that he failed to grasp the true import of Plato's teaching. He holds it proved that "Aristotle felt a certain irritation and displeasure when he perceived there was something in the words of Plato which his large intellect and immense information did not enable him to comprehend."[1] But the modern scientific mind will not fail to appreciate the importance of the departure, while those who are in pursuit of a lofty ideal may discover in it truth equally elevated and better assured.

The Platonic Idea and the Aristotelian Form were both protests against the scepticism of the Sophists. They both erected a standard of objective reality and truth as opposed to that eternal and unstable flux which Protagoras had borrowed from Heraclitus, and transformed from things to thought. But Plato separated between the idea and its manifestation, while Aristotle made the two an inseparable whole. To Plato, species and genus were entities existing apart from the individual, though entering into it and constituting its essence. To Aristotle they were ele-

[1] MAURICE, "Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy," vol. i. ch. vi.; div. iii. sect. 2.

ments of the individual, not less necessary or constitutive than the idea, yet unexistent apart from the individual. In other words, Aristotle distinguished where Plato divided.

The idea of Plato constituted the essence from a metaphysical standpoint, but it was regarded morally and æsthetically as the perfect type. It is the prominence given to the moral and æsthetic side which constitutes the charm of the ideal theory. Plato saw imperfection in all the phenomena of the world and perfect goodness and beauty in the heavens, apart from these phenomena, though animating them. He gave prominence to the moral element in life by placing the good at the head of all as the supreme idea, and in his works the beautiful is as conspicuous as the true. He was an artist as well as a philosopher, and the fragrance of an æsthetic imagination lingers about his severest speculations. The good, the beautiful, and the true, those three abstractions which have thrust themselves for analysis upon thinkers of every age, were present to the mind of both, and never absolutely separated. But Plato looked first for the good and then for the true, whilst Aristotle, with a scrutiny more rigorous, occupied himself mainly with the true. Yet truth to Aristotle was perfectly good, and perfectly beautiful. The Divine Mind which animated all things drew all things to itself by the attraction of its own perfections.[1]

In the great picture, called the "School of Athens,"

[1] Cf. Part I. Appendix B, pp 86, 87.

painted by Raffaelle for Pope Julius II., Plato is represented as pointing toward heaven, while Aristotle turns his face to the earth. The attitude of the two figures fitly symbolises the current conception of the tendency of the two systems. But though Aristotle may look earthward, he is not looking for earthly things. The theology of Aristotle is so important a portion of his speculations that it must be reserved for separate mention. But a result is already foreshadowed which may be at once anticipated. The Supreme Mind which enclosed the whole universe in its network of forms was not a Being who stood aloof from earthly things, but who expressed Himself through them. He was to be sought, therefore, not in any imagination of the mind which apart from manifestation had no reality, but in the manifestation itself. Conceptions of the divine nature framed otherwise were devoid of the sanction which the Divine Mind had purposed and effected. In the first place, they were liable to error. They were merely human conceptions which might or might not be true; and if false most dangerous, because they enlisted the whole strength of the noblest portion of human aspiration on their side. Secondly, they did not follow the track which the Divine Mind had indicated for human thought. The path which mounted upward from things of sense was for the reverent observer even more exalted by reason of its humility.

The Christian's conception is in one respect the same. The type of perfect humanity is for him

no dream, however exalted. It must be looked for in realisation, and the only form which the realisation can assume is that of the perfect man.[1] The perfect community is not a philosophic speculation, but the perfect man "writ large." Human virtue is nothing apart from humanity thus perfected, and the good is an empty abstraction until realised in God.

The Christian, therefore, as well as the Aristotelian, does not invent perfection, but discovers it in a concrete reality, in God made manifest. It is not, even when manifested, an arbitrary thing, in the sense of being dissociated from appeal to the mind which recognises, but as the thought in things appeals to the thought in man by virtue of its affinity, so the perfection in God finds its recognition in the mind of man in such a way that the recognition carries its proof with it. "The fruit of the Spirit—love, joy, peace, long-suffering"—would mean nothing to the Christian except expressions of the Supreme Will, unless they elicited a response from an inward nature which is akin to God, though infinitely removed. But when the response is made, the Form, the Cause appears, and knowledge becomes rational.

The emphasis with which Aristotle insists upon observation and induction is one expression of the expectant attitude of his thought. It is also the expression of a rational faith, which tells him that the Divine Mind has revealed itself to the human mind in the forms which make the universe intelligible

Cf. p. 210 *infra.*

What this Mind does at all it does perfectly, by reason of its own perfection. The Form which makes knowledge possible is far more than a dead outline, or surface, or impress. It is an Energy, a Cause, which penetrates to the centre and pervades the whole of everything which it animates, ever working itself out. Divine energy is perfect energy, and a revelation begun will be completed. Thus, Aristotle looked for a God who either had revealed or would reveal himself in full. If the revelation had been made, it was the fault of the observer if he failed to discover it. And so the philosopher, the lover of wisdom, the lover of God, searched through and into all things in heaven and earth, not with desultory aim, but knowing in part what he sought to know in full. The tentative nature of many of Aristotle's conclusions shows the tenacity with which he clung to truth. Plato, who was far more impressed with the conviction that he had found perfection, needed a full revelation less than Aristotle. Aristotle's belief in a full revelation was, as already indicated, a logical necessity, and if he failed to discover because the object of his search had not as yet appeared, his failure was, by a necessity equally stringent, a prophecy. If perfection did not then exist, it would exist, because it must.

The Christian has found what Aristotle sought for. He has, moreover, made the discovery by precisely the method which Aristotle demonstrated. It is not by any means necessary that Aristotle's method, or any method, should be recognised. The mind, like

nature, works by laws which conceal themselves from view. They are not present to the consciousness of the generality of men, who are too much engaged in learning and working in other departments to occupy themselves with the science which treats of how and why they do it. The inquiry is the subtlest and most difficult because it is the highest of all sciences. The laws are most operative because they are the highest laws. Working uniformly and universally, they disguise themselves as effectually as the law of gravitation before Newton's day, and, even when discovered and formulated, they are difficult of recognition, because here, and here alone, there is no object which can be dealt with. The consciousness to which the highest philosophy appeals is not consciousness as we generally understand it. It is not the consciousness of every-day life, nor of any art, or science, or department of human thought and activity. All these deal with subject and object combined in a whole distinctly traced, but philosophy has to work upon the two factors of complete consciousness which are themselves, of necessity, incomplete. In the introduction to his Essay, Locke truly says that "The understanding, like the eye, while it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance and make it its own object." Suggestive as the statement is, it demands an impossibility. Precisely the same demand is made by the modern scientific mind. But it can never be satisfied. It requires, in the language of Aristotle, more certainty

than the matter admits of. The one characteristic of the subject, which is important beyond all others, is consciousness. In setting it at a distance, and making it its own object, this fundamental distinction must be drawn away from it into an inner self. It must be left a mutilated fragment of its original nature. Otherwise we must cut our own consciousness in two, keeping part to observe and part to be observed. Twist it and turn it as we will, this insuperable difficulty always remains. No art nor pains will ever enable us to be in two places at once. We must destroy either ourselves or the object of our search. It is equivalent to searching for animation with a dissecting-knife. The moment the point is reached, it vanishes. There are, in fact, two kinds of consciousness, both equally operative, though not equally recognised. The Christian, though he uses them both, does not discriminate. Aristotle discriminated and rationalised, though he was not permitted to see in full the perfection for which he sought. When the Christian, knowing, but unable to show how he knows, seeks for philosophic confirmation of his belief, he will find it, not with the empiricist, who does not apprehend the problem, but with an old thinker who had nothing to bias his judgment, and no motive but an earnest zeal for truth.

The Platonic ideal has always exercised a powerful influence over minds of a religious order. It blends itself with the sorrowful conviction that evil is everywhere, tainting even the purest, and blurring

the outlines of heavenly beauty. The refined and sensitive nature, responsive to influences which are too subtle to reach the robust fibre of the majority, shrinks from contact with a world which plays upon it as upon a delicate instrument, and too often smites the strings into jarring vibrations. It closes the outward ear and eye, listening for the solemn music of the spheres, and looking for that city in the heavens where nothing imperfect nor impure can enter. But the imagination, unchecked by experience, is apt to twist its images into fantastic forms, which have no counterpart either in earth or heaven. The Neo-Platonists of the second and third centuries of the Christian era, deeply penetrated by Platonic influence, and longing, above all things, for knowledge of God, and communion with Him, wandered away into a dreamland, which was neither religion nor philosophy. The tendency is always to be found when sober fact is left behind. If it confines itself to mere speculation, the mischief is little to be dreaded, but if the theory thrusts itself upon the practice of life, it may widen into an almost measureless evil.[1]

The aversion with which Aristotle regarded the ideal theory is probably due to this, and to other more strictly philosophical considerations, rather than to any personal prejudice, or dulness of apprehension. His nature had its delicate fibres, and his intellect

[1] "Pessima enim res est errorum apotheosis."—BACON, "Nov. Org.," i. 65.

an edge so keen that it might almost seem an instrument too fine for ordinary uses. But he had a hardy faith in things, which made him grapple with fact and confront difficulty. He did not shrink from a life of struggle, but threw himself into it as a gladiator into the arena, finding his chief pleasure in it because it was a struggle; not over-bold nor over-timid, but keeping his own golden mean; watchful against defeat, yet cheered with a prescience of victory.

The connexion which has existed between Theology and Aristotelianism is doubtless due, in the main, to the order and method which the one sought and the other provided. Logic lent itself admirably to the development of doctrine, and the detection of inconsistencies. But part, at least, of the connexion may be traced to those rational and practical characteristics which are no less Christian than Aristotelian. It is as healthy, as it is necessary, that the Christian should test the foundation of his belief, and be able to give a reason for the faith which is in him. Once more the Church may find her most powerful ally in the old Greek thinker, and may safely surrender to him her premisses as well as her conclusions. Theology may become scientific in the strictest sense, and faith and reason but different aspects of the same truth.

CHAPTER VII.

MATTER.

THE conception of Form as one of the causes of all existence and all knowledge constitutes a marked distinction between the Aristotelian Philosophy and Materialism in the ordinary acceptance of the term. Yet, if it stood by itself, it would, on the one hand, be an incomplete expression of a more comprehensive thought, and, on the other, a shadowy outline, out of harmony with our experience of the world. But Aristotle, when he spoke of Form as a cause, did not regard it apart from other causes. Matter, Form, the Efficient, and the Final Cause, are not independent principles which map out existence between them into four continents which exclude each other. In other words, Matter is not the cause of one thing, Form of another, the Efficient Cause of a third, and the Final Cause of a fourth; but the four co-operate in every instance. They are factors in the formation of the universe, to borrow a mathematical expression rather than terms. Each of them is in reality an aspect of one indivisible whole, and while Aristotle isolates them as aspects, for separate consideration,

he still remains true to the fundamental tendency of his thought, distinguishing, not dividing. Without the Efficient and the Final Cause, Form would be a thought arrested: without Matter, a conception unrealised.

The distinction between Matter and Form may be due in the first instance to contrasting aspects of the material universe. In an indeterminate way, the material out of which a thing is made may be considered side by side with, or apart from, the shape which it assumes under the hand of the artificer. The stone or marble of the sculptor is one thing, and the form elaborated by his skill another. Yet they are both inseparable constituents of the whole.

The two together, Form and Matter blended, constitute the individual object. Apart, they can neither be conceived in full,[1] nor exist in full; but united they produce the subject of all predicates, in the language of logic; the substance of all reality in the language of metaphysics. Yet, although the distinction between Form and Matter may have been suggested by the material world, it would be a mistake to consider mathematical figures as in any way connected with essence. Matter, Aristotle says, is known partly by the senses, partly by the mind, and mathematical figures are given as instances of the latter kind. It has already been seen that quantity,

[1] ἡ δ' ὕλη ἄγνωστος καθ' αὑτήν.—Metaphys., vi. 10.

in its logical aspect, though co-existing and coinciding with quality, is dependent upon it and subordinate to it, and quantity may be relegated to the same position in the science of being as well as of thought, whether it be expressed in the terms of geometry or arithmetic. The form, the essence, of a thing is unaffected by the number of its particular instances or realisations, however great that number may be. If only one man existed, provided that he embodied the whole essence of man, the form would be entirely unaffected; and Aristotle, with keen philosophical instinct, applies to geometry, which is for the most part capable of arithmetical expression, precisely the same principle which he adopts in the case of number. His position is all the more remarkable when compared with previous speculation. Pythagoras, fascinated by the precision and unlimited scope of mathematical reasoning, had made numbers the substance of the universe; and the Eleatic School had found in unity, theological, metaphysical, and logical, an explanation equally extensive, and not less penetrating and ingenious. Each of these schools of thought had exercised a powerful influence upon the mind of Aristotle's master, Plato. The more profound conception of the Eleatics entered deeply into the Platonic system, and the mystical significance which minds of every age have attached to number found various expressions in Plato's writings, even if it never rose to the dignity of a principle. But Aristotle was proof against the

charm. He saw that mathematical conceptions were apprehended by the mind; but they were the laws of Matter when differentiated by Form, contributed, as it were, by Matter to Form in its realisation, but otherwise not entering into it.

Yet in whatever way the contrasting conception of Matter and Form arose, it is one of the guiding principles of Aristotelian philosophy. The Efficient and the Final Cause are, in fact, further developments of the Formal Cause. The essence of any particular thing may be regarded as efficient and final, as well as formal, and in itself it is all three, combining in each of its aspects with matter, in the production of substance, the completed whole. The causes, therefore, may in reality be reduced in number from four to two; and the origin and explanation of all things may be sought in the contrast and union of Matter and Form.

Seeing that Aristotle emphatically asserts that matter without form is unknown, if not unknowable,[1] it may appear almost unnecessary to postulate its existence at all. The question naturally arises, why is it that Aristotle did not anticipate Berkeley's position, and make our knowledge of a thing, and its reality, one and the same?[2]

The answer to the question must be sought in the later developments of Berkeley's theory. To give

[1] ἄγνωστος is capable of both interpretations.
[2] With Berkeley, *esse* and *percipi* are identified.

Aristotle the credit of anticipating these results would in one sense be an anachronism. Berkeley, Hume, Kant approached the problem each from his own particular position. They lived the life of their own time, and grappled with the questions which it presented to them. Yet the thought which passed in its varying developments from Locke to Berkeley, and from Berkeley onward through Hume to Kant, is only another, although a more fertile aspect, of the truth which Aristotle felt for, and partly found. Although Form and Matter in Aristotle do not coincide with subject and object in modern philosophy,[1] each distinction depends on the same process of reasoning, or fades in the light of the same destructive criticism, and in either case the conclusion will only differ in those particular applications which the tendencies of different ages impart. According to the Aristotelian psychology, soul was the form of body. It thus belonged to the domain of mind, not of matter; but apart from matter it was unsubstantial. It was, indeed, a particle of the divine mind, but, freed from matter, it lost its concrete manifestation, and thus its individuality. It was a universal, appearing in a thousand shapes in union with matter, but sinking back to the universal when the union was severed. The philosophical distinction which Aristotle applied to psychology, if it did not entirely agree with the conceptions of the ancient

[1] Cf. Part I. p. ix. note 1.

world, found little, whether in established fact or human fancy, to contradict it. The poet represented a future life as a vague and shadowy existence, and the thinker doubted or denied. Achilles' ghost would rather be the meanest serf on earth, than lord of all the souls in Hades. Socrates hesitated between a kindred, though more elevated conception, and the notion of eternal sleep. But when speculation, dormant for more than a thousand years, awoke with the Renaissance, it found new data to work upon. For our present argument, it matters little whether the data were imaginary or real. They were intimately blended with human thought; believed, at all events, even if they were unfounded; and the philosopher was confronted with the definite conception of a personal existence and identity which was unimpaired by decay and death. Under this new influence, the doctrine of Form and Matter entered upon a new phase. There was still the contrast between matter and mind; but the mind, when manifested in humanity, became the thinking "Ego," self.

If, therefore, Aristotle's position with regard to matter be criticised by the aid of more recent speculation, it will be necessary to follow the problem in the new phase which it has assumed, and if any conclusion be arrived at in the later development of the contrast, it may be transferred to the earlier by subtracting from it the element of personal identity.

The position maintained by Berkeley was that the current belief in the existence of matter was a delusion.

All that we know, he argued, is the idea, which is individual, and not abstract. We can conceive, for example, of an extended object, but not of extension. To suppose the existence of anything beyond these particular ideas is mere imagination. Our knowledge of things is identical with the things themselves, and there is nothing external to ourselves attached to such knowledge, or supporting it.

If knowledge be accepted according to the interpretation which Berkeley put upon it, there is no escape from this ingenious notion, and Aristotle's assumption as to the existence of matter becomes a popular fallacy exalted to the rank of a philosophic doctrine. But, suggestive as Berkeley's theory is, its inadequacy becomes apparent when the argument is pushed to its logical conclusion. It was Hume's great achievement to reach this conclusion. According to Hume's theory of perception, we know nothing whatever of the object in the ordinary sense of the word; the thing, that is, apart from ourselves, which is represented in our notion of it. Up to this point, Berkeley and Hume, arguing upon the same assumption, arrive at the same result. But Hume proceeds farther, shewing how it follows, with a cogency equally binding, that we must dismiss subject as well as object into the region of the non-existent; ourselves, that is, as well as an external world. We have, he maintains, the representative idea, and that alone. In this idea there is no notion of subject or object. The idea, and nothing else, is given. "I

may venture to affirm of mankind," he says, "that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." And again, "All these are different and distinguishable and separable from each other, and may be separately considered, and may exist separately, and have no need of anything to support their existence." In fact, self, and the idea of self, except as an isolated mental picture, or representative idea, is utterly annihilated.

Such is what has been called a *reductio ad absurdum* of the philosophy of sensation. It contradicts what is rightly or wrongly a universal conviction, and the common-sense philosophy of Reid was a healthy, though not a very recondite, protest against it. Both Berkeley and Hume postulated too little in their theory of ideas. Reid went to the other extreme, and postulated too much. One solution, at all events, of the difficulty may be found in an extension of the theory of consciousness.[1] Although Aristotle, for reasons already indicated, never propounded, and probably never contemplated either the difficulty or a way to overcome it; he has taken up a position which, *mutatis mutandis*, commands the whole extent of the more modern controversy. He assumed the existence of matter although it was unknown or unknowable apart from form, and

[1] Cf. p. 149, *supra*.

the existence of form, although it was non-existent in its fullest sense apart from matter, and the processes of later thought have amply vindicated his discernment.

But there is another objection to be met which is not unfrequently brought against the Aristotelian theory of matter, viz., that it ends in an irreconcilable dualism.[1] It is argued that a complete theory of development requires all matter to become form eventually, and that any break in the series which stretches from primitive formless matter [2] to the form of all forms[3] into which alone no matter enters, destroys the unity of the conception, and severs existence into two incongruous portions. From one point of view, the objection is valid. The theory of development which regards one generation or individual as nothing in itself beyond a transitory outburst of the universal life, yielding no permanent result except the material out of which a higher life is made, is one, though not the only, aspect of the modern hypothesis of evolution. It was a theory known to the ancient world. Heraclitus found in the universe an infinite series of changes, in which no moment was arrested. The Eleatics, seeking for a more stable possession in this universal flux of things, denied the whole process of becoming, and strove to demonstrate by many ingenious arguments that change was an idle conception,

[1] SCHWEGLER'S "History of Philosophy," ch. xvi.

[2] Πρώτη ὕλη. [3] Εἶδος εἰδους.

and changeless existence the true hypothesis. Aristotle was well acquainted with each of these conflicting tendencies of thought, and his own theory of development is suggestive, if it is not final.

CHAPTER VIII.

POTENTIALITY.—ACTUALITY.

THE student of the history of philosophic speculation finds a constant recurrence of the same fundamental problems, though variously stated, and widely separated in time. The conceptions of different ages do not alter so much in themselves as in the extent of their application. Thus, when the science of the present day discovers an orderly process of development from the rudest germ of life to its latest and fullest exemplification, man, it is not the hypothesis which is new, for that is as old as Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Empedocles; but its direct bearing upon the organic world. The modern theory of evolution may or may not have been lineally connected with any previous philosophic dogma, but without doubt it offers satisfaction to a need which thought, apart from religious or superstitious feeling, must from time to time experience. But this is only a partial statement, which science would rightly repudiate. The conception of evolution, while it ministers to the needs of thought, does not draw all its evidence from the satisfaction which it affords.

Those who accept it in full do so because of the verification of their hypothesis which they discover in outward, objective existence.

The thinker who finds material organisms linked together by a continuous chain of cause and effect, need not necessarily oppose the religious conception which regards the chain of causation as the method employed by a divine Artificer. The point of separation comes, if the evolutionist maintains that there is nothing beyond the material organism and the laws of matter.

To Aristotle a particle of the Divine Mind appeared as a factor in all existence, whether animate or inanimate, carrying with it a potentiality[1] of development, to be worked out into actuality[2] by an inherent force. Potentiality and actuality are the two terms by means of which Aristotle gave expression to his theory of development. Motion or change is the passage from one into the other, and thus the same thing may appear either as potential or actual according to the point of view from which it is regarded. It is potential in relation to what is above it in the scale of existence, actual in relation to what is below it. The two terms correspond with matter and form. What is potential is matter moving, or capable of movement; what is actual is form realised. It would thus appear that Aristotle, no less than the evolutionist, conceived of a graduated process from

[1] *Δύναμις*. Cf. Part I. p. 7. [2] *Ἐνέργεια*. Cf. Part I. p. 7.

matter, or mere potentiality, up to the highest actualisation of existence.

But it is not a process in which all that is passes away into something else. The form potentially contains within it the end to be attained, as well as the power of attainment, and when it has worked itself out in the full development of its nature the process terminates in that direction. Thus existence may be compared with a tree bearing innumerable leaves, each different, though all are united with the central bole by the intricate lines of twig and stem. Entelechy[1] is the term used by Aristotle to express this modification of his theory of development. Yet the meaning of the term must not be pressed too far. Aristotle does not employ it to denote a finality more definite than the subject, or the state of human knowledge admits of. In fact, both actuality and entelechy may be applied at the same instant to the same thing, the nature, that is, which is at every moment of its being working itself out into completeness; but actuality is an absolute expression, denoting a portion of a never-ending process, while entelechy carries with it the relative significance that at some period, nearer or more remote, the nature which is thus being developed contains in itself a foreshadowed termination.

It would be idle to apply the doctrine of entelechy to the modern problem with any degree of precision,

[1] Ἐντελέχεια.

but it possesses an interest which demands a passing notice. The world as Aristotle, an acute observer, saw it, appeared as a never-ceasing process from the potential to the actual, from matter to mind. But this did not appear as a process in which there was no finality, until one end, common to all, was reached. The individual, as well as the species, had a perfection of its own to attain, written within it, though in characters which its history alone made clear. Though contributing to a universal progress, it yet had a value of its own, which was not realised in full by a mere transition into something higher, although different. The conception does not lend itself too readily to the modern hypothesis of the transmutation of species. It is sufficiently elastic to cover much of the ground occupied by later research, and at the same time it is a guess at truth which devout minds will welcome as a philosophic pre-science, felt rather than expressed, of their own belief in the destiny of the individual life of man.

Speculative principles have always a tendency to become regulative, and the position thus occupied sets a limit to aspiration which may exercise a tranquillising influence upon human effort, without checking any legitimate ambition. To struggle after an end which can never be attained is to be condemned to restlessness for ever. But the nature which can look forward to its own fullest realisation foresees perfect peace when all has been accomplished, and finds rest in the thought that though it knows not what it

shall be, it knows that there will be nothing wanting to its perfection.

It is worthy of notice that the Aristotelian theory of development starts from within, not from without. As such it is contrasted with the methods of modern science, which for the most part determine everything by its relations to other things; or, to express it otherwise, by the influence of the environment, rather than its own inherent character. Natural selection, for example, is a choice made from without, Nature choosing, as it were, this or that particular individual or species for survival and increase. A chemical element is not considered in itself, but from the effects which other elements or compounds have upon it. As yet, modern science, as a whole, regards any inquiry into the thing in itself as futile. It draws no distinction between the order of Nature and the order of knowledge. Resolutely following the latter, it has swept away false conceptions which impeded human progress, and marvellously widened our acquaintance with the external world. It is in this very feature, however, that Aristotle is most in sympathy with our own time. No statements can be more emphatic than his as to the priority of observation and induction in the acquisition of knowledge; and the practice of his life corresponded with the theory. But he was equally emphatic in maintaining the existence of things as they are, determined by their own nature, not by externals. It may be that modern science will become more metaphysical as it

advances, and revert once more to the conception of the form which it has been gradually reaching from without. At all events it is as rational to regard the thing in itself as determining the relations into which it can enter, as to take the opposite view. The modifications which can be brought about by what is external to it are dependent upon the nature of the thing in itself, because it could not enter into relations with other things, or be effected by them, unless it possessed a specific character of its own. Whether or not the change is brought about depends to a large extent on circumstances, but at the same time the potentiality exists apart from the realisation, whatever subsequent modifications the environment may effect.

CHAPTER IX.

THE EFFICIENT AND FINAL CAUSE.

OUR knowledge begins from without, but the order of nature is from within. The essential character of a thing, regarded as intelligible, is form; regarded as operative, it is the efficient cause. In fact, as it has already appeared, the form and the efficient cause are only different aspects of the same principle. This separation in thought between the formal and the efficient cause is almost as fertile in its further developments as the identification of the two in real existence. It has appeared already in several shapes; more especially when the processes of thought, as apparent in the scientific syllogism, were found to be the same as the causation of the external world. The mind of man, starting from true premisses, reached a conclusion by virtue of the necessities of thought, and the mind of nature, working from matter to form, from potentiality to actuality, produced a result by virtue of the necessities of things: and the conclusion and the result were the same, being equally the product of mind, though the conclusion appeared as knowledge, and the result as reality.

The conception of form as force, when it approaches the confines of theology, is in one respect akin to pantheism. Just as form has already given significance to all existence, it now confers motion, rising to life in an ever-ascending scale. This motion pervades all things, stirring the whole universe into ceaseless and ever-varied activity; and the mind that is able to feel the power inherent in its knowledge, moves solemnly with the wide motion of the worlds, or breaks into the countless pulsations of existence which thrill through each portion of the mass. The movement is not a chaotic whirl of atoms, but an orderly progression. It is a mental as well as an actual process, and thus implies an end to be attained which directs every step by which it is approached. Thus the form passes from knowledge into force, and from force to finality. It is intelligible motion carrying with it through the whole series of cause and effect the purpose which is to be wrought out, and reversing the order, drawn onward to the purpose which as potentiality is moving it. And thus form resolves itself at last into the final cause.

The whole system, therefore, of the Aristotelian philosophy is teleological. But it is not the teleology of the theologian pure and simple; or, to state the case more accurately, it is this and something more. Lactantius, and his followers down to the present day, were entirely in accordance with the Aristotelian theory when they held that the will of the Divine Mind is the final cause of all things, but

by narrowing their conception of finality they lost touch with genuine philosophic speculation, and a the same time impoverished their own religious conceptions. The revealed truth from which they began, though the expression of a Divine purpose, was an expression from without the nature of man and of the world. To a large extent it was arbitrary, so far as human intelligence is affected, that is to say, man might acquiesce without responding. His own nature gave him no clue to the meaning of the command, and, while he obeyed it in full, he could mentally conceive of another command, sometimes different from it, and sometimes contradicting it, which he could obey with equal readiness and equal ignorance, feeling within him neither protest nor approval. It is well to delineate clearly, by way of contrast, the outt lines of a position which no religious mind would ever accept in full, although it is often held impregnable in detail against the assaults which it provokes. This logical separation between the Divine Will and the world reduces theology to a thing incomprehensible, strips obedience of all moral worth, and makes of Divinity a Being who wields power and nothing more. It is thought to be founded on a revelation of the Divine Will, but it contradicts both in letter and spirit the authority to which it makes appeal, the foundation of which rests upon a community of nature between the Divine and human mind. Aristotle based all his philosophy on the same conception, approaching it from the side of

reason. The Divine purpose working through the universe resides within each portion of it.

The character of everything which exists is not only the impress of a Divine mind, but of a Divinity which resides within it; and the final expression of all causes is the attraction by which that which is perfect draws all things to itself.

It has already appeared[1] that Aristotle uses the title of First Philosophy to indicate what is now known as the Metaphysics, and that Theology is a synonymous expression. The steps by which Aristotle reached his theological position are the necessary sequence of his previous postulates, although he states them variously, and in forms which need careful examination, if their full force is to be realised. For example, when he argues that motion implies a mover, his conception of motion itself must be rigidly scrutinised if it is to appeal to the philosophical instinct of a later time. Motion in its modern sense does not necessarily contain within it the idea of development. It is one of the forms under which force appears. It takes its origin from one or more of these, and resolves itself back again into them, yielding up neither more nor less than it received, but an exact equivalent. The laws which govern it are capable of precise mathematical expression, or, in other words, its expression is mathematically precise. Certain modern theories of evolu-

[1] Page 129, *supra*.

tion extend a mechanism such as this over the whole field of existence, and the Aristotelian position tacitly admits the possibility of the extension, with one significant exception. The syllogism is capable of being thrown into quantitative formulas in all its varieties,[1] but it is not the quantity which determines its validity. Quantity, in fact, together with mathematics as a whole, belongs to the region of matter [2] and appertains to everything into which matter enters. But matter is in itself a potentiality, and as it moves onward to actualisation it gives place to form, until it is finally eliminated in that highest form of all which draws all things to itself. Thus quantitative expressions which cover the whole range of the manifestations of matter and force alike, to compare the ancient and modern hypothesis, although they apply to all but the highest, lose significance as the element with which they deal grows less. The movement is in fact a development into something higher, potentially though not actually present in the lower stage; and the laws of the lower, though they do not cease to operate, merge themselves into the laws of the higher, by virtue of the same process. The significance of this theory of motion, which, as defined by Aristotle, is the passage from the potential to the actual,[3] becomes more and more apparent as human thought advances. It is idle to deny the ingenuity, or the value, of those modern theories which apply quantitative ex-

[1] *See* above, p. 135. [2] Page 154. [3] Physics, iii. 1.

pressions to life and thought; but as the scale of existence rises, though they do not cease to operate, they gradully cease to govern. As mechanism loses its regulative power, will takes to itself more and more authority. The result of its working may still be shown mechanically, and the mechanical expression may indicate what the direction of the will has been; but, given all the mechanical conditions, the direction of the will cannot always be deduced beforehand.[1] When Aristotle, therefore, defines motion as a passage from the potential to the actual, the form into which the definition is thrown may be antiquated, but the thought which it embodies is still operative.

Objectless motion, resolving itself into its equivalent, whether of motion or any one or more of the forms of force, does not necessarily carry with it a further significance; but motion, which is development, the passage that is, from matter to form, implies thought working itself out. It has already appeared that matter, wherever present, yields a quantitative formula for thought; but the highest thought, the final form, is without matter, and therefore without quantity, indivisible, one.

The highest thought is life, because the activity of thought is life, and thought is but another aspect of activity. It is life which cannot end, because it has nothing potential or relative, and for the same reason it is the highest and best. The name given to the

[1] Cf. Part I., p. 20.

Being who is life absolute, unending, best, is God.[1] The thoughts of the Divine Mind are dependent upon nothing extraneous, otherwise they would only be potential. Moreover, there are thoughts which it is better not to have, and the Divine Mind thinks only what is best, and this without change or motion. In the highest region, therefore, of contemplation, the Divine Mind thinks itself; and subject and object become one.[2] As the centre of all motion, it is motionless, attracting all things to itself as the loved attracts the lover. The supreme felicity which comes at intervals to man in the exercise of his best faculties of thought is a faint reflex of the unchanging blessedness in which, as in a serene atmosphere of contemplation, the Highest dwells.

The Aristotelian philosophy, therefore, culminates in theology. It is built upon observation, and rises by a systematic process in which it is difficult to find a flaw. Its cogency depends, to a large extent, upon the primary distinction which is drawn between matter and form. The reality of such a distinction will be regarded differently by different minds; but the ablest attack which has been made upon one of the modern aspects of the distinction furnishes an additional, and it may be said, convincing argument in its favour.[3] The critical philosophy of Hume leads to a conclusion which contradicts the most assured data of human experience, our own existence

[1] Metaphys., xi. 7. [2] Metaphys., xi. 9. [3] Cf. *supra*, p. 159.

and personality; and those who are not prepared to accept the conclusion will find in Aristotle a system stretching from pole to pole of thought, from the human to the divine.

God and man, in the language of Christian theology, express ideas which are mutually dependent. They stand or fall together. The process which proves or disproves is the same for both alike.

But whatever be the cogency of Aristotle's conclusion, there can be no question as to his integrity and honesty. A spirit of free and unbiassed inquiry breathes through his whole system. A genuine love of truth is the sole motive which possessed him, and any other influence tending to alter the current of his thought, or to adapt his arguments to his wishes, would have been indignantly repelled.[1] Christian philosophy may be charged with a prejudice which Aristotle could not have felt. Those hopes and wishes which centre themselves in the conception of a future life were denied to the subtlest thinker of the Greeks. The only life after death which his data gave evidence for was akin to the Nirvâna of the Buddhist. Matter and form, body and soul together, constituted man, and though the soul, as thought, and a portion of the divine thought, was indestructible, the man himself existed by the union of the two, and perished with the severance of the bond. Aristotle's philosophy, therefore, was as unbiassed

[1] Cf. ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Eth. I. vi. 1.

in this respect as the most sceptical system of modern times; although the conclusion to which it brought him was different. The train of thought which led to the doctrine of a Divine Being as the cause and governor of all things is marvellous in its subtlety and precision; but his apprehension, by the same process, of certain of the attributes of Divinity, is an effort of even deeper philosophic penetration. With but little alteration, his statement might become an integral portion of the creed of Christendom, seeing that both alike seek their highest happiness from the same source, and find as the foundation of their intellectual life, a belief in "One living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts or passions, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness; the Maker and Preserver of all things, whether visible or invisible."[1]

[1] Cf. Part I., ch. v. vi.

CHAPTER X.

THE PSYCHOLOGY.

METAPHYSIC deals with the laws of existence as a whole, and its principles apply to every other department of thought and inquiry. But the application will vary according to the matter which it deals with. The order in which Aristotle wrote his various treatises is open to doubt, and still more so the order in which they shaped themselves in his mind; but there is less question as to the order in which they should be studied. The logical portions of his writings are a necessary preliminary to the metaphysics, although there is much that is common to both. A fixed terminology and a precise method must be acquired before an inquiry into the nature of things becomes possible, even though they presuppose much that more properly belongs to a later investigation. But when the organon or instrument of thought is ready for use, its earliest application would naturally be to the central science which governs all the rest,[1] and although the metaphysics may be the last

[1] The Rhetoric may have followed either the Organon or the Politics.

of the works which Aristotle wrote in a completed form, it must have been one of the earliest which he formulated in his own mind, or sketched for others in its main outlines. After the general principles of the metaphysics have been laid down, there is more room for choice as to the appropriate order of their application. Perhaps Aristotle himself turned to the Ethics, Politics, and Poetics, then to the Physics and Zoology, and lastly to the Psychology, and to the Metaphysics in their final form. The immense scope of his thought and labour is interesting to the historian and the biographer; and its influence upon the thought of his own time, and the times which immediately followed, was undoubtedly great; but large portions, although they may have stimulated modern inquiry, have been superseded by it. The Physics and the Zoology, works upon which, perhaps, Aristotle laboured most, have been necessarily set aside with advancing knowledge; but the ethics, the politics, and the psychology occupy a different position. The ethics and the psychology rest in the main upon the data furnished by the mind itself, and to these Aristotle had access as freely as observers of the present time; and the almost innumerable divisions of the Greek political world presented to Aristotle a field of observation wider perhaps than anything we now possess. Moreover, the political life of Aristotle's time was not guided solely by expediency, nor by outward circumstances and exigencies. In great crises of modern history political theory has

played a prominent part,—through the struggle for independence in America, during the revolution in France, and in Prussia, after her crushing defeat by Napoleon I.; but its energy has been intermittent, and the wide area of its application has left less scope for variety. But in Greece political speculation worked with unremitting force, and thus the experiments in government which arose from the conflict of political parties, or the pressure of outward circumstances, were seldom uninfluenced by the theories and ideals of the philosopher. The instances, therefore, which presented themselves were more numerous, and, to a large extent, more significant; and although here, as in other departments of thought, new factors have been introduced, and new departures made, the results of Aristotle's labour belong to the subject itself as well as to the history of its growth.

The ethics have already been dealt with. It is probable that the politics preceded the psychology in order of time. The Greeks, as a whole, regarded the State rather than the individual as the unit, while in modern times the order is reversed. From the modern point of view, therefore, it is more natural to advance from psychology to politics, although the chronological process is from politics to psychology.

It is difficult to find a precise modern equivalent for the Aristotelian term, psychology. The word, ψυχή, soul, which is the subject matter of the inquiry, presented a variety of aspects, which, if not foreign to the modern conception, do not necessarily form an

integral portion of it. To begin with, soul was not limited by Aristotle to man, or even animals. The extent of its application was as wide as that of life; and although life, in its final development, man, is the main subject of his investigation, the life of plants and animals is not only not excluded, but introduced as a factor without which the whole would be incomplete. Thus, to a certain extent, biology and psychology are the same. But mind, in Aristotle, covers all the ground occupied by soul and life, although its manifestations differ as the scale of existence ascends or descends; and thus psychology in dealing with mental phenomena rises above biology, although it stretches down as far.

Perhaps the best conception of the meaning of soul in the Aristotelian sense of the term may be obtained by the help of the metaphysical distinction between Matter and Form. Matter and Form combine through the whole region of existence, whether animate or inanimate. But at the point where life begins, Aristotle introduces a new terminology. What hitherto was Form and Matter is now soul and body, although soul does not cease to be form, nor body cease to be matter. The soul is the form of the body, the body is the matter of the soul. Still, having recourse to the terms of the metaphysics, soul and body stand related in the same way as actuality and potentiality. The soul is the actuality, the realisation of the body, and not only is it the actuality, but the entelechy also. Taking man as an instance, the soul

is the final significance and realisation of the body. Mention has already been made of the fertility of the distinction between actuality and entelechy.[1] The Aristotelian process of development is not one in which there is nothing beyond unceasing passage from lower to higher, a monotonous treadmill of ascent, in which no rest is to be found. It contains within it the promise of attainment, of a life which is fully developed and complete. Yet, when completeness has been won, the progress is not arrested, for the soul may be dormant or unemployed while still existent, just as in the case of the mind in sleep.[2] Although, therefore, it is the full and complete significance and realisation of the body, it is nevertheless but the first stage in a further progress. To mark this new distinction within a distinction, Aristotle adds one word more. Soul is the earliest, the primary entelechy of body, complete, yet capable of expansion and use.

The connexion between soul and body is the same as that between form and matter. Neither can exist apart from the other, and the destruction of the one involves the destruction of the other. They are in fact, different aspects of one whole, which arises from the union of the two. Mentally they may be isolated, and regarded apart; but though there is distinction there is no division. The concrete whole, compounded of the two, is the one thing which really

[1] Pp. 164, 165. [2] Cf. Part I. p. 2.

exists; and either of them regarded separately is a mere abstraction of the mind.

By the application, therefore, of a metaphysical formula, Aristotle propounds a solution of the great problem of modern thought, the connexion between mind and matter. Whatever degree of truth it may possess, it stands midway between the two contrasting views of later speculation, and to some extent mediates between them. The materialist who regards mind as nothing more than another aspect of matter, or the physicist who holds that a mental process is the outcome and development of a physical, is not more emphatic than Aristotle in maintaining the necessity of the connexion between the two. Both are intimately blended, so that the one cannot operate or exist without the other. On the other hand, those who assume the possibility of separating between the two, do not assign to the soul a higher degree of regulative force than Aristotle. Just as in all things the form contains the significance and motive power of the object, which in its combination with matter it constitutes, so the soul holds within it the full meaning of the body, and the final development which it has reached. But on the one hand Aristotle is at variance with those who approach the study of mental phenomena entirely from the side of physiology. Here, as elsewhere, it is the form, the dominating thought, which holds the key, and although the study of those phenomena which find a material expression is as important in the region of

psychology as elsewhere, it is only in order that the mind may be enabled to grasp, and grasp unerringly, the significance which they contain. And on the other hand, although Aristotle has applied a metaphysical distinction to the question, he is thoroughly alive to the connexion between mind and matter, and to the importance of approaching the problem from the side of observation.

It follows, moreover, from the position which he has taken up, that he would disclaim anything in the shape of occasionalism, or pre-established harmony between the two. This is all the more significant because the theory that the soul was a harmony maintained between two separate and contrasting elements was known to him and examined with care. The doctrine, as discussed by Aristotle, has enough in common with the views of the chief modern expositors of the theory, Geulinx, Malebranche, and Leibnitz, to give value to Aristotle's criticism from a more modern standpoint. It is true, that with the ancients the soul itself was the harmony, while with the later advocates of the theory soul and body are the elements between which the harmony exists. But it can hardly be doubted that Pythagoras and his followers considered the harmony which they postulated an explanation of the relation which existed between soul and body, as well as a mathematical principle. Further, Aristotle found much in the conception of the soul as a harmony which agreed with his own position. It afforded an explanation of

his belief that the destruction of the body involved the destruction of the soul, and the destruction of the soul that of the body; but he nevertheless maintains the position taken up in the metaphysics. The soul, he asserts, apart from the body is non-existent, and the body non-existent apart from the soul. The two together are inseparably blended into a single whole.

It is possible that Aristotle would have been equally opposed to an occasionalism of a more scientific character, which regards mind as a single force, manifesting itself materially, like electricity, at a number of points in space; although it must be remembered that he identified the physical causation of the universe with the intellectual processes of the mind. For example, the thought which concludes rightly in the syllogism is operative in the external world, and thus the result must necessarily be the same. There is certainly an idea common to Aristotle and recent occasionalists, such as Lotze; but in its application the parallel appears to cease.

There is, however, an application, or, as it may be termed, an elucidation, of Aristotle's conception, to be discovered in theological speculation, which goes far to confirm the conclusiveness of both. To Aristotle the conception of soul without body appeared not only illusory but unphilosophic. A wide interval exists between what may or may not be and a belief which violates a fundamental principle of reason. In the one case, evidence alone is wanting. In the other, no evidence would be suffi-

cient to establish it as a fact. The Christian belief in the resurrection of the body removes the doctrine of a life after death from one category to the other. Granted that evidence is wanting, yet as a supposition, if the body does rise again, all the conditions of existence which Aristotle demands are fulfilled. Doubtless the crude materialistic conceptions which have been entertained upon the subject have made this article of Christian belief appear an irrational and vulgar superstition; but it is strictly in accordance with the requirements of Aristotle. St. Paul, in departing from the vulgar notions which his emphatic statements have hardly sufficed to destroy, asserts in the plainest language that there is a spiritual as well as a natural body. We are too ignorant of matter as well as of spirit to make any positive assertion with regard to the connexion which may exist between the two; but the truth as taught by St. Paul is a valuable contribution to Christian philosophy. It does away with the crude, and as it may well appear, impossible demand which has been made upon the credence of mankind; and it exalts the article of the Christian faith which proclaims the resurrection of the body into strict agreement with the requirements of the most rigorous system of old-world thought. The Christian doctrine, therefore, rightly apprehended, is far from being at variance with reason. If there is evidence for the resurrection of the body, this is all that the Aristotelian postulate requires; and the very fact that the belief of

Christendom has unconsciously maintained what Aristotle's theory required, gives antecedent probability to the testimony upon which it rests. And, reversing the order, the Christian conception as to the fact is at least an illustration, if not a proof, of the acumen of the philosopher. Notwithstanding scattered indications of a belief in a future life to be found in Aristotle's writings, he clearly asserts, and indeed is driven to do so by previous assumptions, that with the body the soul perishes. As mind, a portion of the Divine Mind, it still exists, but it is no longer a soul when the body perishes; and cannot be without violation of the conditions laid down.[1] If, however, the doctrine had been presented to Aristotle in the shape which it assumed in the mind of St. Paul, it would have carried with it the confirmatory evidence of agreement with acute and independent speculation.

As has already appeared, the term soul covered the whole range of life, whether it shewed itself in man, animal or plant; and the extent of the term indicates at once that Aristotle regarded the whole series as a continuous development from lower forms of life to higher. Nor does the process stop short at the point when life appear. The chasm which divides the organic from the inorganic world was bridged over by the central hypothesis. He viewed the whole universe as an orderly development from formless matter to matterless form. No modern

[1] Cf. Part I., ch. v.

evolutionist has given clearer expression to this conception than Aristotle. Nor was it merely a metaphysical hypothesis. The greater part of Aristotle's energy was expended in a careful examination of the external world; and if his observation did not give birth to the wide generalisation of his natural philosophy, it certainly went far to verify it. He found in sponges an intermediate link between the inanimate and the animate. Animals appeared to him to possess traces of the mental characteristics of men. He regarded the monkey as an intermediate link between men and animals of the viviparous class.

Thus the doctrine or hypothesis which is with us chiefly associated with the name of Darwin, was announced by Aristotle in the fourth century before the Christian era. Even in Aristotle's time it was not entirely new. Empedocles had entertained the idea in embryo shape, and the philosophy of Heraclitus contained it implicitly. It may appear strange that the theory when once set forth in something like a scientific form should lie dormant for more than two thousand years. But a variety of causes combined to arrest its further development. The great political changes brought about by the establishment of the Macedonian Empire turned men's minds into a new channel. The independent civic life which had given so powerful a stimulus to Hellenic thought was destroyed, and the centres of philosophic speculation found a past to mourn over, but little in the future to look forward to.

The speculative vigour which had sprung into being, one might almost say, after the victorious struggle with the Persians, died away, when the individual and ever-varying life of separate communities perished, and the practical direction which Aristotle had given to the human mind was forgotten. It is something like the irony of the old Greek drama, that the new philosophy enunciated by Bacon, rising in rebellion against Aristotelianism, should end in a re-statement of the doctrine which Aristotle was one of the first to propound.

There is, it need hardly be said, a wide difference between Aristotle's enunciation of the theory, and modern theories, whether of evolution or of natural selection. But the result, as exhibited in chronological order, is the same. There is, however, a fundamental difference in the conception. With Aristotle the order was twofold, the order of time and the order of thought. The order of time was first for us, but the order of thought was first by nature. The potential developing itself into the actual could only do so by virtue of the character it held within it, dormant as yet. This must, according to Aristotle, be pre-supposed in any rational explanation of progress. In the terms of the metaphysics it is the form which guides the whole process as the efficient and final cause, and consequently it must in reality be prior to the chronological series which it produces. The modern theory either denies or studiously refrains from affirming the teleology which with

Aristotle is the more important element of the two; and the divergence is even more significant because the facts are the same.

The lowest form of soul was to be found in plants. Nutrition, growth, and reproduction were its characteristics. The acquisition of sense-perception marks the transition from the inanimate to the animate, and with the power of local movement, springing from appetite or desire, constitutes the animal. The final manifestation, in which intellect is added to the rest, is found in man.

Assimilation, however, is to be traced throughout; but while the plant assimilates the matter of the external world, the animal assimilates the form as well, in the shape of sense-perception; and mind assimilates the data of the senses.

Sensation is the point of division between the inanimate and the animate. It consists of a process in which the animal is moved or influenced by an object external to itself. But it is moved or influenced in a peculiar way, for the object, as a concrete whole, that is to say form and matter in combination, does not come into play; but the form alone, apart from the matter. Aristotle makes his meaning clear by the aid of an illustration. The senses receive the sensations just as the wax receives the impression of the seal. The impression is conveyed without any portion of the gold or iron of which the seal is made.[1]

[1] Psychology, ii. 12. Cf. Part I. i.

In enumerating the special senses, Aristotle does not depart from the popular conception. They are five in number, and of the five, touch and taste have the most extended range, and serve, not for any purpose of moral progress, but for the bare maintenance of existence. Touch has for its object the various qualities which body as body, possesses.[1] Among these Aristotle includes dry and moist, hot and cold, as well as hard and soft. Taste is regarded as a special form of touch, localised in the tongue; whereas touch extends over the whole body. Both touch and taste are contrasted with the other senses as operative only in the case of the proximity or contact of the object; whilst the other three act at a distance from it. The sense of smell stands midway between touch and taste on the one hand, and sight and hearing on the other. It resembles taste in that odour is to the one what flavour is to the other; but it differs from both touch and taste in being carried on through a medium which intervenes, whatever that medium may be, instead of by contact with the object. The medium Aristotle finds it difficult to determine. It is something without a name, common to air and water. Animals that breathe can only smell whilst breathing, but creatures whose element is water appear to possess the power as well.[2]

Sound is the vibration of the air within the ear produced by the vibration of the air without. Rapid

[1] Psychology, ii. 11, 12. [2] Ibid., ii. 7, end.

vibrations produce the high notes, slow vibrations the low. Sound may be distinguished into what is meaningless, and that which possesses meaning, *e.g.*, voice, which is always accompanied by some mental picture.[1]

In discussing sight, Aristotle departs from what appears to have been, on the whole, the popular belief, as well as a theory of the Atomists, viz., that colour is a material emanation from the object seen. The medium through which sight operates is the pellucid,[2] which is contained in both air and water. Light is the actuality of the pellucid, and wherever there is any potentiality there is darkness also. The development from the potential to the actual is brought about by fire, or something akin to it.[3] The eye, the organ of sight, is composed mainly of water. This water is derived from the brain, through connecting channels or ducts.

In addition to the separate senses, there is, according to Aristotle, a central sense, which exalts sensation into perception by rendering it conscious, and compares one sensation with the other. The seat of this central sense is the heart, the brain being merely a contrivance of nature for cooling the heart and maintaining a proper mean of temperature.[4]

Imagination is described as the continuance of a sensation after the object which excites it is with-

[1] *Φαντασία.*—Psychology, ii. 8. [2] Psychology, ii. 7.
[3] Psychology, ii. 7, 4. [4] De Partibus Animalium, ii. 7.

drawn. But it differs from sensation in being able to arise without the stimulus of the object. Moreover, it is confined to the higher stages of development, while sensation belongs to all animals alike: it is capricious in its exercise, and liable to error.[1]

Sleep, according to Aristotle, is the comparative inactivity of the senses. As such, it is one of the marks which distinguish animals from plants, seeing that sensation belongs to the former alone. Dreams are imaginative pictures produced in the senses by movements within the body or without it.

Aristotle's account of memory is closely connected with his theory of imagination. Both memory and imagination are what remains of a sensation when the object upon which it depended is removed; but memory carries with it a distinct association with the object, as a fact in the past, while imagination is more arbitrary and fantastic. Thus memory implies a consciousness of time, and depends upon the central sense, which gives rise to the kindred conceptions of time and number.

But there is a further process which Aristotle distinguishes from memory, namely, recollection. The pictures of the past which memory stores up are associated together by the three laws of similarity, contrariety, and contiguity. By virtue of these laws impressions are recalled, both voluntarily and involuntarily, not in isolation, but in pairs or groups. When

[1] Psychology, iii. 3.

recollection is voluntary, we endeavour to discover an impression like, contrasting with, or immediately preceding the impression which we are seeking; and the more frequently the two have been connected, the more readily will the one suggest the other.

Thus far the psychology of Aristotle coincides to a large extent with those modern theories which approach the problem of thought from the side of sense-perception. Physiology has set aside many detailed portions of the Aristotelian conception, but, as a whole, it would be possible to assert that it is based entirely upon the senses. Without an image of the senses, Aristotle says, thought cannot be exercised.[1] He assumes a sense, located in the heart, to explain the phenomena of consciousness and recollection. The laws which govern the latter admit of an amplification which the most extreme positivist might accept. Scientific truth may resolve itself into invariable sequence, or co-existence; and causation may identify itself with law.

But, side by side with this, there is another view which to Aristotle was the more important of the two. From first to last, it is mind which is at work, appearing in subjective knowledge and objective existence with the first glimmer of a rudimentary sensation. The recognition of a similarity between two impressions in accordance with one of the associative laws

[1] Νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος.—De Memoria, i.

is another way of stating that the mind grasps the universal which they both contain,[1] and the universal contains within itself the cause as well as the significance. However frequently impressions may coexist, or succeed each other, there is, according to the Aristotelian position, no ground for a general statement, unless the connecting link contained within the universal which binds the two together is apprehended. Otherwise the conjunction may be fortuitous, and fail to enter into scientific knowledge.

This metaphysical conception has already been discussed. In its application to psychology there is much difficulty as well as interest. To begin with, the central sense which Aristotle assumes takes to itself, apparently, all the functions of the mind. It raises sensation into perception, and in a measure discovers the universal in the particular. It brings difference to light as well as agreement; and telling of number and time binds together the past and present into a continuous whole.

It must be remembered, however, that mind is a sort of sliding term. It is present wherever form exists, and thus enters into the senses which apprehend the form, and more fully still into the central sense which collects and compares the materials provided by the rest. Mind, working in the central sense, occupies an intermediate position between mere sensation, and mind as apprehending the

[1] P. 126, *supra*.

universal. It is as yet occupied with the particular. Amongst a number of confused impressions one stands out more prominent than the rest, like a soldier who makes a stand in a general rout, and round this others gradually cluster.[1] Experience[2] is the term used to denote this process. It goes on until the first principle, the universal, is reached; and mind, ever rising one step higher, seizes upon it and apprehends it as such. It is still incapable of thinking without the aid of the particular instance, which is the residuum of some sensible impression, and thus a picture or symbol of the universal; yet, although it thinks by the aid of the particular, it does not think the particular, but the universal contained in it, and in the other particulars which have contributed to the final result.

There is, however, a still greater difficulty in a distinction which Aristotle draws within the mind itself. Following out consistently the method which he adopts from the beginning, he discovers form and matter even in the soul which is the form of the body.[3] The former is creative, the latter, passive reason. The passive reason is capable of becoming all things, and this in part by reason of its receptivity. It is like a tablet, on which nothing is as yet actually written, although it is capable of being written upon with infinite variety.[4] The creative reason, on the

[1] Post. Anal., ii. 15.
[2] Ἐμπειρία.
[3] Psychology, iii. 5.
[4] Ibid., iii. 14.

contrary, cannot be written upon. It is impressionless, unmixed with matter, and imperishable. As a portion of the Divine Mind it thinks without ceasing, although we do not always remember because it is unaffected, and thus has no external object. The passive reason, on the other hand, being matter in contrast with the creative, and mixed still further with matter in the descending scale of existence, is perishable. It has been stated, and with some truth, that Aristotle's distinction between these two forms of reason has "made more sensation in the world than all the rest of his writings put together."[1] Yet it is in strict accordance with, and in fact a necessary consequence of, the rest of his system. The portion of the Divine Mind within us possesses from its nature attributes akin to the Divine. When we exercise it we enter into supreme blessedness. On its lower side, though it is only one step removed from the highest, it is not pure mind unmixed with matter; but matter in the ascending, and form in the descending scale. In whichever aspect it is regarded, this passive reason must pass away. As matter, compared with the highest form, it cannot continue the connexion for ever; and as form in its relation to the body, it must with the body cease to be.

The passive reason is compared to a tablet capable of receiving every kind of character. But Aristotle

[1] GRANT'S "Ethics," I. p. 296.

is far from accepting the theory propounded by Locke in very much the same terms. Locke's sheet of white paper was blank. It was receptive and nothing more. Aristotle regarded its receptivity as a potentiality, to be developed into actuality by experience; and thus the characters were already written, but not brought out. In the order of thought it may be said they were already there, to be made visible subsequently by the processes of time.

The creative reason, standing at the head of the long series, creates and interprets all the rest. Without it the universe of matter would fall back into an unintelligible chaos, non-existent also in the full sense of the term. It is the cause both of knowledge and existence, and the meeting of the two in consciousness is thought recognising itself.

The difficulty discovered in the distinction between the creative and the passive reason is in reality more extended. It is only the final application of the distinction between matter and form; and it finds a parallel at the other extremity of the series, where form is lost in matter, the actual in the potential. As the aspect, however, which the world presented to a mind of superlative acuteness, it has profoundly influenced subsequent speculation; and whatever degree of truth it may contain, it offers a reconciliation between the two extremes of thought which have always thrown themselves out into contrast in philosophic eyes. On the one hand it is based upon the senses, on the other upon mind; and the recon-

ciliation which is attempted is suggestive, if not complete.

The Psychology was the first systematic treatise upon the soul. Subsequent discovery has corrected many mistakes, inevitable at a time when so little was known of the constitution of the human body; but the brilliant guesses at truth which it contains throw its errors into the shade. The theory of development which Aristotle formulated is widely accepted now by minds of the highest scientific attainment. The laws of association by which Aristotle accounted for memory have been extended so as to cover the whole area of thought. His hypothesis of a central sense, however strangely located, harmonises with at least one modern school of speculation. The Teleology which runs throughout finds a counterpart in religious philosophy, and the relationship which Aristotle discovers between soul and body prepares the way for the more emphatic statement of St. Paul.[1]

It will be observed that there are large omissions in the Psychology. The will, the moral faculty, and the social instincts are only touched upon incidentally. But they are reserved for separate treatises. The will and the moral faculty are discussed in the Ethics; the social instincts enter largely into the Politics.

[1] Cf. p. 186, *supra*.

CHAPTER XI.

THE POLITICS.

THE State, according to the opening sentences of the Politics, is an association or partnership. It is not, however, a conventional association, in any sense approaching the doctrine of Rousseau; for it has its foundations in the nature of things and the instincts of the human race. The simplest form of this association is that which exists between man and wife, and next to this the relationship between master and slave. According to Aristotle's view, the latter of these forms is based upon nature as well as the former. Nature has given to one class of men the power of foresight, and denied it to another, so that by natural ordering the one designs and directs, the other executes and obeys. There is, therefore, a community of interest between master and slave, as well as between husband and wife, and from the conjunction of the two kinds of partnership the primitive household takes its origin. The village is a larger community arising from the association of several households, and when villages are united so as to be self-sufficing, or nearly so, the State is reached. Thus the origin of the State is to be looked for in the family, and as the family is natural, so also is the State,

though in even a higher degree; for nature is to be sought, not in the germ, but in the full development. Man, therefore, has need of other human beings to supply his wants. If he cannot exist in society, which is a kind of co-operative association for this purpose, he is a beast: if he is sufficient for himself he is a god. In either case he is no part of the State. Justice is the principle which regulates a society of this nature, and law its exposition; and the lawgiver is the benefactor of his kind.

Aristotle discusses slavery at some length. It appears to him a natural and necessary institution. Some men are by nature fitted for freedom, others for slavery, and both are benefited by keeping to their proper position. Animals are better domesticated than when they are wild, and the slave is better as a slave than if he were free. If the master abuses his authority, he acts in a way which is injurious to himself, as well as to the slave, for the slave is like a separate portion of himself, and the interests of both are identical. At the same time Aristotle distinguishes between natural, and conventional or legal slavery, in which superior force alone enslaves those who are designed by nature for freedom; and if his principle had been practically applied, one of the worse results of Hellenic warfare would have been avoided. Moreover he holds that the slave should be encouraged with the hope of freedom, as a reward for faithful service.

Slavery, therefore, as recognised by Aristotle, dif-

fered widely from the slavery of modern times. It was for the advantage of the slave as well as of the master, and contributed to the good of the community. The Aristotelian theory was in advance of the time, and in criticising it we must be careful not to require too much. Indeed it may contain an element of truth which modern times have neglected. It is possible that the education of an inferior race might be advanced more effectually by means of such a system than by the premature grant of freedom; although the practice of slavery, as we understand it, cannot be defended on any principle of justice or benevolence. But the slavery which we condemn was not the slavery which Aristotle contemplated; and the criticism employed against the one is inapplicable to the other.

Nor is it to be expected that Aristotle should have been able to see one of the results of the institution which later history has made clear. Many of the discoveries and improvements of our own time have been the direct outcome of free labour, and would have been practically impossible under a different system. The slave has less motive for economising labour than those who are their own masters. He naturally feels disposed to get through the time without regard to the task. It matters little to him whether his labour is more productive or less productive; and thus his mind is not upon the alert to seize upon the devices for shortening labour which are personally valueless to him because his time is

not his own. This has been without doubt a practical evil in every system of slavery with which we are acquainted, and it accounts to a large extent for the poverty of ancient times in mechanical invention. But theoretically Aristotle meets the difficulty; for if the slave were as he ought to be, he would regard his master's interest as his own. The two, master and slave, were united together in a species of communism; and the relationship had all the practical difficulties of modern communistic schemes. If the free man of modern times cannot extend his conception of expediency beyond immediate and personal interest, if he fails to see that what is done for the whole of which he is a member is done equally for himself in the end, it cannot be expected that slaves of an inferior race should be able, whether by instinct or intelligence, to reach the same ideal.

Still occupied with the family, which is the germ of the State, Aristotle proceeds to a further question. In dealing with slaves he spoke of one kind of property, the living instruments of the master, and this aspect of slavery leads him on to the discussion of property in general. The chapters of the first book of the Politics which treat of property may be termed a rudimentary treatise upon Political Economy. A distinction is drawn between the acquisition of wealth sufficient for the maintenance of the family, and money-making in general. The former is described as natural, and necessary for the support of life. The wealth acquired is natural also, consisting of the in-

struments and commodities which maintain the family, and, through the family, the State. Aristotle is particularly emphatic in prescribing a limit to such acquisition. Wealth, he maintains, has its natural and proper uses; but to pursue it beyond the needful point is unnatural and derogatory. He sees that money, although a measure of wealth, does not constitute wealth itself. Those who make its accumulation an end in itself, instead of a means to an end, aim at living merely, instead of living well and nobly. They seek money as a means of obtaining bodily pleasure; and whether they seek it by the art of money-making, or by a degradation of other pursuits, the practice of arms, for example, or the art of healing, their object is equally ignoble.

The legitimate acquisition of wealth as a method for supplying the wants of the household and the State, is a necessary part of every political system. But the supply of wants, in other words, mere living, by no means constitutes the whole end and aim of the household, and still less of the State. The teleology of the Metaphysics is consistently applied to the Politics as well as to other departments of human thought and investigation, and the end to be attained is a regulative principle, influencing every step in the process of attainment. The end of life for the individual has already been found in the Ethics. It consists of happiness;[1] and happiness itself may be defined as the free play of the faculties according to

[1] Part I., p. 45.

their proper excellence in a life which gives full scope for it. But inasmuch as man is not sufficient for himself, something more than the individual is wanted for the attainment of happiness, and the State must find him the means for the exercise of these energies, as well as the equipment without which even virtue is incomplete. Thus the State does not merely provide for the maintenance of life, but it aims at a noble life. It is not merely an organisation for the production of excellence, but it has equally in view the exercise of what is excellent, and those accessories of fortune which cannot be disregarded, if life is to be wanting in nothing. The State, therefore, is the completion of the life of the individual; and its end is to produce excellence, and to supply it with a field for exercise. Aristotle, however, gave more importance to the functions of the State than is usual in modern theories. It was not to confine itself to removing impediments, to correcting evils and abuses, and checking crime. Its action was to be positive, quite as much as negative. Its parental legislation descended into the minute details of private life. Part of its office consisted in the proper regulation of marriage, the education of children after the age of seven, the conduct of women, the arrangement of meals, the ordering of worship and religious ceremonies. Thus it is far more than the State, in the modern acceptance of the term. Its authority is paternal and spiritual, as well as secular. It is Church and State combined. Custom and fashion are not outside its

sphere. It is wanting in no element which contributes to the noblest realisation of life and happiness.

Aristotle, however, does not imply that any existing form of State is competent to discharge such a multiplicity of duties. He is speaking of what the State ought to do, and of what an ideal State, if ever realised, will actually accomplish. The ideal State was not a new conception. It entered as a factor into the thought of the time, and influenced history as well as speculation. Plato attempted to construct a State off-hand, with too little regard for circumstances and natural growth; but Aristotle departs less from the facts of human nature than his predecessor. Although the abstractions which guided both gave a visionary colouring to their theories which is to a large extent alien to modern thought, these theories contain an element of truth which subsequent times have been too prone to disregard. A definite end, even though its full attainment is impossible, may exercise a powerful influence upon history; and instances are not wanting to show how potent and wide-reaching its employment may become. The fortunes of Russia have been affected by the hope of acquiring Constantinople; and the existence of the German empire may, to some degree, be traced to Fichte's "Addresses to the German Nation" in 1807 and 1808. In assigning one end for all States, Aristotle neglected those outward circumstances which often dictate imperatively the course

to be pursued. But the ideal end, a perfect life, even if it be unattainable, is far from useless. It suggests a standard to be reached; and every effort after attainment, however distant in its results, plays a useful part by narrowing the intervening space and approximating to the perfect pattern. Moreover, it is a test which may be applied to subsidiary or lower aims. It reminds the statesman or the nation, that such objects as wealth and conquest are only to be pursued so far as they contribute to, or are necessary for, the higher life.

Aristotle, however, does not enter upon the task of constructing his ideal State until he has examined existing constitutions, and it may be said, with some approach to accuracy, that he reaches his result by an induction based upon the political phenomena of his time. At the beginning of the third book of the Politics, Aristotle seeks to discover the definition of a State. In order to do this, it is, in the first place, necessary to define the citizen, seeing that the State is a composite whole, of which citizens are the parts. To reside within the State, and to receive the protection of the laws, is not enough to constitute a citizen. To these must be added the power to hold any State office of whatever kind it may be. Strictly speaking, however, the definition will only apply to a democracy. Citizenship differs according to constitutions; but the citizen, in the full sense, is he who shares in office. Constitutions vary according as the Government is in the hands of the one, the few, or the many. But

each of these three may govern for its own advantage, or for the advantage of the whole State: and thus there are six possible forms; of which three, in which the government is for the general good, are constitutions in the proper sense; while the other three, in which the government is for the good of the governing classes, are deviations. Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Polity are the terms applied to the former; contrasting with Despotism, Oligarchy, and Democracy, which are the respective deviations. The former class fulfil, in a measure, the demands of an ideal constitution. Monarchy and aristocracy, in their true sense, are the rule of the best, whether the best be one or more. The Polity awards power to rank and freedom; contrasting with Oligarchy, on the one hand, which is based exclusively on rank, and with Democracy on the other, which is based with equal exclusiveness on freedom. Aristotle regards these divergences of constitution as the result partly of moral characteristics, and partly of outward circumstances. Looking at them from the former point of view, the constitution may be considered as the expression of the moral standard of the people who compose it. Those who assign power to virtue, sufficiently equipped, rise highest in the ethical scale. On the other hand, particular occupations, social distinctions, the nature of the country, may each and all of them play an important part in deciding what the constitution is to be.

The precise form which the ideal state will assume

is not distinctly given. Each of the constitutions properly so called,—Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Polity,—foreshadow it, and contain many of its elements; and two of them, Monarchy and Aristocracy, appear capable of attaining to the ideal standard. The best State is the State governed by the best men. If there is one man who rises supremely above his fellows, he will be monarch by natural right. Law will regulate the aristocracy of virtue; but the perfect man will rise above all law. The aristocracy of virtue will exclude from its ranks all who are engaged in mercenary pursuits. It is part of Aristotle's conception of the good man that he should do whatever he does for its own sake, and not for the material gain which it may bring him. Even those who live the highest life may descend to the level of the citizen and the slave, if it is merely a method of making an income. They are not free men, and thus are incapable of receiving the citizenship of the ideal State, or of exercising control over others. As well as the slave, they need the guidance of a higher nature.

The possibility of the highest forms, therefore, of political life will depend upon the appearance of the supreme nature; or of a group of men, not so highly exalted, but still fully furnished with noble qualities. According to modern theories, such a view as this is visionary in the extreme; but it is not without confirmation in history. Individual men, and groups of men have been found to guide the destinies of a nation, and their worth has been instinctively

recognised. Augustus and his Privy Council, Elizabeth and her statesmen, Frederick the Great and his generals, are familiar instances.

Nor does Aristotle consider it altogether idle to look for the appearance of the one man capable of taking the place of law. Notwithstanding the practical turn which most of his speculation takes, he is not a sceptic as to the possibilities of human nature. His metaphysical system would lead him to look for some perfect realisation of the potential capacity latent in mankind; and the richly diversified life of his century may have presented instances, in which some approach was made to the ideal man. Pelopidas, Epaminondas, Philip and Alexander, were not unworthy types of isolated virtues; and the constructive imagination of the philosopher could piece together scattered excellences, and conceive of a single example of them all.

Nature, however, will not be sufficient of itself. Education is needed to develop the potential into the actual. But the end at which the State aims is a noble life; and the meaning which we assign to a noble life will govern the educational, as well as the political system.

Aristotle dissents entirely from those who hold that wealth or pleasure is sufficient for the attainment of happiness. The two types of life which appear to him most desirable are the practical, which is mainly the political, and the contemplative; and from one point of view the two can be identified.

Thought is an activity of the mind, and is often more practical in aiming at and reaching a noble activity than action which has an end external to itself. On the whole, Aristotle leans toward the life of the philosopher. In the Metaphysics it is the highest contemplation which brings a man nearest to supreme felicity; and the end of all political systems is to make such a life possible, and to produce it. The contemplative life, which Aristotle regards as best worth living, meant far more to him than the terms convey to us. It was a life in the serene heights where truth, beauty, and virtue lose their distinctive features, and become blended into one.[1]

Education, therefore, will be directed towards the attainment of this object; but while keeping the highest steadily in view, it will not forget other sides of human nature. Its purpose is to develop the activities of the soul; the best most, because capable of most, but all to their full extent. For this purpose the State is to take the control of children after they are seven years old. Even before this, State officers are to be appointed to keep them as much as possible from the society of slaves; and particular care is to be taken to prevent them from seeing or hearing anything which would tend to corrupt their nature or tastes. The training of the body is to come first, but it is to be light; not such as will tax boys' strength too much, or tend to

[1] Cf. Part I. pp. 9, 48.

produce a savage type of courage. Until early manhood, no other education is to be received; but when this period of life is reached, physical training is to be discontinued, and instruction given in reading, writing, drawing, and music. After a three years' course in these subjects all mental education is in turn to cease, and a more vigorous training of the body to begin. The labour is to be severe, and a special diet is to be imposed. Aristotle does not carry his system further, but the imperfect sketch which he has given is sufficiently suggestive. Education is to be uniform, to begin from the earliest years, to be under State inspection in the first seven years of life, and afterwards conducted by the State. The training of the body is to precede that of the mind, and the two are not to come together. Abstract studies are to form no part of it until manhood is attained; and even elementary education, in the modern sense of the term, is to be deferred till about the age of sixteen.

Citizens thus educated are not to exceed a certain number. The number is not exactly stated, but Aristotle implies that the voice of the herald should be able to reach the whole. Five thousand is perhaps an approximation to the number he had in view. The population would, of course, be much larger, for to these must be added women, children and slaves. Every citizen was to be a soldier also, trained in the use of arms and military tactics; and the number of men, small according to Aristotle's view, who could be efficiently handled by a single general, was a

further consideration in determining the size of the political community.

Notwithstanding the great revolution in Greek political life which Philip of Macedon prepared, and Alexander accomplished, Aristotle is still fettered by the narrow and isolated conceptions of previous political speculation. The citizen was to him only a citizen in the full sense of the word when he could take a personal part, and exercise an individual influence in State deliberations. The same conception profoundly affected Roman political life; and in both Greece and Rome the only way by which a wider organisation, approaching to the national systems of modern times, could be brought about, was a military despotism. Representative government, the only method by which association on a large scale can be coupled with political freedom, was foreign to the thought of the Greek and Roman mind alike; and where circumstances rendered the isolated life of petty States impossible, the whole fabric of ancient polity was shattered.

Aristotle's conceptions were as narrow with regard to territory as to population. The ideal territory was such as was self-sufficient, capable of producing everything necessary for its inhabitants, and needing no assistance from its neighbours. Metaphysical theories and artistic feeling were, without doubt, factors in the formation of the idea. To stand in need of the products of other States was to be dependent, and therefore imperfect. But the ideal

State must have no touch of imperfection. It must be self-subsisting, unaffected by outward things, and independent of those accidents and complications which are beyond its sphere, and therefore beyond its control. But Aristotle is aware that such a territory is not often to be found. Imports will be required, and these must be paid for by the export of what is produced in excess at home. This constitutes one reason for choosing a situation near the sea. Aristotle does not hold with Plato and other political theorists, who regarded proximity to the sea as prejudicial to the best interests of the State. He thinks that law may be strong enough to check the disorders which arise amongst a crowd of strangers constantly coming and going; and access to the sea, apart from its commercial importance, is of advantage in time of war.

The best conceivable State, however, would neither contribute nor receive. The isolation which is so prominent in Aristotle's theory has a moral as well as a material application.[1] The State, like the individual, existed for itself. It had no message or mission to the world outside it. The intellectual or spiritual truth which it attained contributed to its own felicity, but did not necessarily overflow, to become the life and inspiration of another race. Those modern advocates of free trade, who preach a kind of commercial gospel, holding that the intercourse of

[1] Cf. Part I. p. 76.

nations, even though based upon mutual necessity, is the precursor of a world-wide amity, and of universal peace, hold the germ of an important principle. And when the idea shall be extended beyond natural wants, and nations shall aim at interests wider than their own, the element which is most wanting in these ancient theories will have been supplied.

In a State thus constituted the citizens of mature age will exercise supreme control. The land will be almost exclusively owned by them, and they will be the bulk of the military force of the State. Their slaves will cultivate the soil, and carry on all manual and necessary occupations. The age of thirty-seven is prescribed for marriage in the case of men, and eighteen in the case of women. The State not only prescribes the age for marriage, but sets a limit to the number of children in order to prevent over-population and poverty. Aristotle does not fail to consider colonisation, which corresponds roughly to modern emigration, as a means of providing for surplus population; but he does not assign so much importance to it as we might expect. In fact he regards over-population as an evil in itself, and colonisation a remedy for it. It is better therefore, in his view, to prevent than to cure. Although he protests against the exposure of children, he advocates preventive methods which are repugnant to the principles and sentiments of modern times. But the State control of such matters does not appear to him an insuperable difficulty. In modern political theories the problem

is considered as either outside the province of the statesman, or beyond his power to solve. But the time seems to be fast approaching when legislation must grapple with it, or leave it to the pitiless solution of natural laws. Aristotle was not content with living from hand to mouth, or trusting to contingencies. He went to the root of the matter at once; and although his measures cannot be adopted in detail, the principle is becoming almost paramount among social and political questions.

The position of women in the ideal State is lower than that which is assigned to men; yet it is not without dignity and usefulness. Until children reach the age of seven their education will be mainly conducted by their mothers. The wife is the companion and friend of her husband, not his slave. In household matters she will have her full share of authority; and although there is no explicit statement to this effect, the union of man and wife is by implication to last throughout life. Communism, whether it extends to the family, as with Plato, or to property alone, as in modern schemes, is rejected by Aristotle, and with emphasis. The household is regarded as a source of virtue and of a noble life; and care is taken to preserve its sanctity. Communism of the modern kind is regarded as a violation of a natural instinct, the love of property. Such a love is not in itself culpable; but it requires to be disciplined. Liberality, Aristotle holds, ought to be carried further than was the practice of his time. Wealth brought responsibility with it,

and the right way of treating the matter did not consist in the violation of an instinctive and blameless desire, but in its proper training and development.

The citizen, duly educated, provided with the means of life, and married, spent his maturity in political activity or philosophic inquiry. When his energies became impaired, some priestly office might afford suitable and sufficient occupation for his declining years.

Such is what appeared to Aristotle the ideal State and the ideal life. It was a life of many-sided culture and activity; fully occupied, but free from care and anxiety. The struggle for existence finds no place in it. The poor, as a class, do not exist. Wealth, though sufficient for all, is not an object in itself; but only the means for the attainment of an ideal perfection. The aristocracy is an aristocracy of worth, and its members justify their position by the practice of virtue and intelligent self-denial. As an ideal, it falls below the highest standard; but it rises far above ordinary conceptions and realisations. Yet the reason of the failure must be sought, not in the central idea which it expresses, but in the limit which it assigns to human expansion. It is still true that the highest life consists in the full development of human nature but humanity made perfect carries with it a new significance. The theory that it is the function of the State not merely to act in a negative way, by removing impediments, but positively to produce and develop all the highest qualities of human nature,

stands in striking contrast to the political conceptions of modern times. Under circumstances so different, it is not unnatural to regard it as a dream. The miniature state of the Greek world might be able to accomplish what is utterly beyond the power of the huge systems of modern times; yet there are problems and difficulties common to both, which may lead to a different conclusion. If the laws which govern society do not change with the size of the community, the high aims which animated Aristotle may give a new and invigorating impulse to the policy of States.

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